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ABSTRACT 
DEPICTING THE OTHER: QIZILBASH IMAGE IN THE 16
TH
 CENTURY 
OTTOMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Arslantaş, Yasin 
M.A., Department of History, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Akif Kireçci 
 
July 2013 
 
This study examines the early roots of the Ottoman perception of Qizilbash, both the 
Safavids, rising as a new power in Iran at the turn of the 16
th
 century, and their 
Turcoman collaborators in Anatolia. The previous literature showing the image of 
the Qizilbash in the eyes of Ottoman dynasty employed mostly archival sources, such 
as fatwa collections and mühimme registers. In contrast, by focusing on the 
historiographical narrations of the years of 1509–1514, the present study looks at the 
literary works of 16
th
 century chroniclers, particularly Selimnâme literature, and their 
role in building the Ottoman religio-political discourse on the Qizilbash with an 
attempt at showing their propagandist (or Selimist) nature. The present study argues 
that this discourse helped the dynasty to justify the act of war against them. After 
giving a brief background of the early Ottoman history with an emphasis on the 
shifting position of nomadic-tribal Turcomans, the study probes how a chosen 
sample of Ottoman histories from the 16
th
 century depicted the Qizilbash image and 
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how they identified the “self” through depiction of the “other.” This thesis argues 
that religio-political discourses created in the 16
th
 century led the Ottoman state to 
espouse a more Sunni-minded imperial ideology, and to identify the social and 
religious status of the Qizilbash.  
Keywords: Qizilbash, Safavid, Turcoman, Ottoman historiography, Chronicle, 
Selimnâme, Self, Other, Image, Identity Construction. 
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ÖZET 
ÖTEKİNİ TASVİR ETMEK: 16. YÜZYIL OSMANLI TARİHYAZIMINDA 
KIZILBAŞ İMAJI 
Arslantaş, Yasin 
Master, Tarih Bölümü, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent Üniversitesi 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Akif Kireçci 
 
Temmuz 2013 
 
Bu çalışma Osmanlı’nın 16. yüzyılın başında İran’da yeni bir güç olarak ortaya çıkan 
Safeviler ve onların Anadolu’daki Türkmen destekçileri hakkındaki algısının 
kökenlerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmada hem Safevileri, hem de 
Anadolulu Türkmenleri Kızılbaş olarak adlandırmak tercih edilmiştir. Osmanlı 
hanedanının gözündeki Kızılbaş imajı hakkında daha önceden yapılmış çalışmalar, 
genellikle fetvalar ve mühimme defterleri gibi arşiv kaynaklarını kullanmaktaydı. 
Aksine bu çalışma, 16. yüzyıl Osmanlı tarihçilerinin eserlerine, özellikle Selimnâme 
literatürüne bakmakta ve onların Kızılbaşlar hakkında oluşturulan dini ve siyasi 
söylemdeki rollerini incelemektedir. Bunu yaparken 1509–1514 yılları arasındaki 
olayların tarihçiler tarafından anlatımları esas alınmakta ve bu anlatımlar onların 
propagandacı doğaları göz önünde tutularak tartışılmaktadır. İleri sürülen 
noktalardan birisi, bu söylemlerin Kızılbaşlara karşı yapılmış ve yapılacak olan 
savaşların meşrulaştırılmasına yardım ettiğidir. Bu çalışma, öncelikle Türkmen 
göçebe aşiretlerin erken Osmanlı tarihi boyunca değişen pozisyonlarını incelemekte, 
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daha sonraysa 16. yüzyıl Osmanlı tarihyazımından seçilen bir örneklemi kullanarak 
Osmanlı yazarlarının Kızılbaşları nasıl öteki olarak resmettiklerini ve bu ötekiliği 
nasıl kendi öz kimliklerini tanımlamada kullandıklarını göstermektedir. Yine bu 
çalışma, 16. yüzyılda yaratılan bu dini-politik söylemlerin Kızılbaşların dini ve 
sosyal statülerinin tanımlanmasına ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun daha Sünni-odaklı 
bir ideolojiyi benimsemesine sebep olduğunu öne sürmektedir.  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kızılbaş, Safevi, Türkmen, Osmanlı Tarihyazımı, Kronik, 
Selimnâme, Benlik, Öteki, İmaj, Kimlik İnşası. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1.     Subject 
 
From the mid-15
th
 century to the end of 16
th
 century, bureaucratization or 
institutionalization of the Ottoman state occurred at the expense of its founding 
Turkish elements. As the Ottoman state evolved from a loose organization into a 
centrist empire, existing institutions were replaced with ones that were more 
complex. This process significantly worsened the position of the Turcomans, the 
nomadic, tribal Turkish population of Anatolia, who were descendants of the initial 
settlers. These warrior-settlers had played a prominent role during the foundation of 
the Ottoman principality, by providing military and moral support to the Ottoman 
rulers along the frontiers. In the course of time, however, the nomadic Turcomans 
were alienated from the social hierarchy and became discontented with the Ottoman 
centrist polity; accordingly, they were considered an obstacle to Ottoman 
centralization and bureaucratic development. The centralist policies aimed to make 
the nomads tax-payers tied to a village, town or city. Turcoman alienation may be 
attributed to two factors: their insistence on continuing their nomadic lifestyle despite 
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the pressure of Ottoman settlement policies, and the gradual incorporation of Sunni 
Islam into the Ottoman bureaucratic apparatus as a so-called state religion. A 
majority of the Turcoman population had remained followers of non-orthodox beliefs 
during this religious consolidation. In general, the Ottoman central authority 
remained tolerant, or even indifferent, to the heterodox religious beliefs and practices 
of Turcoman population. As long as these variant belief systems were not practiced 
or promulgated publicly, they were not considered a direct challenge to the political 
and religious authority of the Ottoman dynasty.
1
 Thus, the problem between the state 
and the nomadic heterodox Turcomans in the 15
th
 and 16
th
 century was less about 
heretical religious beliefs in an Ottoman Empire where Sunni Islam constituted the 
orthodoxy, than it was about socio-economic discontent, at least in the beginning.  
The Sunni character of the Ottomans had existed since the foundation of the 
state. However, it became more apparent in the 16
th
 century, when Ottoman authority 
began to be challenged both by Turcoman rebels in Anatolia and by the increasingly 
powerful, Shi’a Islam-practicing, Safavid dynasty of Iran (1501–1736). Similar 
interests of the Ottoman and Safavid states fostered the regional, political, as well as 
economic competition. The declaration by the founder of the Safavid dynasty, Shah 
Ismail (r. 1501-1524), that Shi’a Islam would be the state religion changed the 
magnitude of the Safavid-Ottoman rivalry, turning it toward conflict. Support for 
Ismail among the heterodox Turcomans of Anatolia intensified the religious 
dimension of the competition.
2
 This support, which was mainly but not exclusively 
faith-based, is not surprising: Shah Ismail was not only a political leader, as a 
                                                             
1
 Elke Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16. Jahrundert nach arabischen 
Handschriften (Freiburg: Schwarz 1970), p. 151.  
2
 I need to make it clear that there were also Sunni nomadic Turcomans in the Ottoman Empire. 
However, it is still possible to say that those who collobarated with the Safavids were followers of 
Anatolian heterodox Islam, which will be discussed in the subsequent chapters in detail.  
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religious leader, he had great influence on the Turcoman subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire. His popularity had an ancestral origin, as his father and grandfather were 
also influential spiritual figures among the Turkish population.  
Before examining the ideological side of the rivalry, I shall explain the 
meaning of the term Qizilbash appearing in the title of this study, and my 
interpretation of it. Qizilbash, literally means “red head” in Turkish—a reference to 
the red headdress worn in battle. Ottomans began to use Qizilbash to designate the 
Turkish population based in Anatolia in the late 15
th
 century, and that is its most 
common definition. However, my research into 16
th
 century Ottoman narratives 
showed that the term was also applied to the Safavids of Iran, a group allied with the 
heterodox Turcomans.
3
 After all, these Turks founded the Safavid state.
4
 As a result 
of the Ottoman-Safavid conflict, Turcomans migrated to Iran where they tended to 
serve as the main source of labor for the Safavid army during the first century of the 
Safavid state. There was no strict differentiation between the Safavid and Turkish 
identity in Safavid Iran until the late 16
th
 century when the Qizilbash was declined in 
Iran to a noticeable extent. Moreover, by calling them “Qizilbash,” I differentiate 
heterodox Turcomans of Anatolia from those any other nomadic and tribal groups 
who did not participate in rebellious activities against the Ottoman authority.  
The Ottoman-Qizilbash political and religious conflict created also an 
ideological rivalry between the both. Many Ottoman scholars at that time attempted 
to justify political and military acts of the Ottoman dynasty through the anti-
Qizilbash polemical literature. This literature included risalas (booklets on certain 
issues written by religious scholars) and fatwas (legal judgment on or learned 
                                                             
3
 İlyas Üzüm, “Kızılbaş,” DİA, XXV, p. 546. 
4
 Faruk Sümer, Safevi Devleti’nin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü: Şah İsmail ile 
Halefleri ve Türkleri (Ankara: Selçuklu Tarih ve Medeniyeti Enstitüsü, 1976).  
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interpretation of issues pertaining to Islamic law). These sources have been 
acknowledged and examined by modern historians with little attempt at determining 
the ideological positions of the Ottomans and the Qizilbash.  
This study investigates the repercussions of the Qizilbash image in 16
th
 
century Ottoman historiography. The focus is on events which occurred as 
background to a struggle for the Ottoman throne that took place between 1509 and 
1513 between the sons of Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512) and Selim I (r. 1512–1520), 
ultimately the victor of this struggle. Specifically, I examine the ways in which 16
th
 
century Ottoman well-educated bureaucrat-historians imagined and represented the 
Qizilbash as heretical, sacrilegious, ignorant, atrocious, licentious, and rebellious. 
The four-year period under study offers considerable insight into the Qizilbash issue 
and the Ottoman polemical reactions to it. Narrative mentions of the Qizilbash were 
always derogatory.
5
 In their narratives, the historians discussed why the Qizilbash 
had to be regarded as the most dangerous contemporary enemy of religion and state 
(din ü devlet). Although the Ottoman-Qizilbash conflict had been primarily a 
political one since its early days, humiliation and criticism of religious beliefs of the 
Qizilbash were at the core of the 16
th
 century Ottoman historiography. The 
bureaucrat-historians of the Ottoman Empire deemed themselves, as the followers of 
the “True Path” of the religion of Islam, excluding the Qizilbash as heretics or as 
“those out of the circle,” (a term used by Ahmet Yaşar Ocak).6 The enmity towards 
the Qizilbash as “other” has also drawn the boundaries of the “self.” I suggest that 
anti-Qizilbash religio-political discourse was created by Ottoman historians as an 
ideological response to the Qizilbash challenge, which had religious and political 
                                                             
5
 Colin Imber, “The Ottoman Dynastic Myth,” Turcica, XIX, 1987.  
6
 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler: 15–17. Yüzyıllar (İstanbul: Tarih 
Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2013).  
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dimensions. I also argue that these depictions helped the Ottoman dynasty to justify 
the act of war against a newly emerging religio-political threat.
7
 With these works, I 
contend, Ottoman official discourse on the Qizilbash became more visible and more 
clearly outlined. 
The anti-Qizilbash works can be categorized as “literary propaganda,” a type 
of discourse used to legitimize political authority since the early periods of Ottoman 
quest for self-identification.
8
 The claims of legitimacy in the early Ottoman period 
were derived from popular/literary epics or vernacular Islam. However, the 
consolidation of Sunni dominance over the Ottoman religious and political discourse 
in the 16
th
 century, led to new claims derived from learned historiography and from 
the orthodox Islam of the ulemâ (religious learned class).9 It is important to note that 
legitimacy claims were not derived from a single source, but rather from a set of 
myths and legends, each of which appeared at a different time to answer a certain 
political need.
10
 The Qizilbash/Safavid challenge was a typical example of such 
needs. 
Prior to discussing the primary and secondary literature, it will be useful to 
examine certain concepts, such as identity, legitimacy and justification that will be 
important to the present study. For historians, studying collective identity has always 
been an important means to better understand the deeds of people in history. 
                                                             
7
 Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 
69. 
8
 Hakan Karateke, “Legitimizing the Ottoman Sultanate: A Framework for Historical Analysis” in 
Legitimizing the Order: the Ottoman Rhetorics of State Power, ed. Hakan Karateke and Maurus 
Reinkowski (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2005), p. 15. According to Bernard Lewis, legitimacy means that 
the ruler was qualified and entitled to the office which he held, and that he had acceded to it by lawful 
means. He also states that the definition of legitimacy changed over the course of medieval centuries. 
As long as the ruler had the necessary armed strength and was a Muslim, these were enough for him to 
be legitimate. Bernard Lewis, The Political Language of Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1991), p. 99.  
9
 Colin Imber, “Dynastic Myth.” 
10
 Colin Imber, “Ideals and Legitimation in Early Ottoman History,” in Süleyman the Magnificent and 
His Age, ed. Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead (London-New York: Longman, 1995), p. 138. 
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Although it is difficult to provide a single definition of the concept of collective 
identity, perhaps it is best defined as a group affiliation differentiating one culture 
from the other.
11
 That is, this differentiation is usually implemented through creating 
and defining the "Other.” The image of the Other, i.e. as an enemy or a rival, enables 
a culture to draw the boundaries of its self-image and differentiate it from the “other” 
which is defined. That is, attempting to define the “other” is a method of defining the 
“self.” As Edward Said explained, for example, imagining the Orient was a way for 
people in the West to define their society:  
Many terms were used to express the relation: Balfour and Cromer, typically 
used several. The Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, “different”; 
thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, “normal.”12 
 
Likewise, Orientalists not only tried to understand the Oriental culture, but also to 
crystalize their own identity by benefiting from the contrast between the Orientals 
and the Westerners. 
Identity construction may be seen as an attempt at “legitimization” when it 
acts as a form of propaganda in the hands of power groups. As Claessen stated, 
power can be obtained in four ways: by force, by threat, by manipulation, or by 
legitimacy. For him, legitimacy is the right to govern of the just and fair political 
authority.
13
 A definition of political legitimacy might be when subjects’ believe in 
the rightfulness of the ruler or the state and, more specifically, in their authority to 
issue commands.
14
 In this conceptualization, being legitimate does not presuppose 
                                                             
11
 Stephanie Lawler, Identity: Sociological Perspectives (Cambridge-Malden: Polity Press, 2008), p. 
2.  
12
 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), p. 40.  
13
 Henri J. M. Claessen, “Changing Legitimacy” in State Formation and Political Legitimacy, ed. 
Ronald Cohen and Judith D. Toland (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1988), p. 23.  
14
 Hakan Karateke, “Legitimizing the Ottoman Sultanate,” p. 15.  
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being just and fair; rather, it is about convincing the ruled subjects that the people 
and offices vested with political authority are just and fair. In other words, legitimacy 
exists if the subjects believe wholeheartedly that they should obey the commands and 
heed the words of their rulers. If obedience is procured through force or for the self-
interest of a certain group, there is certainly no legitimacy there.
15
  
Political authorities often build their claims to the legitimacy of their rule, 
meanwhile defining the self and the other. In politically-traditional authorities, 
arguably the best way to disseminate such claims was through literary propaganda. 
Works might be commissioned to legitimize the rule of the authority and to prove the 
correctness of the rulers’ actions. Commissioned literary propaganda attempted to 
glorify the self-image of the society, especially through glorification of the ruler’s 
image, while simultaneously alienating and humiliating the other. This deliberate 
“othering” through literary propaganda included hostile characterization of either 
external rivals and enemies, or of internal opposition to the current regime. The 
“other” represented the exact opposite of the self-identity they attempted to 
construct.  
Yet the two similar concepts that are often intertwined, legitimacy and 
justification, should be employed carefully. Although recent scholars tend to make 
no distinction between them, throughout this study legitimacy refers to the broad 
claims of the state, legitimizing its right to rule, whereas justification refers to their 
claims specifically aimed at justifying their actions.
16
 In fact, there is a connection 
                                                             
15
 Ibid, p. 16.  
16
 A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 755. 
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between these conceptualizations. Justifications may be considered a subset of 
legitimacies.  
 
1.2.  Primary Literature and Method 
 
This study focuses on a special genre of literary propaganda, the Selimnâmes. 
These works, devoted to the reign of Selim I (1512–1520), began to be written in the 
last years of Selim’s reign and reached a peak during the reign of Süleyman (1520–
1566). However, the primary sources used are not limited to Selimnâme literature: I 
include a variety of works that were important for various reasons. All of the primary 
sources used aimed to achieve cultural, political, as well as religious legitimacy for 
the Ottoman dynasty, however.
17
 I believe that they contributed a great deal to the 
othering of the Qizilbash, by addressing the Qizilbash issue, arguably one of the most 
significant problems of the 16
th
 century. As mentioned previously, 16
th
 century 
Ottoman historians conjured not only the identity of their enemy but also the religio-
political identity of the Ottoman Empire through their depiction of the Qizilbash. In 
this regard, the Ottoman historiography of the 16
th
 century may be considered a 
justificatory tool in the hands of the Ottoman dynasty. By Ottoman identity, I mean 
the imperial ideology that crystallized in the 16
th
 century and which included 
espousal of Sunnism as theological and practical orthodoxy, as a parallel.  
It would be useful to give a brief analysis of the rise of Ottoman 
historiography with an attempt to analyze its evolution from the 15
th
 to the 16
th
 
                                                             
17
 Cornell H. Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire: The Historian Mustafa 
Ali (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 241.  
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century. The beginning of Ottoman chronicle-writing dates to the first half of the 15
th
 
century. However, there are sharp differences between the narratives written during 
the reign of Bayezid II (1481–1512) and those of earlier historians. Victor L. 
Menage, who examined the nature of early Ottoman historiography, argues that 15
th
 
century historians wrote either to express their piety or simply to entertain 
themselves and the readers.
18
 It is interesting to note that the pre-Bayezid Ottoman 
historians, Şükrullah and Enverî gave only a marginal place to the Ottoman dynasty 
in their Islamic histories, and presented the Ottoman sultans as merely holy warriors, 
fighting in the frontiers of the Muslim world. In contrast, 16
th
 century Ottoman 
historiography possessed a more powerful political and religious discourse. The latter 
focused on the legitimacy of the Ottoman rule and the formation of a legendary 
image for the sultan. For example, the chroniclers in Bayezid II’s time introduced 
him as Eşrefu-s Selâtin (the most excellent and glorious of all Muslim rulers, with 
the exceptions of Prophet Muhammad and the four initial caliphs) and Sofu Sultan 
(pious sultan).
19
 
As implied above, the historiographical activity increased significantly in the 
reign of Bayezid II. This increase can be explained by following reasons. First, 
Bayezid gained his power in reaction to the centralist and expansionist policies of his 
father, Mehmed II (r. 1444–1446 and 1451–1481), i.e. vowing to overturn these 
policies, while Bayezid’s brother Cem (d. 1495) was viewed as the continuation of 
his father’s regime. The historical works used as a propaganda tool for Bayezid’s 
style of rule critiqued those styles of Mehmed the Conqueror, and his viziers. 
                                                             
18
 Victor L. Menage, “Osmanlı Tarihyazıcılığının İlk Dönemleri,” in Söğüt’ten İstanbul’a, ed. Oktay 
Özel and Mehmet Öz (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2000), p. 82. 
19
 Halil İnalcık, “The Rise of Ottoman Historiography,” in Historians of the Middle East, ed. Bernard 
Lewis and P. M. Holt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 164.  
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Second, as a result of the increase in territories and political aspirations of the 
dynasty, Ottoman sultans increasingly became aware that they were governing a 
large Muslim Empire. Thus, they aimed to use these dynastic histories to display 
their superiority over the other Muslim powers of the time, i.e. Safavids and 
Mamluks.
20
 Accordingly, Bayezid found the chronicles penned under previous 
sultans to inadequately reflect the prestige of the Ottoman dynasty. In response, he 
ordered two respected scholars of his time, İdris-i Bitlîsî and Kemalpaşazâde, to 
write a history of the Ottoman dynasty in the Persian and Turkish languages 
respectively.
21
 Menage regards these works as a turning point in Ottoman 
historiography: 
The first (Bitlîsî’s Heşt Bihişt) demonstrated that Ottoman history could be 
recorded in Persian as elegantly and grandiloquently as the history of other 
dynasties had been, the second (Kemalpaşazâde’s Tevarih-i Ali Osman) 
showed that the Turkish language was now an adequate vehicle for the same 
rhetorical devices.
22
  
 
The Selimnâme corpus which unlike other chronicles of their time, maintains a 
distinctive and important emphasis on the reign of Selim I. They were panegyric 
accounts of Selim’s life and military exploits.23 The initial examples were started in 
the final years of Selim’s reign (1512–1520) and became popular during the reign of 
his son, Süleyman I (1520–1566). Selim was the first Ottoman sultan, to whom a 
special sub-genre was devoted. In the 20
th
 century, this attracted the interest of 
several historians. Ahmet Ateş initially distinguished these works as a separate 
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corpus of narratives.
24
 Agah Sırrı Levend approached the grouping as part of 
gâzavâtnâme literature (chronicles of raids), because they focused on the military 
activities of Selim.
25
 Erdem Çıpa states that with some exceptions that were written 
before Süleyman II (i.e. the works of İshak Çelebi, İdris-i Bitlîsî and possibly Edâ’i), 
Selimnâmes should be seen as a systematic project of early modern Ottoman 
revisionist historiography commissioned by Süleyman to clear his father’s name 
from his “unlawful” deeds and, indirectly, to establish his own legitimacy.26 In a 
similar way, Rıza Yıldırım suggests that it is better to consider Selimnâme authors as 
ideology-makers rather than historians.
27
 To add these comments, I must also 
emphasize that the Selimnâme corpus should be considered as a continuation of the 
tradition of legendary-historical or epic literature, beginning with Ahmedî’s 
İskendernâme (“Epic of Alexander the Great,” 1390, 1405). It seems that the 
tradition of epic literature, based on this earliest example written by Ahmedî, 
continued after the 14
th
 century. Thus, it is not surprising that Selimnâme writers 
usually liken Selim to Alexander the Great in their epics of Selim. 
Related to their role in legitimizing the deeds of Selim and shaping him into a 
legendary figure, Selimnâmes enabled the construction of an official Ottoman 
discourse on the Qizilbash. Selim used the alleged urgency of the Qizilbash threat to 
present himself as the champion of gazâ and Sunni Islam by highlighting his fights 
against both the Christian “infidelity” and “heretical” Shi’ism vanguarded by the 
Qizilbash so that his ascension to the throne could be justified. In order to prove his 
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military prowess, Selim conducted raids against the Georgians and the Qizilbash 
during his governorship in Trabzon in north-eastern Anatolia. Selimnâme literature, 
which takes a pro-Selim stand, indicates that Selim and pro-Selim factions, including 
Janissaries and Ottoman governors in the Balkans, developed and employed a 
strategy during the dynastic struggle brought about by the Qizilbash hostility.
28
 Selim 
deemed himself as the only prince equipped with necessary skills to deal with this 
serious threat. He thought that the Qizilbash posed alarming threats to the 
foundations of the Ottoman state, and to Sunni Islam, because they supported 
religious and political propaganda within the Ottoman borders.  
To return our discussion on the Ottoman historiography, we can generally say 
that 16
th
 century Ottoman historiography possessed a eulogistic way of expression.
29
 
These histories were based on praise for the political system and the sultan, and 
efforts to establish him as a legendary figure. Mustafa Âli was an exception to this 
practice; however, as will be explained below, his writings were probably influenced 
by his personal disappointments during his bureaucratic career. Obviously, in their 
use of eulogistic expressions, Ottoman bureaucrat-historians hoped to win the favor 
of the Ottoman dynasty. Although the royal patronage was not as strong as it would 
be after the late 16
th
 century, when the state itself appointed official historians called 
Şehnamecis who have written historical works in Persian language, historians already 
adopted a pro-dynastic attitude in their works.
30
  
The extent to which the authenticity of these works was limited by their 
authors’ political motives is a matter of debate. One who criticizes the limits of their 
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authenticity should consider two points to understand why Ottoman historians used 
anti-Qizilbash discourse, and what they wanted to explain with it. First, while it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to suggest that all historians were explicitly ordered and 
commissioned by the sultan himself, most of the texts were the products of the 
Ottoman kul (servant) system, which compelled authors to be extremely respectful of 
the state and the sultan.
31
 For these historians, the main purpose of writing history 
was to exalt and glorify the state and the sultan.  
In addition, Ottoman historians worked in a cultural environment where they 
were influenced by each other’s ideas and works. Hopes or expectations of financial 
gain and greater bureaucratic status led almost all historians to present works to their 
patrons, who were mostly prominent statesmen. This patron-client relationship was 
one of the factors that prevented their authenticity. Accordingly, it is no coincidence 
that Mustafa Ali, a 16
th
 century Ottoman historian, made the harshest critiques of the 
regime in his time. He had spent a career full of disappointments and many times had 
to deal with the lack of patronage. Moreover, it should be noted that some historians, 
such as Kemalpaşazâde and Celalzâde, were themselves at the highest ranks of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy, thus, did not need any patronage.  
The manner of expression adopted by the chroniclers when mentioning the 
Qizilbash problem—the most alarming problem of the state—that the Qizilbash 
influenced Ottoman state ideology by creating a contrast with the alienated Qizilbash 
image. The Ottomans who, particularly after Selim I’s 1517 capture of Arab 
provinces, regarded themselves as the sole protector of orthodox Sunni Islam must 
have fought against the Qizilbash “heresy” just as they fought non-Muslims. As 
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stated earlier, the fundamental conflict between the Ottoman state and the Qizilbash 
was not religious. But religion, as a justification for the anti-Qizilbash stand, had 
tremendous repercussions on the military personnel as well as the ruled subjects in 
the long run. As Marcus Dressler states, religious contention was a result of the 
conflict, rather than its cause.
32
 
Undoubtedly, Ottoman historians writing after the 16
th
 century have 
continued to mention the Qizilbash issue, if only occasionally. Nonetheless, the 
present study is limited to the 16
th
 century texts, for three reasons. First, the 
eulogistic historiographical tradition of the 16
th
 century was replaced by a more 
authentic one in the 17
th
 century. This transformation becomes clear in Rhoads 
Murphey’s words: 
Once the Ottoman imperial ethos was firmly established–history ceased to be a 
vehicle for the sole use of and manipulation by the monarch. 17
th
 century 
historians in the Ottoman Empire became increasingly inclined to record 
popular as well as regal sentiments as they reflected on contemporary 
developments and events of the recent past.
33
 
 
In other words, over the course of time, the legitimizing role of Ottoman historians 
became less prominent. Second, and building on first point, perceptions of the 
Qizilbash held by 17
th
 century historians were greatly influenced by the writings of 
their predecessors. Lastly, the Qizilbash challenge gradually ceased to be a serious 
one for the Ottomans as a result of their persecutions, their subsuming into more 
mainstream Bektashi sect to refrain from the prosecutions, and their voluntary 
migrations to Safavid Iran. For these reasons, I believe that anti-Qizilbash discourse 
can be examined through the 16
th
 century texts alone, rather than calling on work 
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from later periods, when the problems between the state and the Qizilbash were less 
frequently observed.  
Nearly twenty-four examples of Selimnâme genre are recorded. The present 
study will focus on six pieces written (respectively) by İdris-i Bitlîsî (d. 1520– 
written in the reign of Selim); Kemalpaşazâde (d. 1536 –Süleyman); Celalzâde (d. 
1567 –Süleyman); Edâ’i (d. 1521 -Selim); Şükrî-i Bitlîsî (d. after 1530 -Süleyman) 
and Hoca Sâdeddin (d. 1599 –Selim II). This study uses three non-Selimnâme works 
as well: Haydar Çelebi’s Rûznâme (written in 1514 –Selim), Kemalpaşazâde’s Book 
VIII (Süleyman) and Lütfi Paşa’s (d. 1564 –Süleyman) Tevârih-i ‘Al’i Osman. The 
limitation is based not only the need to choose a sampling of works in order to make 
the study feasible, but also on the fact that not all Selimnâmes are original in content 
and style. Of the entire corpus, some relied heavily on the accounts of their 
predecessors while some are almost shadow copies or translations of earlier 
accounts.
34
 For example, Sâdi’s Selimnâme is the same as Kemalpaşazâde’s and 
Celalzâde’s accounts in many respects.35 
Apart from the chronicles, I also use fatwa collections in order to support my 
arguments. These fatwas were those written by a certain mufti called Hamza, well-
known Şeyhülislam (the highest position among the ulemâ) of Süleyman the 
Magnificent (r. 1520–1566), Ebussuud (d. 1574), and Kemalpaşazâde who also 
served as Şeyhülislam to Süleyman from 1526 to 1534.  
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The importance of these texts lies in the critical positions of their authors 
within the Ottoman system, or in the crucial roles they played during the Qizilbash 
issue. Celalzâde, Kemalpaşazâde and Lütfi Paşa were important statesmen, 
determining the Ottoman religio-political discourses in the 16
th
 century. İdris-i 
Bitlîsî, Haydar Çelebi, Şükri-i Bitlîsî and Edâ’i played prominent roles on the 
Qizilbash issue during the 1510’s. Sâdeddin’s later account cannot be categorized in 
any of these groups. However, as İdris-i Bitlîsî had, Sâdeddin reported the Qizilbash 
issue and the reign of Selim from an ideological point of view, which makes his 
writing important for the scope of this study. He wrote his work based on what he 
heard from his grandfather, Isfahanlı Hafız Mehmed who participated in the battle of 
Çaldıran in person. It is also noteworthy that Edâ’i, Şükrî-i Bitlîsî and İdris-i Bitlîsî 
were Iranian refugees and did not receive their education in the Ottoman territories. 
However, as they wrote their works under the Ottoman patronage, I argue that their 
narratives are accurate reflections of the general intellectual discourse of the period 
in question. 
I use critical and comparative perspectives to analyze the chosen texts. Each 
author’s attitude towards the Qizilbash is evaluated, where applicable, by considering 
biography, government position or positions held, and personal relations as found 
within or out of the texts. I investigate possible historical influences on their works 
by probing the exact or approximate dates they were written. In doing this, I attempt 
to uncover the authors’ adherences to and links with the official state ideology and 
examine whether these historians wrote independently from this ideology.  
It is crucial to note that the present study does not attempt to deal with what 
actually happened or what it may have meant to be the Qizilbash. Rather, it is about 
how Ottoman bureaucrat-historians, trained in a certain intellectual and cultural 
17 
 
environment, perceived the Qizilbash and interpreted what happened through their 
self-identity and self-interests. For this reason, literary works are the primary sources 
of this study rather than administrative documents of the Ottoman Empire. It is not 
state documents, found in the archives, which create discourses; it is the books that 
are often employed as a vehicle for disseminating imperial discourses.  
It is important to answer an important question here. Who were the audience of 
these literary works? It is difficult to determine properly to what extent these works 
were read in 16
th
 century Ottoman realms, and thus the magnitude of their 
propagandist effect. I should first emphasize that these texts were mostly circulated 
among a class of elites, first the sultan himself and his entourage. So the readers were 
confined to a small group of the educated. Then why take such care with the 
production of these works if they were not intended widely read and to have 
influence? The answer is that the circulation of the books should not be considered 
the sole source of transmission: In the Ottoman Empire, knowledge was also 
circulated orally or through fermans (edicts) of the Sultan read in the provinces and 
where the Ottoman official ideology was reflected. I suggest that the official 
ideology was created by these scholars and spread through imperial edicts and fatwas 
to the masses.   
 
1.3.     Survey of Literature 
 
Although modern historiography has been interested in the Ottoman-Safavid 
conflict to a significant extent, there are still a limited number of studies that address 
the Qizilbash dimension of this conflict. The list of relevant scholarly works begins 
18 
 
with Ahmet Refik Altınay’s book on the Rafızism and Bektashism in the 16th 
century.
36
 In his book, Altınay compiled the documents and reports concerning the 
Qizilbash from mühimme registers maintained between the mid-16th and 17th 
centuries. These documents, when examined in a chronological order, reveal the 
decisions of the state on certain events and people. Altınay’s book was later 
supplemented, by Hanna Sohrweide. In an article about the Qizilbash sect, 
Sohrweide cited certain archival documents published by Ahmet Refik.
37
 However, 
although this article was the first detailed study of the Qizilbash, it did not take into 
consideration the Selimnâme literature.38 Colin Imber also described the persecution 
of the Qizilbash, but based on mühimme registers that were not published by Ahmet 
Refik.
39
 Following the same tradition, Saim Savaş recently published a book, which 
focuses on the Ottoman policies towards the Qizilbash.
40
 However, these works were 
more or less limited to the collections of primary sources rather than expressing 
detailed points of view concerning the Ottoman discourse on the Qizilbash. 
Although authors of the current literature tend to assume that the emergence 
of the Qizilbash threat consolidated the political and religious identity of the 
Ottoman Empire, this assumption has yet to be supported with a careful examination 
of Ottoman chronicles, especially the Selimnâme literature. Mühimme records and 
fatwas of religious scholars have already been studied, to a certain extent. However, 
the important role of historiography in the definition of Ottoman imperial religio-
political doctrines, using the Ottoman-Qizilbash conflict, seems to have been 
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ignored. Nevertheless, a few studies are worth mentioning. Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, a 
leading historian of heterodox movements in the Muslim world, has alluded to the 
Ottoman official ideology of the Ottoman Empire on the heretic movements.
41
 His 
description of this ideology will be discussed in the following chapter. Elke Eberhard 
was the first scholar to investigate anti-Safavid polemical literature and fatwas given 
by 16
th
 century Ottoman theologians; her work emphasizes their justificatory role on 
the war against the Qizilbash, particularly accusations of heresy and infidelity against 
the Qizilbash.
42
 İsmail S. Üstün’s study also focused on the ideological alienation of 
the Qizilbash.
43
 He studied the “orthodox” counter propaganda of the Ottoman 
ulemâ. Relying on fatwas, risalas, and letters issued by a certain Hamza44, 
Kemalpaşazâde (d. 1536) and Ebussuud (d. 1574), Üstün argues that, during the 16th 
century, there was a marked shift towards establishing the legitimacy of the Ottoman 
rule via canonical Islamic sources.
45
 Even though Üstün's study presents a broad 
picture of the Ottoman official discourse on the Qizilbash, its focus is neither the 
chronicles themselves nor the Selimnâmes. Rıza Yıldırım was another scholar who 
studied the alienation of the Qizilbash from the Ottoman society: In his path-
breaking study of the origins of the Qizilbash identity during the Ottoman-Safavid 
conflict, he elaborates on the ways that an intensifying imperial regime in the 
Ottoman state alienated the Qizilbash.
46
 However, Yıldırım concentrates on socio-
economic alienation and historical incidents rather than the Qizilbash image in the 
Ottoman historiography, which at the same time helped the consolidation of Ottoman 
                                                             
41
 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Zındıklar ve Mülhidler, pp. 81–122.  
42
 Elke Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik. 
43
 İsmail Safa Üstün, Heresy and Legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth Century (The 
University of Manchester: PhD dissertation, 1991).  
44
 Although there is no agreement among modern scholars about the identification of Hamza, what is 
important here is that a certain mufti called Hamza issued the fatwa that justified the battle of Çaldıran 
in 1514.  
45
 İsmail Safa Üstün, Heresy and Legitimacy, p. 6.  
46
 Rıza Yıldırım, Turkomans. 
20 
 
self-identity. The first researcher to call attention to the role of historiography in the 
definition of the Ottoman religio-political discourse on the Qizilbash was İ. Kaya 
Şahin with his study on the career of Celalzâde as an Ottoman intellectual, 
bureaucrat and historian.
47
  
 As the present study also considers the notion of political legitimacy, a unique 
general study, edited by Hakan Kareteke and Maurus Reinkowski, must be 
unmentioned.
48
 It examines the reflections of political legitimacy in the Ottoman 
world. Together, the essays create a seminal study that enabled me to comprehend 
and interpret the methods employed by the Ottoman state to justify its political and 
military actions. In one article, Christine Woodhead showed how Murad III (r. 1574–
1595) attempted to counter criticisms and opposition to his ruling style through 
Şehnâmeci historians of his reign.49 Markus Dressler’s article is also of particular 
importance.
50
 Similar to my arguments, Dressler asserts that Ottomans and Safavids 
constructed their religious ideologies, imperial identities and legitimacies through 
their conflict and enmity. He emphasizes that Ottomans and Safavids, as well as the 
Qizilbash, had overlapping worldviews, self-images and terminologies that benefited 
their political aspirations.
51
 
After analyzing the modern literature on the Qizilbash, I realized there was 
little research that examined the historiographical works to understand the Qizilbash 
image in the eyes of the Ottoman historians. If we know that the historians reflected 
the ideology of the central authority, modern historians seem to have neglected how 
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the Qizilbash image was perceived by the justifying perspective of Ottoman 
bureaucrat-historians. The mechanisms of the Other, through which the Ottoman 
historians glorified and polished the Sunni character of the state in the 16
th
 century 
are also a mystery. Mühimme registers and fatwas undoubtedly indicate ways the 
central authority justified the anti-Qizilbash acts. However, these documents alone 
are not enough to evaluate the Qizilbash image within the general context of political 
events. In contrast, the histories are more useful to grasp the image within the cause 
and effect relationship established by their authors. For these reasons, my research is 
based on a sample of narratives chosen deliberately from the 16
th
 century Ottoman 
historical corpus. By investigating texts that show the Ottoman side of the Ottoman-
Qizilbash ideological rivalry, I believe that my research will contribute to a better 
understanding of the Ottoman perception of the Qizilbash in the 16
th
 century.  
In the first chapter, I re-consider the increasing tension between the Ottomans 
and the Turcoman population. I present a concise history of the socio-economic 
aspects of Qizilbash alienation within the context of the Ottoman transformation 
from a tribal organization into a bureaucratic empire. Moreover, in relation to the 
Ottoman Empire, I analyze the rise of the Safavid dynasty in Iran. I present the 
Ottoman-Safavid conflict as a process of simultaneous identity construction, in 
which both parties used the power of religious and political justification.  
The second chapter is focused on the political use of the Qizilbash image, as 
depicted by the Ottoman historians as they narrate events of the struggle for the 
Ottoman throne, and the reign of Selim I until the aftermath of the battle of Çaldıran 
(when Selim eliminated the Qizilbash problem to a significant extent). I argue that 
the Qizilbash issue played an important role on the internal politics of the Ottoman 
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Empire, and the Qizilbash as portrayed by Ottoman historians explained the 
necessity of Selim’s ascension to power.  
In the third chapter, I examine the Qizilbash image in the 16
th
 century 
Ottoman historiography from social, cultural and religious perspectives with the help 
of some theological and legal discussions. In this chapter, I suggest that Ottoman 
historians drew a picture of the Qizilbash to justify the Qizilbash persecutions that 
continued through the 16
th
 century and, through this, consolidated the political and 
religious position of the Ottoman Empire. Also in this chapter, I analyze the contrasts 
developed by the authors to describe the self and the other through Selim’s 
occupation of Tabriz and the Battle of Çaldıran.  
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CHAPTER II 
  
 
TENSION BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN STATE AND 
TURCOMANS 
 
 
 
2.1.     A Glimpse into the Ottoman Bureaucratic Transformation 
 
Khoury and Kostiner argue that tribal peoples played an important role in the 
establishment of Islamic states such as Umayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid, Seljuk, 
Ottoman, Safavid and Qajar. The initial structure of each of these states was a tribal 
confederation led by tribal military leaders.
52
 The warlike character of the tribal 
peoples contributed a great deal to the foundation of these states. Scholars have noted 
that this warlike character developed both to survive in unprotected outlying areas 
(those not surrounded by the walls as in cities), and also to search for the booty and 
pasturelands on which their nomadic economy was traditionally based.
53
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However, as these states required more complex institutions and experienced 
administrative transformations, tribal structures lost their significance, and they were 
gradually pushed out of the system, opposing all the values and legalities of the new 
states. This transformation may be observed in Ottoman history as well. The 
Ottoman state was established by tribal-nomadic Turcoman holy warriors (gazîs) and 
had a loose organization in the beginning. Over time, it evolved into a bureaucratic 
state. As a result of territorial expansion and population growth, the necessity for 
efficient political administration that the tribal structures could not supply became 
inevitable.  
In other words, territorial expansion made the Ottoman transformation from a 
weak into an institutionalized structure inevitable. The increasing quantity of 
territories not only complicated the governance but also brought about some new 
identities. Below is a short summary of the Ottoman expansion from Mehmed I (r. 
1413–1421) to Süleyman I (1520–1566). Ottoman sultans expanded the territories 
more or less steadily from Mehmed I’s reestablishment of the political unity of 
Anatolia in 1413 to the siege of Vienna in 1683. By the mid-15
th
 century, the 
Ottoman state was no longer a frontier principality that could be governed by weak 
institutional structure and army; rather a need for very efficient and well-organized 
institutions emerged.
 
This need to institutionalize the governmental structure became 
more urgent after Mehmed II conquered the city of Constantinople, the capital of the 
Byzantine Empire, in 1453. Mehmed II pursued various centrist policies to keep 
peripheral elements under control and reinforce the political and economic power of 
the central authority.
54
 He also passed a kanun-nâme (law code) that created 
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impersonal bureaucratic procedures.
55
 This law code became the core and basis of 
the subsequent Ottoman laws to the 17
th
 century.
56
 Although the conquest of Istanbul 
brought about an imperial vision to the Ottomans, it is still not possible to say that 
during this period the dominant identity in the state was Muslim.
57
 Mehmed II’s son 
and successor, Bayezid II, consolidated the territories conquered by his father, and 
further built the imperial regime that dismantled the tribal aristocracy of the early 
Ottoman period.
58
 With the subjugation of Arab principalities, including Islamic holy 
cities, Mecca and Medina, by Selim I in 1517, the sultan assumed the title of caliph, 
which permitted him to take first-hand religious authority for himself and his 
successors.
59
 As caliphs, the Ottoman sultans regarded themselves as the supreme 
leaders of Islam and protectors of orthodox Sunni tradition (şeriat-penâh) against 
heresy and infidelity.
60
 Also, in contrast to the multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
character of the early Ottoman period, Selim’s conquests in Eastern Anatolia and in 
Arab lands shifted the religious demographics of the Empire, so that the Sunni 
population became the majority.
61
 Finally, throughout the long reign of Süleyman I 
(1520-1566), who continued the expansionist imperial policy of his father, Selim, the 
Ottoman Empire became one of the major players in the world politics and reached 
its largest territorial borders.  
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One aspect of the imperial transformation was a solidification of the official 
political and religious ideology of the Ottomans. This is a process that I term “ideo-
religious transformation.” Rudi Lindner puts forward that “state ideology,” led and 
consolidated by orthodox ulemâ and centralizing bureaucrats, especially in the 16th 
century, masked the tribal core of the state.
62
 Similarly, Gabriel Piterberg posits that 
bureaucratic regime was idealized by the Ottoman ulemâ and courtiers.63 Indeed, the 
Sunni identity of the Ottoman state became significantly more prominent over time, 
with the emergence and rise of Sunni religious officials, the ulemâ by the mid-15th 
century. In other words, reformulation of the Ottoman identity was conducted and 
expressed through the incorporation of Sunni Islam into the state apparatus.
64
 An 
Ottoman high culture, which relied on this identity, was formed beginning from the 
reign of Bayezid II, and reached maturity under his grandson, Süleyman.65  
As Halil İnalcık states, Süleyman I’s reign marked the beginning of a more 
conservative Shari’a-minded official ideology both on practical issues and as a 
discourse.
66
 İnalcık remarks that, under Süleyman, the Ottoman state was no longer a 
frontier state, as it became a rather worthy successor to the classical Islamic caliphate 
with its institutions, policies and culture.
67
 Although construction of the ideological 
constituents of this transformation was underway prior to Süleyman’s reign, it was at 
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that time that the official ideology of the Ottoman state reached its ultimate character 
as a reaction to certain internal and external developments.
68
 
 
2.2    The Nature of the Early Ottoman State 
 
The Ottoman state was founded by Turcoman warriors, forced by Seljuk 
administrators to settle near the Byzantine borders. This situation enabled the tribes 
to be flexible in their movements and allowed them opportunities to plunder 
neighboring enemy territories.
69
 This flexibility was partly due to the absence of a 
strong political authority in where the Ottoman state was founded. When Seljuk 
authority in Anatolia collapsed, following their defeat by the Ilkhanid Mongols at the 
battle of Kösedağ in 1243, Turcoman begs established autonomous or semi-
autonomous principalities in Anatolia. These tribal leaders employed the notion of 
gazâ to motivate their armies. According to the gazâ thesis, tribal rulers of the early 
Ottoman principality were most interested in conducting raids, warring for both 
religious reasons and to gain spoils and pasturelands.
70
 However, there are 
contradictions within the gazâ thesis: the Ottomans did not hesitate to incorporate 
Christian warriors into their armies, and they did actively fight against the other 
Muslim principalities in 14
th
 century Anatolia. Given that, one may argue that 
religion had only a marginal place in the identity of early Ottomans. Heath Lowry’s 
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argument supports that: what made someone Ottoman was the degree of his or her 
contribution to the common initiative based on conquest and capture.
71
  
As Ömer Lütfi Barkan initially suggested, the Ottoman administration also 
benefited from dervishes, religious leaders of the Turcoman population of Anatolia. 
These dervishes, known as Horosan Erenleri or Abdalân-ı Rum, served as architects 
of the rise of the Ottomans.
72
 Administrators of the state used their influence to assist 
with colonization and Islamization of newly conquered lands.
73
 In exchange, 
dervishes received the right to settle on occupied areas, and given lands as waqfs 
(religious endowments) while enjoying some degree of independence from the 
central administration.
74
 Thus, the dervish-state relationship was based on mutual 
profit.  
The dervishes maintained cordial relations through three early Ottoman 
sultanates, those of Osman I, Orhan and Murat I.
75
 Suraiya Faroqhi states that early 
Sultans, in particular, did not hesitate to present gifts to the heterodox dervishes.
76
 
According to the early Ottoman narrators, such as Aşıkpaşazâde (c. 1484) and Neşrî 
(c. 1520), Osman was a disciple and son-in-law of Şeyh Edebali, a well-esteemed 
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guild sheikh in Konya. Cemal Kafadar has suggested, however, that Edebali is a 
fictive character and that Osman’s kinship to him fabricated by early Ottoman 
chronicles.
77
 In any case, building good relationships with the dervishes was 
important owing to their influence on Turcomans; they could be persuaded to play a 
mediator-like role for the central political authority to control rural population.
78
  
The limited number of sources on the early Ottoman state includes the 
chronicles produced in the 15
th
 century, contemporary Byzantine chronicles, travel 
books, as well as hagiographies (menâkıb-nâmes) of early dervishes. These sources 
clearly indicate the presence of a heterodox Islam in Anatolia prior to the foundation 
of the Ottoman state. According to Ahmet Y. Ocak, three religious factors shaped 
Anatolian heterodoxy. First was a folk-vernacular Islam, containing influences of old 
pagan traditions of the Turkish tribes, such as Shamanism, the worshipping of nature 
through totems and spirits.
79
 All pre-Islamic Turkish faiths possessed such mystical 
characters.
80
 Nomadic Turkish tribes, migrants from Central Asia to Anatolia as a 
result of Mongol invasions, held on to this mysticism as one of their customs, habits 
and beliefs.
81
 After conversion to Islam, non-Islamic traditions and motives of the 
nomadic tribes lingered on in their belief system. This esoteric form of religion was 
more dominant than the commands and prohibitions of Sunni orthodox Islam.  
A second aspect of the heterodoxy was the important influence of Sufism. 
Sufism is a tolerant belief system, with singular emphasis on the power of love. The 
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tenets of Sufi tradition do not impose strict rules requiring discontinuation of old 
traditions, which eased the conversion process of Turcomans into Islam. Therefore, it 
is not surprising to find that the Sufis Hacı Bektâş (d. 1271), Celâleddin Rumi (d. 
1273) and Yunus Emre (d. 1321) were among the most influential religious figures in 
pre-Ottoman Anatolia. The thought of the famous Andalusian Sufi mystic, Ibn Arâbî 
(1165–1240) that was based on the doctrine of the Unity of Being (vahdet-i vücud),  
was of particular importance in shaping the religious structure of the 12
th
 and early 
13
th
 centuries. Ibn Arâbî, who later settled and died in Damascus, brought the 
mystical tradition of Andalusia into an Anatolia ruled by the Seljuks.
82
  
Third, vernacular heterodox Islam was even influenced by religious principles 
and practices of other religions, especially Christianity. Historians emphasize that 
there was a significant interfaith dialogue (syncretism) in the pre-Ottoman era.
83
 The 
well-known story of the monk who became a disciple of Rumi while remaining a 
Christian is one good example of the religious nature of early Ottoman Anatolia.
84
 
Franz Babinger depicts the nature of Anatolian Islam in that period as “not a 
prosperous religion; rather it was popular, hereby easily understandable among 
Turcoman tribal-nomadic populations living in the frontiers and highlands.”85  
Heterodox Sufi orders of medieval Anatolia can be categorized in two groups: 
a conformist group that was loyal to the central authority and accepted waqf lands 
from the state, and a non-conformist group, which was in opposition to the authority, 
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independent and rebellious in nature.
86
 The Bektashi order, which many Qizilbash 
joined in the 16
th
 century to escape Ottoman prosecution, was part of the conformist 
group. The religious nature of the non-conformist group was based on vernacular 
heterodox Islam that was popular among the Turkish population. The Babai revolt, 
led by the non-conformists Baba İshak and Baba İlyas against the political authority 
of Anatolian Seljuks, was contained with difficulty.  
The same form of religion continued to shape the religious beliefs of Turkish 
masses until the 16
th
 century. This is because the dervishes, who fled from 
persecution by the Seljuk authority due to their roles in the Babâi revolt, found 
refuge in the farthest regions, especially in Ottoman territories.
87
 It is no coincidence 
that the heterodox religious discourse of the Babâi revolt was not different from that 
of the Şeyh Bedreddin revolt, which broke out in 1416 in Ottoman Anatolia. The 
religious discourse of the Babâi revolt also paved the way for the Qizilbash 
rebellions and established a foundation for the creation of the Qizilbash identity in 
the 16
th
 century.
88
  
Cemal Kafadar has suggested that usage of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, terms 
derived from European history, are inappropriate for the religious milieu in pre- and 
early Ottoman Anatolia. He argues that one should remember that the so-called 
orthodoxy did not take the form of state behavior until the 16
th
 century, when 
Ottoman-Safavid religious confrontation occurred.
89
 According to Kafadar, the terms 
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are inadequate descriptions of the nature of religion during the period in question. He 
suggests that there were no strict boundaries between the two spheres in pre- and 
early Ottoman Anatolia and so prefers metadoxy as a description. Metadoxy 
references the absence of any polity concerned with creating and enforcing such 
orthodoxy.
90
 I will, however continue to employ the terms heterodoxy and orthodoxy 
as they have been used by most modern historians.
91
 
There was also Sunni orthodoxy in Anatolia during this period. The Mongol 
invasions of the 13
th
 century had forced not only nomadic Turkish tribes but also 
learned Sunni scholars to migrate from Central Asia to Anatolia. Although nomadic 
groups, which continued to follow a diversified religious culture of Islam and archaic 
Turkish beliefs, constituted the largest population of pre-Ottoman Anatolia, the 
rulers’ preference for Sunni institutions and scholars shaped the religious and 
political history of Anatolia.
92
 Medreses, Islamic educational institutions based on 
Sunni orthodoxy, were established by the Seljuks and Turkish principalities in 
Anatolia during the 13
th
 and 14
th
 centuries.
93
 The royal patronage of Seljuks and, 
later, of Turkish beys, attracted religious scholars to Anatolian cities, especially such 
prominent ones as Konya, Kayseri and Sivas.
94
 While urban areas were populated by 
merchants and artisans as well as Sunni religious scholars (forming an urban elite), 
nomads were living in frontiers.  
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As the Ottoman principality expanded its territories, the emergence of Ottoman 
ulemâ went hand in hand with the consolidation of Sunni identity of the state. 
Orthodox scholars, called fakıs, who were trained in Islamic law, served as advisers 
to the Sultans as early as Osman and Orhan, particularly on the issue of governing 
newly conquered lands.
95
 Early viziers were chosen from among these scholars. 
The 16
th
 century witnessed the redefinition of Sunni Islam in the Ottoman 
realms through the religious works of ulemâ that were incorporated into the 
bureaucratic apparatus. Linda Darling has suggested two factors to help explain this 
process: Ottomans wanted to distinguish themselves from the Shi’ite Safavids and 
they wanted to accelerate the absorption of the Arab lands conquered by Selim I.
96
 
Baki Tezcan suggests another factor: Ottoman law, which was mutually symbiotic 
with Sunnism, had to be systemized in order to respond to the needs of an Empire-
wide economic market.
97
 Of these three possibilities, this study will focus most 
closely on the Shi’ite Safavid factor, which has been well explained by Colin Imber:  
The rise of the Safavids after 1500 reinforced the tendency to stress the 
orthodoxy of the Ottomans. The need to defend the "True Faith" against the 
infidelity of the Safavids, and their guardianship of the Holy Places after 1517, 
led the Ottoman Sultans to enlarge their claims during the 16
th
 century.
98
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2.3.  The Rise of Ottoman Imperial Institutions 
 
 The Ottoman bureaucratic and imperial regime began to rise in the mid-15
th
 
century. With the rise and development of structural mechanisms, the Ottoman state 
evolved into an empire with a hierarchical bureaucracy. This process, which 
strengthened the imperial culture and identity, alienated Turcomans. Three 
institutions at the core of Ottoman bureaucratic development–timar, devshirme and 
ilmiyye—played significant roles on the alienation process. It is important to 
understand how their rise worked against the Turcomans. 
The Tımar system was the Ottoman land regime, in which tax revenues of a 
certain region were given, in part or entirely, to appointees of the administration, in 
return for some military, fiscal and administrative services.
99
 In the Ottoman Empire, 
tımar’s presence can be traced to the reign of Orhan. However, it took its classical 
form under Murat II.
100
 We know that similar land regimes had been applied by 
Abbasid, Byzantine and Sassanid states. 
Although tımar was a method used for efficient collection of taxes, it 
provided the state with certain advantages in centralizing its power.
101
 This is 
because the tımar holder possessed only the right to collect taxes, not the land itself, 
on behalf of the sultan. In traditional Ottoman law, all of the properties belonged to 
God and then to the sultan as God’s shadow on earth. The Ottoman state did its best 
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not to limit the political or financial power of tımar holders in any regions, often by 
appointing them far away from their hometown and frequently changing their places 
of duty. Likewise, in the classical age of the Ottoman Empire, this right of tax-
collection could not be inherited by family members.
102
 This prevented local groups 
and families from rising to power. Generally speaking, peasants were not allowed to 
cultivate land larger than that which could be managed with a couple of oxen.
103
  
With the tımar system, army and bureaucracy also became more centralized. 
An army of provincial cavalry, called tımarlı sipahis, was recruited at wartimes. As 
tımar holders were also loyal servants of the sultan, these troops emerged as an 
institution that further enabled the state to centralize its power. Moreover, the state 
controlled all lands of the empire, even those extremely distant from the center, 
through tımar holders, who served also as the political administrators for their places 
of duty.  
 Devşirme was a system in which non-Muslim children were periodically 
recruited and Ottomanized; as adults, they could climb to the highest positions of the 
Ottoman bureaucracy.
104
 Inherited from the Seljuk sultanate of Rum, devşirme, also 
known as the kul system, refers to the fact that these children were raised as loyal 
servants of the sultan.
105
 Although the exact period when the Ottomans began to 
recruit non-Muslim children is not certain, devşirme as an Ottoman institution was 
founded roughly in the first half of the 15
th
 century.
106107
 Devşirmes also constituted 
                                                             
102
 The period between 1453 and 1566 is usually called the classical age of the empire. Gabor 
Agoston, “Ottoman Warfare, 1453–1826,” p. 127.  
103
 Halil İnalcık, “Tımar,” EI2.  
104
 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds, p. 141; Gabor Agoston, “Ottoman Warfare, 1453-1826,” p. 
121. 
105
 Halil İnalcık, “Ghulam,” EI2.  
106
 Halil İnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest,” p. 105; Victor L. Menace, “Devshirme,” EI2.  
107
 J. A. B. Palmer,“Yenicerilerin Kokeni,” in Söğüt’ten İstanbul’a, pp. 449–450.  
36 
 
the primary source for the Janissary corps.
108
 They were expected to remain 
unmarried and to avoid engagement in moneymaking affairs, although these rules 
were occasionally breached, especially after the 17
th
 century. As the devşirme had no 
recognized lineage after they were recruited, they were assumed to be reluctant to 
accept bribes or abuse their jobs to benefit family members. 
Ultimately, the system replaced the Turkish or gazî families in army and 
bureaucracy. While the situation was the opposite before the conquest of Istanbul, 
most of Mehmed II’s grand viziers were picked from the kuls. He persecuted his 
grand vizier Çandarlı Halil Paşa, a man of Muslim Turkish origin, whose family had 
acquired significant authority in state affairs, as soon as the conquest was 
completed.
109
 It would be plausible to ground his preference for the kuls in the fact 
that they were considered unquestionably loyal to the sultan, a result of both the way 
they were educated and the fact that they lived their lives at the mercy of the 
sultan.
110
 
As the topic of this study is the discourse produced by the Ottoman elites, the 
formation period of ulemâ is significant. As Ottoman power multiplied with new 
conquests, the Ottoman lands became increasingly more attractive for Sunni scholars 
in search of royal patronage. Since Orhan’s reign, rulers, statesmen, commanders, as 
well as notables, had financed the construction of medreses and provided them with 
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continuous income through foundations.
111
 Thus, the Ottoman sultans became the 
patrons of scholars, enabling them to benefit from their scholarship in scientific, 
judicial, governmental, educational and military issues. Success on the battlefield 
increased faith in the future well-being of the Ottoman state, which indirectly 
strengthened the Sunni identity due to the increasing number of scholars under the 
Ottoman patronage. But other Sunni political authorities in Anatolia or elsewhere 
still presented alternatives to the patronage of the Ottoman sultan, especially 
following Bayezid I’s defeat by Timur in the battle of Ankara in 1402. The capacity 
of the Ottoman dynasty to patronize religious scholars significantly increased under 
Mehmed II and reached its peak after the Ottoman Empire became the only Muslim 
empire following the conquest of Islamic holy region. However, despite the existence 
of Sunni institutions and scholars prior to and following the establishment of the 
Ottoman state, Sunni identity was less apparent over the state polity and institutions 
before the 16
th
 century, especially during the reign of Süleyman I. 
Sunni ulemâ was incorporated into the Ottoman bureaucratic system in the 
15
th
 century.
112
 Needless to say, Sunni religious scholars took the place of the 
mystical leaders of nomadic-tribal subjects, babas or dedes. In contrast to the 
mystics, whose teachings were not based on a written systematic theology but on oral 
tradition and folklore, ulemâ received and lectured on canonical education in Islamic 
law.
113
 As a result of the rise of ulemâ, the intellectual and cultural atmosphere of the 
early modern Ottoman Empire was influenced greatly by the Arabo-Persian 
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culture.
114
 Thus, it is no surprise that while heterodox mystics, as well as the 
Turcomans of Anatolia, used an unsophisticated version of Turkish, the languages of 
ulemâ were Arabic and Persian, or a dialect of Turkish strongly influenced by those 
languages, and generally less unfamiliar to Turcoman nomads and to peasants.
115
 In 
addition, just as janissary corps and tımar holders were, ulemâ were more loyal to the 
sultan’s authority. They were not only clerics but also government officials, who 
served as judges and professors at various ranks, in contrast to mystics who had an 
independent and rebellious character.  
Another duty of the ulemâ was to formulate Ottoman law and, as a result, it 
was systematized as a mixture of örf (Sultanic law) and şeriat (Islamic -mainly 
Hanafi law). Ebûssuûd (1545–74), the longest serving Şeyhülislam during the reign 
of Süleyman I, was the person most responsible for modifications to contemporary 
Ottoman law. He incorporated şer’î principles formulated by the great imams of the 
9
th
 century, considered the founding fathers of four Sunni schools of law, particularly 
in the Hanafi school of law. Meanwhile, sultanic law-making also developed 
significantly.
116
 Thus, it can be said that ulemâ class contributed to the construction 
of the Ottoman official ideology, arguably more than any other classes.  
As I stated above, the rise of these three institutions worked against nomadic 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire. By the early 16
th
 century when the Qizilbash 
rebelled against the Ottoman administration, the formation and development of these 
institutions was mostly complete. 
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2.4.      Alienation of Turcomans  
 
As a result of the Ottoman imperial transformation, the nomadic Turkish 
populations that had played a military role in the foundation of the Ottoman 
principality were excluded from the rising imperial regime. The alienation was both 
socio-economic and ideo-religious. Socio-economic alienation was a result of the 
centrist policies of the strengthening imperial regime in the Ottoman Empire. As the 
principality transformed from a tribal chieftaincy into a centralized bureaucratic 
empire, Turkish nomadic population gradually became disconnected from the state. 
The second stage of the Turcoman alienation was conducted through certain 
writings, including chronicles, fatwas, religious texts etc., produced by 16th century 
Ottoman scholars and statesmen. Their goal was to glorify the dynasty and create a 
religio-political contrast with the Safavids, with whom they were engaged in a 
conflict with the Ottomans that began just after the foundation of the Safavid state in 
1501.
117
 As I will discuss below, these writings clearly determined the ideological 
and religious differences between the Qizilbash and the Ottoman identities. This is 
why I call the second stage of Turcoman alienation ideo-religious.  
The main purpose of this study is to explain the ideo-religious alienation of 
Turcomans conducted by Ottoman historians through their pejorative perception of 
the Qizilbash. However, in order to understand the fundamentals of the Qizilbash 
discontent and their rebellions in the early 16
th
 century, it is also important to 
examine the socio-economic alienation within the context of the rise of Ottoman 
imperial regime. Once the Ottoman principality was established by tribal elements, it 
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required a well-structured bureaucracy rather than a tribal government mechanism 
functioning through oral tradition and kinship relations.
118
 During the Ottoman 
bureaucratic transformation, tribal practices and quasi-institutional structures were 
replaced by a central government and efficient bureaucratic apparatus.
119
 For 
instance, the Janissary corps, which the central powers assumed to be more 
dependent on and loyal to the rulers, replaced tribal military forces, which had 
previously, played a significant role in the establishment of the Ottoman state.  
Moreover, the Ottomans abandoned tribal economics based on raids into the 
neighboring enemy lands in favor of a more complex economic system based on 
tımar. In addition, the aggressive raiding mentality of the tribal chieftaincy was 
replaced with a more rationalist and less warlike mentality that capitalized on 
developing cordial relations with neighboring countries.
120
  
In the 15
th
 century, the gap between heterodoxy and orthodoxy started to 
widen. A group of orthodox scholars were appointed as judges and muftis to the 
provinces.  Although the heterodox Sufis played important roles on the conversion 
activities in the Balkans, the incorporation of Sunni scholars into the Ottoman 
bureaucracy had greater benefits for a rising imperial regime. This is because Sunni 
orthodoxy, promulgated by ulemâ, relied on a bookish religious tradition and had a 
long history that produced a great volume of religious and legal scholarship. Thanks 
to this scholarship, which ulemâ possessed, the Ottoman state established its 
orthodoxy in law, education and even state ideology.  
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The most important development for the alienation process of Turcoman 
population was the centralization attempts of early Ottoman sultans; an effort by 
them to sedentarize and so better control the nomads. Yıldırım Bayezid was the first 
sultan who applied a deliberate centralist policy. It is possible to say that he was 
responsible for evolution of the semi-feudal state into a real Islamic sultanate.
121
 
Bayezid captured most of the territories of other Turco-Muslim beylicates in 
Anatolia, as well as a significant amount of territories in Balkans. He appointed 
governors chosen from within the kul system to these new lands.
122
 The Ottomans’ 
defeat by Timur, in the battle of Ankara in 1402, meant loss of newly conquered 
lands, however. This defeat also failed Bayezid I’s centralization efforts.123 
Nonetheless, his policies remained as a good example of the attempt to centralize for 
subsequent sultans, especially for Mehmed II.  
 Mehmed II is accepted by many scholars of Ottoman history as the real 
founder of centralized Ottoman Empire.
124
 In addition to expanding the volume of 
territories under the Ottoman control and the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, 
Mehmed increased the significance of a slave-based central bureaucracy at the 
expense of the Turkish aristocrat families.
125
 His policies created discontent among 
                                                             
121
 Halil İnalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest,” Studia Islamica, No. 2, 1954, p. 105.  
122
 Halil İnalcık, Klasik Çağ, p. 21.  
123
 Ibid, p. 22.  
124
 Among the centralist policies of Mehmed II, those which increased the power of central authority 
are the consolidation of the kul (slave) system, authorization for fratricide allowing the sultan to 
eliminate his brothers, diminishing the influence of frontier begs and mystics, forcing nomads to 
sedentarize and pay taxes and providing the safety of pilgrimage roads. He espoused some ideals and 
identities, which are the gaza mission, making Constantinople, or now Istanbul, the capital of his 
universal empire, claiming to be the inheritor of Rome. Another important policy is the reconstruction 
of Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and general Rabbinates primarily for tax-paying purposes. Ahmet 
Yaşar Ocak, Yeniçağlar, pp. 36–42. 
125
 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Yeniçağlar, p. 42; Halil İnalcık, Klasik Çağ, p. 34. 
42 
 
many groups including the old landed classes, nomads and heterodox dervish lodges, 
whose lands were expropriated.
126
  
The discontent is closely related to the aim of Mehmed’s centralist policies, 
which was to increase the revenues of the central treasury. Revenue growth was 
necessary to cover the costs of the new central Janissary army, and also because 
Mehmed was constantly engaged in warfare. Military technology such as 
gunpowder, big size cannonballs etc. was expensive. Two main revenue sources 
were used to meet these expenses. One was imperial confiscations, especially of the 
lands of the descendants of frontier warriors and heterodox dervish lodges. These 
lands had been granted to them permanently during the early Ottoman period.  
The other revenue source was the sedentarization and subsequent taxation of 
nomads, a means that met with resistance from nomadic-tribal Turcomans, who 
wanted to continue their nomadic lifestyle.
127
 Nomadic Turcomans constantly moved 
from one pastureland to another for the care of their livestock, a situation that made 
tax-collection almost impossible for the Ottoman officials. Thus, their status was 
mostly haric-ez defter (out of the record).
128
 Ottoman administrators constantly 
sought to sedentarize nomads to ease tax collection and increase control over these 
subjects.  
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In contrast to nomadic groups and landed powerful Muslim Turkish families, 
the centralization increased the role of the Sultan’s kuls.129 After the conquest of 
Istanbul, and Mehmed’s execution of Çandarlı Halil Paşa (d. 1453), who was the 
grand vizier of his father, Murad II (r. 1421–1444 and 1446–1451), inborn Muslims 
could barely rise to the top of bureaucratic hierarchy.  
The centrist policies created a conflict between the Ottoman state and 
nomadic Turcomans. Turcomans were displeased with these policies because they 
were to lose their freedom of movement and had to pay taxes. Yet the new order 
could not properly transform nomadic-tribal people, whose lifestyle was 
incompatible with the abovementioned measures taken by the state.
130
 Turcoman 
tribes had difficulties in adapting to changing conditions and did not want to make 
concessions from their traditional life styles.  
The roots of the conflict are better understood when one considers the effects 
of population pressure in the Ottoman Empire, which multiplied especially between 
1450 and 1600, and the effect of natural disasters in the early 16
th
 century.
131
 Using 
tahrir registers of the 15
th
 and 16
th
 centuries, Ömer Lütfi Barkan became the first 
historian to determine the existence of a population pressure and economic stress this 
may have caused on resources.
132
 In addition, the population pressure was 
exacerbated by a series of natural disasters, including a severe earthquake in 1509, 
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plague and a famine in the early 16
th
 century.
133
 These factors created a heavy tax 
burden on all Ottoman subjects and thus increased the tension between the state and 
the Turcomans.
134
  
 
2.5.    Ottoman Official Ideology  
 
This study examines the ideo-religious alienation of the Qizilbash within 16
th
 
century Ottoman historiography. We should first investigate, however, the existence 
of state ideology in the Ottoman Empire and, in particular, an ongoing debate about 
it. Official ideology consists of the religious, political and ideological stance of the 
state, that is, the beliefs that permit the state to respond to similar developments in a 
similar way. Although I accept that such an ideology existed in the 16
th
 century, I do 
not believe that it was a constant ideology. Instead, I recognize shifts, in accordance 
with certain external and internal conditions. For example, Ottoman state ideology 
became more bureaucratic in the 16
th
 century as a result of many factors, including 
the Safavid/Qizilbash threat. The official stance of that time was not the same as that 
of the 19
th 
century, which can be called the age of modernization. 
Ahmet Yaşar Ocak has argued for the existence of an Ottoman official 
ideology, concluding that there was such an ideology despite two major objections 
from those opposing this view. The first point of those who oppose Ocak’s view is 
that the concept of “official ideology” suggests an imposing structure, and there was 
neither pressure nor imposition of Ottoman official ideology. The second objection is 
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that if an official ideology did exist, it should have been propagated by systematic 
and institutionalized methods for a long period of time, but this did not happen in the 
Ottoman case. Rejecting these objections, Ocak defines the roots of Ottoman official 
ideology as: 
…neither a conscious program created by those in the center exclusively to 
suppress those in the periphery nor an ideology, like in modern ages, shaped by 
a certain individual or a group based on a philosophical background, intended 
for a certain objective. Instead it was formed over the course of time under the 
influence of internal and external conditions.
135
 
 
Ocak’s argument that official ideology was not formed by a group of people needs to 
be reexamined. I believe that a group of imported religious scholars, as well as those 
educated in medreses, contributed significantly to the formation of this ideology. For 
instance, Kemalpaşazâde’s (d. 1536) and Ebussuud’s (d. 1574) fatwas, as well as 
their risalas, established the official ideological position of the Ottoman Empire in 
many issues during the 16
th
 century.  
Development of an Ottoman state ideology should be read together with 
certain religious and secular notions. Frequently used in Ottoman documents, the 
notion of din ü devlet (state and religion), adopted from Islamic political theory, 
regards state and religion as conjoined twins.
136
 Maintaining their continuation was 
one of the major duties of an Islamic ruler. Another notion, reflecting the attention 
paid to the state in the Ottoman political theory, is devlet-i ebed müddet (the eternal 
state). This refers to the necessity of protecting the state, which is sacred, at all costs. 
They were also the sultan’s obligations to maintain an “ever-victorious army” and an 
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“ever-expanding frontier” for the sake of nizam-ı âlem (the world order). Indirectly, 
these obligations meant that all rights of diversity or even life could be sacrificed to 
maintain the existence and unity of the state.
137
 It goes without saying that an eternal 
state could not be imagined without religion and a pious ruler.  
Ottoman official ideology defined an ideal human type, which the state 
presented to its people as a model. The right to rule of the sultan, the shadow of God 
on earth (zillullah fi’l ‘arz), was believed to have been given by God.138 Another title 
which was used by the sultan was el müeyyed min indillah (supported by God).139 
According to the sultan, his subjects were trusts of God (vediatullah). He had the 
responsibility to make them live in wealth and secure the justice among them so that 
nizam (the order) could be achieved.
140
 In return for these sultanic duties, reaya (tax-
paying subjects) were expected to be loyal to their status of reaya ibn reaya (son of a 
reaya), cultivate and pay taxes on time, join the army of tımarlı sipahis when needed, 
never dabble in politics, which was not their business, and be obedient to the 
commands and requests of their administrators, appointed from the administrative 
center.
141
 
As will be examined in the subsequent chapters, the Qizilbash described the 
opposite of this idealized Ottoman subject. The Qizilbash were introduced as etrak-ı 
bi-idrak (Turks with a low capacity of perception) in the writings of Ottoman 
historians. This attitude toward the Qizilbash should be read together with the fact 
that Ottoman urban areas were under the influence of Arab and Persian high cultures; 
                                                             
137
 Ömer Çaha and M. Lütfullah Karaman, “Civil Society in the Ottoman Empire,” Journal of 
Economic and Social Research 8(2), p. 55.  
138
 Ann Lambton, “Some Reflection on the Persian Theory of Government” Theory and Practice, pp. 
138–139. 
139
 Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Yeniçağlar, p. 198.  
140
 Halil İnalcık, “Osmanlı Padişahı,” in Doğu Batı Düşünce Dergisi 13:54, 2010, pp. 9–20. 
141
 Rıza Yıldırım, Turkomans, p. 116; Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Zındıklar ve Mülhidler, p. 92.  
47 
 
the Qizilbash were perceived as ignorant nomads who could not get along with urban 
culture.
142
 
 
2.6.      The Advent of the Safavids 
  
The origins of the Safavid state begin with Şeyh Safiyeddin (1252–1336), the 
founder of the Safeviyye Sufi order. He was based in Ardabil in Azerbaijan near the 
Caspian cost. Safiyeddin assumed the leadership of the Safavid order in 1301. 
Financed by the Ilkhanids, who ruled Iran at that time, the sheikh gained an 
enormous reputation, as a result of religious propaganda conducted not only in Iran 
but also in Anatolia, Syria, Caucasus and in Egypt.
143
 
Scholars have debated whether this order was Shi’ite in its origins. Minorsky 
argued that the order strictly adhered to Sunni Islam, but turned toward Shi’ite Islam 
under Ismail’s grandfather Şeyh Cüneyd.144 Roemer, on the other hand, noted that 
Shafi’i sect of Sunni Islam, to which he believed Safavids adhered earlier, was the 
closest to Shi’a. Furthermore, there was Sunni-Shi’ite syncretism in Iran at the time 
and the order could have been based in this.
145
 Another interpretation suggests that 
the rise of Sufism as a bridge between Shi’ite and Sunni Islam during the period 
between Mongols and Safavids paved the way for the rise of Shi’a. Hussain Nasr and 
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Henry Corbin interestingly argue that Sufism and Shi’ism are inseparable.146 This 
argument is represented in Corbin’s statement that “true Shi’ism is the same as 
Tasavvuf (Sufism), and thus, genuine and real Tasavvuf cannot be anything other 
than Shi’ism.”147 
Yet a famous historian of Sufism, Annamarie Schimmel, argues against 
Corbin and Nasr. Schimmel underlines: 
…Yet from that time  [advent of the Safavid house in 1501] Sufism and the 
Shia creed were rarely combined, and only a few Shia orders exist today. In 
spite of the relatively close relationship between the two movements in the 
period of formation, the Sufi congregations usually supported the Sunni case 
and often became defenders of the official Sunnite creed under the later 
Abbasid caliphs.
148
 
 
It must also be noted that the Ottomans were sending precious gifts every year to 
Ardabil under the name of çerağ akçesi.149 This is not surprising because many 
sources support the view that early Safavids were Sunnis.  
Religious identity of Cüneyd and his son, Haydar, is significant for the process 
of consolidation of power of Safavid house in the early 16
th
 century. Cüneyd’s quest 
for material power led the Kara Koyunlu Cihanşah, the strongest ruler of the region 
at the time, to expel him from Ardabil with his forces. Cüneyd found asylum with 
Cihanşah’s rival, the Ak Koyunlu ruler Uzun Hasan (d. 1478).150 He travelled around 
Anatolia and attracted many supporters among heterodox Turcomans by claiming to 
be a descendant of Ali. Cüneyd changed the nature of the order into a militant 
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political movement.
151
 Cüneyd made the Safavids into a militant political movement. 
He was killed in battle by the ruler of Şirvan. Uzun Hasan, the Turcoman ruler, had 
placed himself in a position of power by marrying his sister to Cüneyd and his 
daughter to Cüneyd’s son, Haydar: This permitted him access to the military and 
spiritual power of the Safavid dynasty. On Hasan’s death, however, his son 
threatened rather than appeased by growing Safavid power, allied himself with the 
new ruler of Şirvan. Together they caused the death of Haydar in 1488. 
Shah Ismail’s early life represents the most important period of his life 
explaining why the Safavid Sufi order became a political movement. Ismail became 
the leader of the order after the death of his brother in 1494, at the age of seven. 
During the next five years, he lived under the protection of Mirza Ali Kirkaya in the 
city of Lahijan near the Caspian Sea in northwest Iran. He was educated in Quranic 
studies, Persian and Arabic and the seven Qizilbash commanders of Lahijan were 
responsible for his military education.
152
 According to Roger Savory, the resourceful 
emotional and educational support of the Qizilbash chiefs was strongly influential in 
making Ismail a revolutionary leader.
153
 They also kept alive the network of the 
Safavid order in Anatolia, Syria and Azerbaijan. Ismail left Lahijan in 1499 to make 
his bid for power. One Qizilbash emir who served the Shah Tahmasb (r. 1524–1576) 
narrates Ismail’s move in this way: “The Khan, as glorious as Alexander the Great, 
decided to go to Ardabil, the home of irshad, in order to rescue the country from the 
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hands of infidels and ask for the help of the souls of his ancestors.”154 Successful 
military raids against Georgia and Şirvan permitted Ismail to avenge his father and 
grandfather. Undoubtedly, his successes were achieved with the help of Qizilbash 
tribes, which rallied to Ismail since the summer of 1500.
155
 By joining with the 
Safavid army, the Qizilbash, who did not conform to the Ottoman authority, had 
found a new environment in which they could pursue the gazâ ideal. Eventually, 
Ismail captured Tabriz after a victory against Akkoyunlus in 1501 and acclaimed 
himself as the Shah there, starting the dominance of Safavid dynasty in Iran that 
would last until 1736.
156
 One of the causes of his success was the chaotic political 
atmosphere in Iran at the time stemming from the fact that the descendants of the 
Akkoyunlu Sultan Yakup were in a struggle for the throne.
157
 Roger Savory puts 
forward three factors to explain the Safavid success. First, the Safavid sufis were 
unquestioningly obedient to their Shah. Second, as explained below, from the time of 
Cüneyd, the head of the Safavid order was considered divine, believed to be the son 
of God by his supporters. Third, the Safavid Shahs claimed to be the representatives 
on earth of the Twelfth Imam or Mahdi, the ultimate savior of humankind.
158
 
When Shah Ismail I established the Safavid state following a series of battles, 
in 1501, he proclaimed Shi’a Islam as the official religion of the new state. It became 
a formidable Shi’ite state in the region with well-defined and complex institutions, 
religious teachings and political paradigms by adhering to an orthodox interpretation 
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of Shi’a Islam called Twelver Shi’a.159 Two factors led him to this conversion: his 
own Shi’ite inclinations, formed during his education in Lahijan; and his desire to 
provide the new state with an ideology that would differentiate it from the Sunni 
Ottoman Empire and the Uzbeks.
160
 However, it should be noted that the 
incorporation of Twelver Shi’a into the Safavid state ideology was not completed 
until Shah Abbas (1587–1629), who significantly reduced the power of the Qizilbash 
in the state affairs and imported Shi’ite scholars from Jabal Amil.161 
Shah Ismail enjoyed widespread support among the Qizilbash people of 
Anatolia who were followers of his Sufi order. He had ambitions to incorporate 
Anatolian lands into his greater Iranian project.
162
 Ismail possessed an important tool 
to make this plan happen, as he could rely on the Qizilbash elements of Anatolia who 
had been adherents of the Safavid order as a result of religious propaganda made its 
previous leaders, Cüneyd and Haydar. The Qizilbash, considered an undesirable 
group living within the borders of the Ottoman state, were willing to recognize the 
political and religious leadership of the Safavid shah. Indeed, Ismail’s continued 
religious and political propaganda in Anatolia through his caliphs (dâi) had broad 
repercussions throughout the region. Ismail used the influence of his spirituality 
among the Qizilbash Turcomans to achieve both his political and religious goals. 
Thus it is important to examine the religious relationship between the Qizilbash and 
the Shah. In the eyes of the Qizilbash, Ismail was the mürşid-i kâmil (perfect guide); 
sometimes he was perceived as a God-like figure. This acceptance of the spiritual 
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character of Ismail differentiated the Safavid state from its contemporaries in western 
Asia.  
Safavid territorial expansion at the expense of the Ottomans led, inevitably, to 
conflict. This conflict has been the topic of considerable research. Although initially 
considered a religious conflict, more recent literature tends to accept a mixture of 
reasons. There were five dimensions to the rivalry/conflict in question: religious, 
political, military, cultural and economic. As stated above, religion was used as a tool 
of legitimacy by both parties. Some historians still apply the paradigm of European 
confessionalization during the 16
th
 century to the conflict between the Ottomans and 
the Safavids, arguing that they encountered the same challenges as their European 
counterparts. Tjana Krstic, for instance, sees little difference between Catholic-
Protestant schism and Sunni-Shi’ite schism in their use of religious discourse in the 
identity construction processes of the states.
163
 Politically speaking, Ismail was aware 
that the Ottoman had to be challenged to extend his power. Ismail’s intention was to 
establish an empire that would incorporate parts of the Ottoman and Mamluk 
territories. To achieve this goal, he wanted to use the Anatolian Turcomans, instead 
of waging a pitched battle against the Ottoman army, which was equipped with 
superior weaponry. Safavid political propaganda, inviting Turcomans to join under 
Ismail’s leadership, was disseminated all over Anatolia through the spies (da’i) of 
Shah Ismail. For the Ottomans, this cooperation was even more dangerous than the 
presence of a Shi’ite rival in its eastern borders.  
Economically, the rise of a power in the East was a serious threat for the 
Ottoman trade through the Silk Road. Thus, each state pursued trade policies that 
would minimize the other’s benefit from international trade. For example, Selim 
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prevented the importation of Iranian silk into Ottoman lands.
164
 The economic rivalry 
intensified during and after the reign of Süleyman (1520–1566) 
There was also a cultural competition between the Ottomans and the 
Safavids. The opposite of Rumi was primarily Acem (Iranian).
165
 In this cultural 
rivalry, the Ottoman Empire represented the urban and educated culture; the Safavids 
represented tribal and nomadic culture. It is ironic that the Sultan wrote to the Shah 
in Persian, which was seen as an ornamented language fashionable to use at the time, 
and the Shah replied him in a simple Turkish, the language of his tribal origins.
166
 
Interestingly, in their eulogy of the sultans, Ottoman historians did not hesitate to 
refer to Persian mythical kings—Feridun, Cem, Dara, Hüsrev and others. These 
mythical figures are known from the Şehname of Firdevsi. Although their 
deployment can be considered an influence of Iranian literary tradition on Ottoman 
historiography, Ottoman historians may also have aimed to show the sultans as heirs 
to antique Persia while excluding the Safavid rulers as usurpers of the region.   
 
2.7.    Concluding Remarks 
 
The rise of the Ottoman imperial regime created some hostile groups within 
the Empire, including disposed tımar holders such as Turcoman notables in Anatolia, 
akıncı (raider) families of the Balkans (who had enjoyed some degree of 
independence in the lands they conquered and ruled) and medrese graduates who 
were not appointed to their expected positions after graduation. The centrist policies 
of the Ottoman state led such groups to join together against the Ottoman authority, 
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especially at times when this authority was relatively weak. It is no accident that the 
Şeyh Bedreddin (d. 1420) revolt broke out in 1416, when the state had just gone 
through a period of civil war (interregnum –fetret devri).167 The unpleasant banded 
together under Şeyh Bedreddin, a Sufi theologian and the most profound scholar of 
Islamic law.
168
 The Ottoman government’s suppression of this revolt may be 
interpreted as the beginning of a new period, during which Sunni orthopraxy was 
molded into official state ideology.  
This new period, however, could not succeed in internalizing nomadic-tribal 
groups of Anatolia. Ottoman bureaucracy and institutions developed at the expense 
of these groups. Over time, they became more alienated from the Ottoman central 
authority. As a result, joining with the ranks of the Safavids, the heterodox 
Turcomans rebelled during the final years of Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512), who pursued 
relatively softer policy towards the Safavids and the Qizilbash.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THE POLITICAL USE OF QIZILBASH IMAGE AS DEPICTED 
BY THE 16
TH
 CENTURY OTTOMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss the ways 16
th
 century Ottoman historians used 
the Qizilbash image as a pro-Selim vehicle within narratives written between 1509 
and 1513. During this period, Ottomans were challenged by a serious religio-political 
threat from the heterodox Turcomans of the Ottoman Empire and their collaborators 
from the Safavid dynasty of Iran. Supported by the Safavids, the Qizilbash rebelled 
against the Ottoman political authority. These rebellions hastened the triumph of 
Selim over his brothers. Prior to his ascension to power in 1512, Selim was known 
for his hostility towards the Qizilbash. The modern historians rather focused on 
giving a history of the events and people. In this chapter, I investigate ways that 
Ottoman historians perceived these events and people. I argue that Ottoman 
historiographical literature of the 16
th
 century used the image of the other in 
narrations of the Ottoman civil war (1509–1513) as a means to support the political 
legitimacy of the Ottoman dynasty. In addition, the authors’ comparisons of Selim 
and his brothers, Ahmed and Korkud, relied on what Bayezid’s brothers achieved 
against the Qizilbash before and during the Qizilbash revolts of the early 16
th
 
century. Ottoman historians’ narrations of the military failures of Ahmed and 
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Korkud, and of Selim’s successes as governor of Trabzon, justify Selim’s ascension 
to power. In this chapter I will also discuss the pejorative image of Şahkulu (the 
slave of the Shah) and Nur Ali Halife rebellions, which broke out in the same period. 
Sixteenth-century Ottoman histories deemed these rebellions serious threats that 
would have caused the collapse of the Empire in the absence of Sultan Selim. 
 
3.1.    The Role of the Qizilbash Challenge in the Ottoman Domestic Politics 
(1509-1513) 
 
The illness and old age of Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512) made him unable to 
govern the Ottoman Empire efficiently or lead the army at the chaotic time of the 
Qizilbash rebellions. This situation led to a dynastic struggle between his sons, in 
which even Bayezid himself played a prominent role. Prince Şehinşah, who died in 
1511, was not a part of the struggle, but Korkud (d. 1513) and Ahmed (d. 1513) 
continued fighting at the cost of their lives. In the end, Selim I (r. 1512–1520), the 
youngest of Bayezid’s princes, overran his brothers and also forced his father to 
abdicate. Selim I’s success is attributed to his skillful use of the Qizilbash problem. 
Afterwards, in 1513, Selim secured his position through the murders of most of his 
rivals for the throne. The deposed Sultan, Bayezid II, died in 1512 near the village of 
Abalar near Hafsa in Edirne on the way to Dimetoka where he planned to spend his 
exile years.
169
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Selim had a comparatively disadvantaged position at the beginning of the 
dynastic struggle. His aggressive character and his position as the youngest son made 
him the least favored prince by Bayezid himself and by the Ottoman bureaucratic 
circles. In contrast to Selim, Ahmed, who had a more compliant character than his 
brothers, had many supporters in the imperial capital.
170
 Bayezid and his viziers had 
always believed Ahmed would be the next Sultan, and laid the groundwork for his 
enthronement. The other candidate, Korkud, was considered lacking in 
administrative skills, although his intellectual abilities were always admired by 
Ottoman historians.
171
 Under Bayezid, each son/prince was governor of a province. 
Şehinşah, the prince who governed Karaman, was considered to have a pro-Qizilbash 
stance, and did not join the succession struggle.
172
 Selim was the governor of 
Trabzon, the province farthest from the capital, Korkud the governor of Antalya and 
Ahmed was governor of Amasya.
173
 Therefore, Selim had several disadvantages: no 
supporters in the capital and no physical proximity to Istanbul. These disadvantages 
deprived him of the throne, as he would not be the first to arrive if his father died: it 
would take too long for news of the vacancy to reach him and for him to travel to 
Istanbul.  
Inalcık and Yıldırım agree that Selim succeeded in ascending to the throne 
through a strategy based mainly on the use of Qizilbash issue.
174
 Selim’s use of the 
anti-Qizilbash policies allowed him to ascend to the throne and provided him with 
political legitimacy during his rule. It may be argued that his reign was born as a 
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reaction to Bayezid’s moderate foreign policy towards Iran. Although Bayezid took 
some precautions, such as the deportations of the Qizilbash usually to western 
regions such as Modoni and Koroni in southern Greece, he often preferred not to 
provoke Ismail.
175
 Dissatisfied with his father’s foreign policy, Selim was ready to 
fight against the Qizilbash. Selim’s raids, as governor of Trabzon, against the lands 
occupied by the Qizilbash won the favor of the Janissaries, the tımarlı sipahis and 
Akıncıs. Meanwhile, Ahmed and Korkud were criticized for ineptness in their 
struggles against Qizilbash troops.  
As a result, Ottoman historians present Selim as the champion of the warfare 
against the Qizilbash.
176
 Historians’ depiction of a warrior Selim against the 
Qizilbash threat also aimed to boost his legitimacy as ruler, although it raised 
questions among the Ottoman bureaucrats in Istanbul who favored Ahmed. 
 
3.1.1. The Rise of Selim’s Fame as a Warrior: Anti-Qizilbash Activities in 
Trabzon 
 
One argument to justify Selim’s ascension to the throne in the Ottoman 
narratives pointed to his successful struggle against Shah Ismail’s occupying army in 
Erzincan and Bayburt in eastern Anatolia. In fact, Shah Ismail had first come to 
Erzincan in 1500. There, he met with his Anatolian disciples, with the intention of 
receiving their support for his fight against Halilullah, the ruler of Şirvan, a city in 
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Azerbaijan. His intention was to avenge the deaths of his father and grandfather, both 
killed by Halilullah. About 3,000 armed Turcomans who agreed to support Ismail in 
his fight against Halilullah. When he asked them whether they would like to engage 
in his fight against Şirvanşah (the ruler of Şirvan), they answered “You are the son of 
our şeyh; we sacrifice our heads in the service of you, command!”177 This obedience 
was the main source of Ismail’s political success.   
The city of Erzincan was occupied by Shah Ismail’s troops in 1503. As 
Celalzâde narrates, Selim was quite angry about this “illegitimate” occupation, which 
clearly showed Ismail’s political aspirations toward eastern Anatolia.178 Recognizing 
this threat, Selim decided to conduct a surprise attack on Ismail’s army. When God’s 
supreme assistance arrived, Celalzâde adds, Selim captured the city from the 
Qizilbash with devastating force.
179
 While Celalzâde does not mention the details of 
Selim’s entrance into Erzincan, Şükrî, does provide a detailed account of the battle 
between the armies of Selim and Ismail. Şükrî states that although the city had been 
ruled by the Ottomans during the reign of Bayezid I, it changed hands until it was 
captured by an unworthy (nâ-sezâ).180 Şükrî narrates Selim’s motivation behind 
attacking Ismail’s army in Erzincan, using Selim’s own quotes:  
Who is that Ismail? How dares he to occupy someplace close to my property? I 
am the worthy one. What does that red head (Qizilbash) say? Bayındırlu 
(Akkoyunlu) is now gone; now, this region is mine. They (Qizilbash) need to 
be obedient to Rum (the Ottomans).
181
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These statements reveal Selim’s position when he was a şehzâde, governing Trabzon. 
Obviously, he perceived himself as the new ruler of eastern Anatolia, once the 
Akkoyunlu power disappeared. Eventually, Selim triumphed in the battles against the 
Qizilbash in Erzincan and Bayburt in 1503 and 1507. His successes were narrated by 
Hoca Sâdeddin as follows: “He had raised the Ottoman standard many times in these 
cities, devastating and baffling the Qizilbash, who are bloodthirsty lot with soiled 
swords.”182 One result of Selim’s anti-Qizilbash stance during his rule in Trabzon 
was a growing fame among the Janissaries.  
The Safavids, on the other hand, claimed territories once ruled by the 
Akkoyunlus and considered themselves as legitimate heirs to the Akkoyunlu dynasty. 
One reason for this was that Ismail’s father Haydar was married to the daughter of 
Uzun Hasan, the Akkoyunlu ruler, and his grandfather Cüneyd had married Uzun 
Hasan’s sister. Clearly, Selim did not accept the Safavid legitimacy claims for these 
territories.  
It is important to note that Bayezid did not approve Selim’s aggressive 
warfare against the Qizilbash. He wrote Selim several times, warning him that he 
should stop his attacks. In one of these letters Bayezid stated his preferences: “We 
were told that you wage untimely wars in that region. You should be on the safe side, 
confining yourself solely to self-defense of your city. We do not give you consent to 
increase our enemies.”183 According to Celalzâde, obedience and commitment to his 
father led Selim to cease attacks on the Qizilbash.
184
 Kemalpaşazâde also mentions 
the content of these letters as such “Be in peace with our enemies in your region, be 
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it Qizilbash or Georgian, we do not give you consent to increase our enemies.” Like 
Celalzâde, Kemalpaşazâde also says that Selim he kept his silence although these 
letters annoyed him.
185
  
 Selim’s aggressive policies won the favor of the military classes, however. 
Those who joined his raids made voluntary propaganda about prince Selim on 
returning to their homelands. In his Selimnâme, Celalzâde recounts a speech Selim 
gave to the notables of the provinces:  
It is not a good sign for a sultan to dignify the unskillful, the stingy and the 
rascal just because they are of kul origin. It is not appropriate to turn away from 
the men of the people like you. God willing, I am decisive in this intention. 
Tell my intentions to your people so that they give up loving and supporting 
the Qizilbash.
186
 
 
Apparently, with this promise, he wanted to the support of Turks in Anatolia in a war 
against the Qizilbash or his brothers. He also claimed to reinforce the lost soul of 
gazâ in the Ottoman Empire, which would make Anatolian masses once again 
sympathetic towards the Ottoman cause. Celalzâde continues: “Selim’s fame 
increased when these begs returned to their homelands and told of his speech. 
Sayings such as “Go on Sultan Selim, the time is yours” (Yürü bre Sultan Selim, 
devran senindür!) became widely circulated.”187  
People of Tekeli region, on the other hand, were influenced by Ismail’s 
propaganda. He claimed to be the new gazî of the Islamic world. Selim also 
attempted to reinforce gazâ ideal and to not leave the title gazî to the Safavid ruler. It 
is best reflected in Şükri’s words: “Gazâ against the infields belongs to us. It is only 
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we who can provide any remedies for such seditions. We dyed the abode of infidels 
with blood. The Shah of the east (Shah Ismail) learnt gazâ from us.”188  
 Even before his accession, Selim was known for hostility against the Qizilbash 
and he based his policy on the Qizilbash threat. In a letter he dispatched to his father, 
he says: 
In addition, a group, especially in the defeated country of Acem (Iran), came 
up with the faithless Qizilbash pursuit. From day to day, their properties are 
significantly increasing. It is known that they are the enemies of the Ottoman 
dynasty in terms of religion and nation. A big disorder and sedition is expected 
from that faction. If they continue to be approached with negligence and 
inattention as it was case in the past, the disorder it caused may reach an 
unpreventable level. And, these disorders and tumults may spread everywhere 
in the country. It is now obligatory that someone should assume this religious 
and civil duty.
189
 
 
Here, Selim stresses the urgent nature of the Qizilbash problem. If it was not dealt 
with immediately and properly, he emphasizes, the outcomes could be more 
disastrous.  
 
3.2.    The Images of the Actors of the Dynastic Struggle (1509–1513) 
 
A comparative examination of the images of four contenders to the dynastic 
struggle, as depicted by Ottoman historians, is significant to this study. This 
examination reveals the pivotal role of the Qizilbash issue in the four-year struggle 
from which Selim emerged the victor. In the period 1509-1513, Qizilbash uprisings, 
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related to the succession struggle, broke out; the new sultan was expected to solve 
this problem. Ottoman historians used Selim’s tactics to solve the Qizilbash problem 
as part of their explanation of Selim’s superiority over his brothers. In doing this, 
they also emphasized why Bayezid’s abdication was necessary. 
 
3.2.1.   Selim versus Bayezid 
 
To 16
th
 century Ottoman chroniclers, Selim was a savior, struggling to protect 
his country: in contrast, Bayezid is portrayed as a gullible man misguided by the 
statesmen. Critiques of the reign of Bayezid are principally critiques of the statesmen 
with whom he surrounds himself, particularly the corrupt practices of high-ranking 
bureaucrats. This is a general tendency in Ottoman historiography; critiques are not 
directed at the sultan. In the accounts of the Ottoman historians, Bayezid was a 
seraphic, good-tempered, pious and charatible sultan (sultan-ı melek-hisâl), who did 
not like to shed blood.
190191
 According to the historians, this soft nature, and his 
advanced age, made him susceptible to deceptions and misinformation from his 
viziers. Bayezid’s sole mistake was his appointment of inappropriate men to the 
vizier positions. Celalzâde describes these viziers as insufficient in knowledge, 
precaution and manners, as well as weak in religion: he goes so far as to refer to 
them as “uneducated idiots.192 Another historian, Sâdeddin, who wrote in the late 
16
th
 century, also complained about the viziers’ corruption, drinking alcohol, taking 
bribes and, in general, paying more attention to earthly (dünyevî) issues than ethereal 
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(uhrevî) ones. According to Sâdeddin, the great earthquake of September 1509 was 
God’s retaliation for these blasphemies.193 
 Ottoman chronicles argue that, Selim prevented the collapse of the Ottoman 
state due to the Qizilbash challenge. İdris-i Bitlîsî describes the situation as follows:  
Now, riot and opposition, always damaging to property anywhere, come to the 
pride in the Islamic world, this dynasty. The enemies of religion and state, 
especially regional infidels and cruel Qizilbash heretics, have infiltrated our 
territories. These riots will quickly spread through all Anatolian lands and 
reach to the Balkans.
194
   
 
İdris-i Bitlîsî also states that Bayezid was not able to wage military campaigns owing 
to both his disposition and his physical condition. He continues: “Of course, it is now 
necessary to think about the continuity of the state and to protect the lands. However, 
this duty requires a brave commander!”195 It is easy to understand that this brave 
commander capable of saving Ottoman lands would be Selim. A twentieth-century 
historian, Çağatay Uluçay, has explained Bayezid’s passiveness against the Safavid 
threat as related to his love of Iranian culture. According to him, consciously or not, 
Bayezid contributed to the spread of Shi’a. This statement is not much credible, 
however, as Uluçay bases this assertion merely in the names given to his sons, 
Selimşah, Şehinşah and Alemşah since Şah was the title of Safavid rulers.196 At that 
time, it was fashionable to use higher Persian culture. This is also why Selim himself 
was corresponding in Persian.  
 Selim’s approach and attitudes were the exact opposite of his father, as they 
always emphasized his intention to reassert the aggressive warfare style of his 
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ancestors. Selim’s role models must have been Sultan Mehmed II, who conquered 
Istanbul, and Bayezid I, who made tremendous efforts to create an imperial state. His 
espousal of aggressive warfare can be understood from his enthronement speech, 
recounted by İdris: “You all shall know that my main objective in accepting this 
Godly trust, which is the throne of the sultanate and caliphate, is to remove darkness 
and cruelty from the earth and to consolidate Islam, just as our ancestors did.”197 This 
attribution to the ancestors was a general rhetoric of the time. Celalzâde’s assessment 
concurs, as he stresses that Selim kept his promise to lose no time in the fight against 
apostates and heretics.
198
 Another passage from İdris-i Bitlîsî’s narrative includes 
more detailed information about Selim’s displeasure with his father’s policies: 
Gazâ, the tradition of my ancestors, calls for the extension of the circle of Islam 
through jihad, as allowed by the Quranic verse “O Prophet! Rouse the 
Believers to the fight!” To this end, our ancestors unceasingly motivated the 
warriors, but this tradition—obligation, even—has been disregarded for years. 
Old warriors have almost forgotten this heroism; adolescents have no 
experience of war. This good tradition of the Ottoman dynasty has been 
abandoned.
199
 
 
Selim was certainly criticizing his father’s reign by emphasizing this negligence, and 
particularly Bayezid’s passivity in the face of the Qizilbash threat. All chroniclers 
supported Selim’s approach to the Qizilbash issue, agreeing that it indeed posed a 
serious threat, and one unnoticed by the Ottoman authorities at the time. 
Accordingly, Sâdeddin writes:  
…especially the Qizilbash, whose lives are bad, had been ignored until they 
have destroyed the protected lands, down to the frontier of Karaman. This 
occurred because of the passing of state affairs to the narrow-minded viziers, 
employed in key positions. In fact, the most important duty of these viziers was 
to inform the sultan immediately from the first-hand about any new incidents. 
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However, since all responsibility was left to them, they were suspending this 
duty. In order to cover up viziers’ attitude, Sultan Selim employed those who 
were perceived unworthy in Istanbul, and who lost their hopes as a result of 
viziers’ oblivious attitudes, for his wars against Qizilbash and Georgians.200 
 
Ottoman historians justified Selim’s ascension by criticizing the dismissive 
approaches of the viziers of Bayezid II, despite the urgency of Qizilbash threat.  
Another topic of critique Selim raised was his father’s increasing tendency to 
appoint kuls to important posts, rather than hereditary Muslims. In a speech made to 
the warriors who joined in his pre-accession gazâs, Selim stated that many useless 
men were preferred to inborn Muslims just because they are of kul origin.
201
 This 
tactic was both an effort to gain the sympathy of the Turks, and a reaction to the 
statesmen in Istanbul who were also of kul origin and tended to support his brother, 
Ahmed.  
Bayezid, and a majority of leading statesmen, favored Ahmed’s succession 
over that of his brothers Korkud and Selim although Ahmed’s enthronement, 
however, was prevented by the Janissaries, who preferred Selim. Although Şükrî 
states that nobody knew of Bayezid’s preferences and it seemed there was no one in 
his heart, many of his contemporaries argued otherwise.
202
 We do know from many 
sources that Bayezid abdicated the throne in favor of Ahmed in 1511.
203
  
Sâdeddin reports that when requests by Selim to visit his father and kiss his 
hands were rejected by his viziers, he said “there is no hope from my father; he 
already reserved both the crown and the belt for Ahmed.”204 The viziers were biased 
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towards Selim because Selim was critical of imperial policies, for which, according 
to Ottoman historians, viziers were more responsible than the sultan. These viziers 
supported Ahmed, largely because of his compliant and manageable character. 
However, the struggle for the throne reached a point at which they feared losing their 
positions, should Selim prove victorious, because of their earlier pro-Ahmed stance. 
They conducted lobbying activities in Istanbul. What they were feared of did become 
real that all of these pro-Ahmed statesmen were eliminated when Selim ascended to 
the throne. 
Aware of his slim chance for the Ottoman throne, Selim secured the 
governorship of the Kefe province, in Crimea, for his son Süleyman.205 However, as 
his real intention was to receive a governorship for himself in Rumelia, Selim left 
Trabzon for Kefe to visit his son. Selimnâme authors insist on that in requesting a 
Rumelian governorship Selim’s intention was to fight against the infidels and this 
fight would be a good example for other princes.
206
 He planned to continue on to 
visit his father and, as the historians indicate, show him respect by kissing his hands. 
Correspondence between the Porte and Selim show that his requests were not 
accepted. As a result, a fight between the troops of Bayezid and Selim occurred in 
Çorlu in 1511. At the end of the battle, Selim fled to Kefe and the protection of his 
son. Selim was the first prince in Ottoman history to go to battle with his father, the 
legitimate sultan. This was unacceptable because in theory, Ottoman sultans were 
supposed to rule during their whole times. Therefore, any acts intending to challenge 
against a ruling sultan was regarded as rebellion and illegitimate.
207
 In justifying this 
deed of Selim, some chroniclers prefer not to mention this battle, while some 
                                                             
205
 Kemalpaşâzade, p. 33.  
206
 Sâdeddin, p. 15.  
207
 H. Erdem Çıpa, The Centrality of the Periphery, p. 100.  
68 
 
refrained from providing details. One of the historians who mentioned the battle, 
Celalzâde, attempts to clear Selim’s name from this illegitimate deed: 
…[Selim’s] capture of the Ottoman throne and his adventures with Sultan 
Bayezid, may God bless his tomb, are very well known. However, those who 
observed from outside did not really know what happened, and they blame 
Sultan Selim for rebelling against his father, writing books and booklets with 
their insufficient minds. Without probing inside the events, they produce 
writings about Sultan by fabricating scenarios with presumptions.
208
 
 
The Selimist historian Celalzâde had assured his reader that his book was based on 
personal experience or information from those who knew the events very well, not 
fabrications. Criticizing the fabricators, he noted that the battle of Çorlu happened 
without the consent and allowance of Selim. According to Celalzâde, when Selim 
came to visit his father, the holders of the most important vizier posts communicated 
this news to the sultan by saying, “Sultan Selim’s goal in crossing to Rumeli and 
asking for permission to visit you is nothing more than his hope for the throne and 
taking on the administration.”209 If Selim had intended to war with his father, he 
would have started with these viziers, Celalzâde asserted.210 Thus, he attempts to 
show both Selim’s invincibility and reluctance to fight against his father. Many 
others, such as Kemalpaşazâde, Lütfi Paşa and İdris-i Bitlîsî, also accuse the viziers 
of causing this battle by misleading the sultan.
211
 
The Qizilbash threat reached an alarming level with the 1512 Şahkulu revolt 
in the Tekeli region (Antalya). Ahmed and Ali Paşa, the supreme governor of 
Anatolia (Anadolu Beylerbeyi), were sent by Bayezid II to suppress the rebellion. Ali 
Paşa was defeated and killed by Şahkulu. Because of this failure, Bayezid’s 
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subsequent abdication of the throne in favor of Ahmed was objected by the military 
classes.
212
. Later on, Korkud would also face objects from the same groups, for much 
the same reason. Emphasizing his old age, Edâ’i reports that Sultan Bayezid II was a 
broken man; it was if his body was gone, but his spirit remained. When the 
Janissaries saw that the Sultan was not even able to drink water, Edâ’i himself states, 
they sent a letter to Selim, explaining the situation and asking him to come to 
Istanbul to take on the throne.
213
    
Selim arrived in Istanbul in 1512. According to the Selimist sources, Bayezid 
was pleased to relinquish the throne to his son, Selim, and did so of his own free will. 
Kemalpaşazâde writes, “there is no doubt that the Sultan delivered the throne to his 
son with his own will.”214 Regarding the same event, Lütfi accepts Selim’s mistakes 
by noting that Bayezid left the throne to Selim, forgave his sins, and told Selim his 
wishes: “…take revenge for the Ottomans on the Egyptians (Mamluks) and for the 
people of Islam (ehl-i Islam) on the Qizilbash; and also you should get on well with 
your brothers.”215 If these statements are an accurate indication, Ottomans interpreted 
the Egyptian issue as a political problem, and considered the Qizilbash problem a 
problem of religion for all Muslims. Sâdeddin also narrates a longer testament of 
Bayezid to Selim: 
If [or when?] you become the sultan, make justice your guide, have mercy 
upon the helpless and the desperate, and show affection to the poor and the 
lonely. If you want to take the world under your command, respect the wise. If 
you claim to be the Shah,sever the vein of cruelty and hostility. If you claim to 
be the servant of God, be fair. God provided you with the servitude of 
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Anatolian people, and you shall forbid heedlessness, not hurt anyone with 
cruelty, and not haze people…216 
 
In other parts of this advice, Bayezid also counseled Selim to get on well with his 
brothers, respect the Islamic law, and treat dervishes mercifully. The passage 
suggests that Bayezid was fearful of cruel deeds of Selim, especially against his 
brothers.  
The same quotes also suggest that his abdication in favor of Selim was not 
completely voluntary. His obligation to declare Selim as the sultan is suggested by 
his comment that “whichever direction the public tends to, whatever the soldiers’ 
wish is, let it be so.”217 A poem attributed to Bayezid also shows that the abdication 
of Bayezid appears to have been a necessity, not a voluntary act.  
I did not voluntarily abdicate/See beys what Selimşah did to me/I supposed that 
he understood me/I supposed that he was my companion/I saw him not as a son 
but a brother/See beys what Selimşah did to me.218 
 
The historical sources also mention a curse of Selim, possibly belonging to Bayezid. 
This curse says “My son, shall God sharpen your sword, have luck of the Irish, but 
you shall not live long enough as you acted disrespectfully against your father.”219 
Whether these quotes belonged to Bayezid or not, it is true that there were many 
rumors accusing Selim of deposing his father, or even playing a possible role in 
causing his death by poisoning him.
220
 An examination of the Selimnâme literature 
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clearly shows us that one of the motivational factors of the authors was to clear 
Selim’s name from these rumors. Although the first Selimnâmes were written in the 
last years of Selim, this was mostly a project of Süleyman also to legitimize his own 
rule.  
 
3.2.2.   Selim versus Ahmed 
 
In 1511, Prince Ahmed was the oldest living son of Bayezid II. He served as 
the governor of Amasya, where his father had been governor during his own 
princedom. Ahmed’s being governor in Amasya is important because those who 
were appointed to this city was considered as the strongest candidate for the 
throne.
221
 While Ahmed had many supporters in the capital, his unsuccessful 
struggles against the Qizilbash diminished his reputation, especially among the 
military classes. As a result of this lack of support, he lost the dynastic struggle to 
Selim. Since Ahmed tried to act like an autonomous ruler in Anatolia after Selim’s 
rise to power, he was caught and killed in Bursa in April 1513. 
In 16
th
 century Ottoman historiography, Ahmed is portrayed as the opposite 
of Selim. According to these chroniclers, Ahmed was not worthy of the throne 
because of his unsuccessful struggles against the Qizilbash; in contrast, Selim was 
accorded respect as a skillful man, especially on the battlefield. According to the 
Ottoman historians, Selim fought against the infidels and heretics when he was 
governor of Trabzon, while Ahmed spent his time as governor of Amasya having 
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fun. This explains the Janissaries opposition to Ahmed, when he was invited to 
Istanbul with the hope of succeeding his father. 
Ottoman historians put forward that Bayezid’s preference for Ahmed was 
based on Ahmed’s intimate relations with Bayezid’s viziers.222 Kemalpaşazâde, for 
example, writes that: “There were always supporters of the deceived Sultan Ahmed 
in the capital, when one left, the other replaced him.”223 Ahmed’s network in Istanbul 
provided him with support during the struggle for the throne. İdris states, as a 
motivating factor, hopes by these supporters that they would to retain their 
bureaucratic positions.
224
 The Ottoman historians also hint that these supporters 
believed they could easily manage Ahmed, once he was Sultan.  
 Ottoman historians asserted Ahmed’s unsuitability for the throne by pointing to 
his addiction to entertainment throughout his governorship in Amasya. Celalzâde 
records this as follows:  
Ahmed supposed that the sultanate could go on with the goodness and favor of 
his father. The things he cared about were eating and drinking both day and 
night, to kiss rose-bud lips, and to hold the waists of tall girls. He did not know 
anything about capturing countries, protecting lands under threat, the state of 
enemies, or afterlife (referring to the weakness of his faith).  
 
Celalzâde reports that Ahmed was self-indulgent and without the managerial and 
intellectual features that a sultan should have. In contrast to Ahmed, Selim was 
regarded as the true heir to the throne, one who did not go a moment without 
thinking of the struggle against enemies. Also, he was considered to be the only 
prince equipped with skills to deal with the urgent Qizilbash threat.  
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Selim was described as the great enemy of the Qizilbash; Ahmed was 
considered their partner. Selim’s anti-Qizilbash stance was known both in Istanbul 
and in other provinces. Çağatay Uluçay mentions that Sunnis, fleeing Ahmed’s 
palace in Amasya, went to Trabzon to reside under the governorship of Selim. In his 
assessment of the pro-Qizilbash stance of Ahmed, Uluçay also suggests that the 
activities of Shah Ismail’s spies in Amasya, and their usage of the city as a base 
annoyed many Sunnis. Eventually, Ahmed’s protections for the Qizilbash forced 
those Sunnis out of the city.
225
  
It is also important to note that Ahmed’s son Murad was known to be 
sympathetic toward the Qizilbash. As I discuss below, he would become a Qizilbash 
himself, wearing their red hood, i.e. becoming the Qizilbash, and joining the ranks of 
a Qizilbash leader called Nur Ali Halife. Celalzâde interprets Murad’s becoming 
Qizilbash as a strategy by Ahmed to gain the support of the Qizilbash in his fight for 
the throne. This strategy did not work, however: After the troops of Nur Ali Halife 
were defeated by the Ottomans, the Qizilbash chose to join their forces to Ismail 
rather than supporting Ahmed. Murad accompanied them to Iran, intending to return 
to Anatolia with Qizilbash support. However, on arrival in Iran, Prince Murad was 
killed by Shah Ismail.
226
 
Upon an invitation from his father to take the throne of the Ottomans, Ahmed 
left Amasya for Istanbul in 1512. However, his claim was blocked by the Janissaries, 
largely owing to his position in the Qizilbash threat. Ahmed started camping at 
Üsküdar while waiting the final arrangements of his ascension. The Janissaries first 
warned Ahmed through letters that they would not give consent him to take the 
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throne. When they saw that preparations to welcome Ahmed continued, five 
thousand Janissaries attacked the residences of pro-Ahmed statesmen, forcing 
Ahmed to leave Istanbul.
227
 Had Ahmed been successful in suppressing the Şahkulu 
revolt, Sâdeddin reports, the Janissaries and all of the governors would have agreed 
with Ahmed’s enthronement.228 Despite imperial support from Ali Paşa, the supreme 
governor of Anatolia, and his army, Ahmed could not succeed. As İdris explains this 
situation,  
Sultan Ahmed, who claimed to be the ruler of the Ottoman lands, has been 
incapable of even protecting his former throne and keeping his own region, 
Amasya, under control. His quality and capacity to rule was understood by the 
whole world in a few incidents caused by the Qizilbash opposition.
229
 
 
Of all the historians, Celalzâde criticizes Ahmed the harshest. According to 
Celalzâde, Ahmed’s foolishness was obvious and his ignorance made him unworthy 
of the throne. Celalzâde also described the Janissary reaction to Ahmed’s arrival in 
Istanbul: 
A non-believer and mezhepsiz (one who belong to no sect of Islam) group, 
which is a cruel and hazardous community, rebelled in the Islamic country. 
They shed much blood, destroying many families. They damned the post of 
sultanate. They killed Ali Paşa, the supreme governor of Anatolia (Anadolu 
Beylerbeyi). Ahmed could not disband the enemies of religion and Islam. How 
could he dare to take the throne? This is the place of the saints and the 
courageous men. The ghazis here are the servants and slaves of the religion that 
Prophet Muhammad preached for. 
 
Employing similar rhetoric, Sâdeddin states that one who does not prove his 
power may not become the sultan. One who intends to become powerful should be 
patient in the face of the difficulties of governance; he should not flee as Ahmed 
                                                             
227
 Kemalpaşâzade, p. 109.  
228
 Sâdeddin, p. 55.  
229
 İdris, p. 97.  
75 
 
did.
230
 The Janissaries continue: “We cannot allow Sultan Ahmed to take the lead, 
while the symbol of nobility (Selim) is there like a ripe fruit in the sultanate tree.”231 
Some historians, such as Sâdeddin and Edâ’i, claim that Ahmed’s assignment to join 
Ali Paşa to suppress the Şahkulu revolt was part of Bayezid’s strategy to provide 
sufficient justification for his choice of Ahmed as his heir.
232
 As Bayezid wrote to 
Ahmed, “Prepare for the war like a roaring lion, and get rid of the Qizilbash.”233 
Although commissioned by his father to suppress the Şahkulu revolt, Ahmed tried to 
use this as an opportunity to rally the support of the Janissaries in order to ascend to 
the Ottoman throne. What is more, he left the battlefield where Ali Paşa was killed 
by the rebels. As a result of his failures, his sultanate was rejected by the Janissaries. 
When pro-Ahmed statesmen were trying to convince the Janissaries about Ahmed’s 
sultanate by the pro-Ahmed statesmen, a new Qizilbash revolt, led by Nur Ali Halife 
broke out near Tokat. Ahmed commissioned his head vizier, Yular Kısdı Sinan Paşa, 
to suppress this revolt. Ahmed’s troops were once again destroyed by the 
Qizilbash.
234
 This second failure against the Qizilbash contributed considerably to 
the reluctance of the Janissaries about his ascension.
235
 
 Once Selim seized the throne in 1512, Ahmed was captured and killed in 
Yenişehir. Selim broke with the request by his father to get on with his brothers. He 
cleared his own way not only by killing Ahmed and Korkud, but also their sons. 
Sâdeddin’s justification for this behavior is typical of the Ottoman historians. 
“…after their condemnable acts emerged, ignoring and delaying these acts is 
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violation of the law.”236 Sâdeddin continues: “Neither people nor soldiers will be 
comfortable while there are two sultans in the country. There cannot be two swords 
in a scabbard; and two lions in a cage.”237 
 
3.2.3.   Selim versus Korkud 
 
16
th
 century Ottoman historiography considers Korkud as a well-versed, 
intellectual, mild-mannered and quiet prince. Korkud, educated in Islamic law, was a 
musician and poet. He was considered an inappropriate choice for sultan, because of 
his interests and also because he had no son to succeed him. İdris states that his 
scholarship and deep understanding of religious issues are unquestionable, but he has 
no power or maturity in decision-making, leadership or governance.
238
 Emphasizing 
also that Korkud had no sons, Sâdeddin stated that continuation of this dynasty, 
which should live forever, depended on the passing of the throne from father to son. 
To forget this fact would have caused the collapse of the sultanate and the 
destruction of the country.
239
 
 The intensification of Qizilbash activities in the region managed by Korkud 
placed his name at the center of critique. In 1502, Bayezid had appointed Korkud, 
already governor of Manisa, to the province of Antalya to prevent intensification of 
activities by Ismail’s agents in that region.240 His request to return to Manisa was 
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declined by the Porte.
241
 Resentment over this rejection led Korkud to abandon 
Antalya for Egypt in 1509, on the pretext of pilgrimage. İshak Çelebi states that the 
reason Korkud left Antalya was offense at Bayezid’s favoritism toward Ahmed.242 
Korkud spent more than one year in Egypt. While he was in Egypt, the central 
authority in Antalya went into decline, paving the way for an intensification of 
Qizilbash propaganda.
243
 Korkud came to regret his self-exile, however, and wrote to 
Istanbul requesting forgiveness.
244
 Eventually, he was permitted to return to Antalya, 
but the Qizilbash rebellions there caused him to leave—again, without permission—
for Manisa. As Sâdeddin describe the series of events: “Because Prince Korkud’s 
sensitive soul loathed the ugly faces of the Qizilbash, one night he suddenly departed 
from Antalya for his old place of duty, Manisa, leaving some brave men there to 
transport his treasury under protection.”245 Kemalpaşazâde explains Korkud’s second 
departure as follows: “After returning from Egypt and staying in Antalya for a while, 
he decided to leave the region because he felt anxious from the activities of dirty 
Turks (etrak-ı na-pâk), i.e. the Qizilbash, who were human in appearance, but like 
unperceptive animals in sense.”246 Kemalpaşazâde adds: “Upon the abrupt departure 
of Korkud from Antalya, the qizilbash rabble (evbaş-ı kallaş) supposed that Sultan 
Bayezid died, and wanted to take advantage of this authority gap, by waving the red 
flag of rebellion.”247 The rebels then marched to the north and defeated the troops of 
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Korkud in Alaşehir. In a battle in Kütahya, Şahkulu troops killed Karagöz Paşa, the 
supreme governor of Anatolia.
248
 
 In fact, Korkud took measures to control the Qizilbash activities during the first 
year of his governorship in Antalya. Referring to this situation, Sâdeddin states that 
the people of Antalya were safe and peaceful under him until the dirty Turks, i.e. the 
Qizilbash, rebelled.
249
 Nevertheless, Korkud was not considered worthy of the throne 
by the military classes because of his failure to deal with the Qizilbash in his region. 
More important, however, was the tendency to believe that by abandoning of post in 
Antalya without permission, Korkud paved the way for Qizilbash rebellions against 
the Ottoman authority.  
When Bayezid was convinced about the ascension of Selim, Korkud also came 
to Istanbul with the intention of ascending to the throne. But, according to Sâdeddin, 
this was just a trickery of some deviant-minded statesmen. Şükrî states that Korkud 
came to the capital because he intended to suggest Selim for the throne. Other 
sources disagree.
250
 Once he arrived in Istanbul, Korkud saw the coalition around 
Selim, and fled when he realized that he had been deceived.
251
 An important point 
for this study is that Sâdeddin emphasizes that Selim became sad when Korkud was 
captured in Bursa, but does explain why he did not attempt to stop Korkud’s 
execution.
252
 
In sum, Ottoman historians’ narrations of the civil war highlighted the warrior 
image of Selim, while emphasizing the advanced age of Bayezid and insufficiencies 
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of either Ahmed or Korkud in dealing with the Qizilbash problem. These histories 
were focused to justify Selim’s ascension to power. It may be interesting to note that 
all these narratives were written in the waning years of Selim’s reign, or immediately 
after. Clearly, this was a strategy of Selim’s son, Süleyman, to clear his father’s 
name from certain questionable and unlawful acts. Criticisms of Selim had three 
bases: he was the first Ottoman prince to rebel against his father, when Bayezid was 
the legitimate ruler. Selim was even accused of poisoning his father, a possibility 
also raised by Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede in his Sahaif-ul Ahbar.253 Lastly, Selim 
was criticized for executing his brothers and many of their sons.
254
 Even though the 
fratricide had been legalized in the law code of Mehmed II, provided that it was for 
the sake of nizâm-ı alem, it remained controversial until the reign of Sultan Ahmed I 
(1603–1617), who brought about the rule of the succession of the eldest healthy 
son.
255
  
 
3.3.    The Image of the Qizilbash Rebels 
 
My goal in this monograph is to analyze the ways that Ottoman court 
historians perceived the Qizilbash rebellions, particularly the Şahkulu and Nur Ali 
Halife rebellions of 1511 and 1512 respectively. There is no doubt that these 
rebellions were considered great threats to Ottoman political authority. Indeed, on 
including the Safavid support behind them, Qizilbash rebels posed an alarming threat 
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at a time of political turmoil over succession. The rebels reached as far as Bursa, very 
close to Istanbul, and had great influence on the intensification of the political rivalry 
between Bayezid’s sons.  
 
3.3.1.   Şahkulu Rebellion  
 
Şahkulu was the leader of the first Qizilbash revolt. His father, Hasan Halife, 
was an Anatolian agent of Şeyh Haydar, the leader of the Safavid order. Hasan 
Halife had been sent to the Teke region (Antalya) by Haydar to preach the mystical 
message of the order. Şahkulu’s rebellion, which broke out in 1511 in the Teke 
region, was arguably the most serious and dangerous Qizilbash uprising ever. 
Şahkulu made use of Safavid-style ideological tools, such as the claim of Mahdism, 
to join Turcoman tribes against the Ottoman authority. As Ismail had been, 
Şahkulu’s supporters considered him a Messiah.256  
It would be wrong, however, to exaggerate the religious factor. In fact, socio-
economic factor was even more important than the religious differences. This can be 
seen when looked at who participated in the rebellion. The participants included not 
only heterodox Turcomans but also peasants and Sunni tribes dissatisfied with the 
tax and settlement policies of the state and timar holders who were deprived of their 
timars by the state.
257
 Sâdeddin’s account best shows this:  
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Those commissioned to maintain order in the country robbed people, and 
started the practice of bribery [and] most of former timar holders remained 
landless. They became tired of visiting the Palace in vain and, having nothing 
to lose, they were forced to try all sorts of ruses. Many became friends with 
and supporters of unruly gangs and their participation helped the sedition to 
expand.
258
 
 
Sâdeddin blames “ill-intentioned” statesmen as a cause leading to the Qizilbash 
rebellion. This passage clearly identifies the motivation underlying the rebellion as 
something more than religious differences. Those involved in were rather the 
unhappy targets of Ottoman social and economic policies. It is telling that Ottoman 
historians barely refer to the socio-economic side of the rebellion although heavy 
taxes in the beginning of the 16
th
 century was arguably the most important reason of 
the discontent among the dissatisfied groups. This negligence is important because 
apart from a few exceptions mentioned above the historians mostly used the religious 
rhetoric in their critique of the rebellion and thus ignored the socio-economic 
discontent among the subjects. This was probably because they found the emphasis 
of religious dimension more conducive to self-justification. 
After defeating Korkud’s troops, Şahkulu rebels killed Karagöz Paşa, the 
supreme governor of Anatolia in Kütahya, and Ali Paşa, the most important 
supporter of Sultan Ahmed, in Sivas. Afterwards, they marched to Erzincan, where 
they fought against a local named Hacı Mustafa and the troops he gathered from the 
surrounding areas. According to Uluçay, Şahkulu probably died in this battle. His 
army fled to the Safavid lands, but the leading commanders in the army were 
executed by Ismail on the grounds that they robbed a caravan on their way.
259
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The narration of this rebellion makes it important in this study. Ottoman 
historians present the rebellion as the greatest threat stemming from the Qizilbash, 
and an event that made Selim’s assumption of power imperative for the continuation 
of the state. The historians use identical discourse to depict the rebellion. For 
example, Kemalpaşazâde underlines that God created a Moses (Selim) for a Pharaoh 
(Şahkulu):  
The hellraiser and irreligious man, known as Şahkulu, was an agent of Shah 
Ismail, the deviant. He came to Anatolia to spread the groundless Shi’a 
religion. But God did not leave what he did to people unpunished by creating a 
rod to swallow this chimera, and a Moses to drown the Pharaoh. Thus, God 
saved the world from this disaster, by granting Selim the Ottoman throne.
260
  
 
This metaphoric narration of the Şahkulu rebellion is based on Quranic verses, and it 
is interesting to remember that Selim did not deal with the Şahkulu rebellion, at least 
not personally. Those involved were Ahmed and Korkud, though both of whom were 
unsuccessful. Edâ’i also provides a depiction of the rebellion:  
The miserable and deplorable Tekeli and Varsak tribes put on the Qizilbash 
belt of turmoil and defeatism. They wore Qizilbash clothes, and espoused their 
methods of persecution. One individual among this community, whom destiny 
called Şeytankulu, was the beginning and end of all the evilness.261 
 
Ottoman historians occasionally adopt the term Şeytankulu (slave of the devil) 
instead of Şahkulu. Celalzâde also writes: “he (Şahkulu) unfurled the flag of the 
devil.”262 That is to say, Ottoman historians represented Şahkulu as an agent of the 
devil, while the Ottoman sultan was the shadow of God on earth. Furthermore, by 
emphasizing that anyone could adopt Qizilbash clothes, the historians indicate that 
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Qizilbash is not a birthright; instead one could be Qizilbash by wearing the Qizilbash 
crown. 
 Sâdeddin’s depiction of the Şahkulu rebellion is highly significant, as it reflects 
the typical Ottoman perception of Şahkulu and his followers:  
People of this region were already stubborn and rebellious; these features were 
part of their depraved character and lack of respect and virtue. They were 
inhuman animal-like people, without any sense of perception, whose hearts 
were full of sedition. When Korkud left the city abruptly they thought that 
Sultan Bayezid died and Korkud had gone to the capital in order to ascend to 
the throne. Thus, they rebelled, coming together according to the Qizilbash 
traditions on April 19, 1510, and choosing a scoundrel (Şahkulu) as their 
head.
263
 
 
Sâdeddin also accuses the insurgents of attempting to rob Korkud’s treasury. He 
states that they killed Muslims and pillaged their properties.
264
 It is easy to see that 
according to Sâdeddin, the Şahkulu rebels were not Muslims, but must be non-
believers, because they damaged the lives and property of Muslims. Yet because not 
all of the rebels were from Turcoman tribes, the Muslims, mentioned by Sâdeddin 
were those who were unwilling to join the rebellion. As Celalzâde states, the 
nomadic Turcomans constituted the majority of the rebels. Here, he also explains the 
damages the rebellion caused.  
Şeytankulu gathered all kinds of bad people: Turcomans, idle bachelors, and all 
of the clever but bad men, regardless of whether they live in cities, towns, 
villages or the mountains. They damaged property of Muslims, seizing their 
horses and hinnies. The rascals, mounted on the horses, ravaged all the lands in 
all the provinces along their way, and robbed all of their property. They killed 
those who opposed their acts with venomous and murderous swords.
265
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Ottoman historians of the period emphasize the distinction between social 
classes in the Ottoman Empire as they humiliate the Şahkulu rebels. Kemalpaşazâde 
depicts the Turcomans of the Antalya region as:  
…dike burun füttaks (the men who kill people at any opportunity and who do 
not obey rules) of Tekeli Turks were among the first to join the ranks of Ismail; 
they gained fame with their bravery and obedience to him. Those wastrels, 
none of whom ever possessed a parcel of land in their life, and never had been 
called human in own their region, became the generals in division units of the 
Qizilbash, and thus received much more respect than they deserved.
266
 
 
Kemalpaşazâde presents Şahkulu and his troops as unworthy poor people who were 
never granted a timar by the state. As part of the reaya, the landless underclass (as 
discussed in Chapter II) there were limited opportunities for mobility. The state, in 
general, expected that the reaya would to accept and obey the rules they established, 
and follow the dictates of its officials in the provinces. Kemalpaşazâde attempted to 
humiliate those who joined into the rebellion, or accuses them of not staying within 
the determined boundaries of their social classes. Accordingly, Celalzâde records 
that after they defeated both Karagöz and Ali Pashas, the rebels possessed properties 
they have never seen in their lives: 
The wicked lot (Şahkulu and his troops), who were to be vanquished, acquired, 
and were satisfied with, booty such as golden swords and daggers pertaining to 
Hüsrev [or Khosrau, a Persian King], starry silver armor, golden belts and 
sciuroid coifs, and wind-like horses walking like zephyr. Nobody knew what 
happened to Şeytankulu, the commander of this depraved community. It 
seemed as if just after Ali Paşa was defeated, this group of hyenas were 
scattered in four directions as if by wind.
267
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Celalzâde states that because of the acts of Şahkulu and his troops led to punishment 
and a curse from God. Kemalpaşazâde also emphasized that the demise Şahkulu was 
not certain by remarking that the seditious scoundrel known as Şeytankulu was 
absent in the war. Nobody knew about his end.
268
 
 
3.3.2. Nur Ali Halife Rebellion 
 
Nur Ali Halife was a caliph, or agent, of Ismail sent to Anatolia. Although 
there is no consensus on the connections between Şahkulu and the Safavids, Ottoman 
sources make clear that Nur Ali was a spy for Shah Ismail. Originally from Sivas (in 
the province of Rum), Nur Ali e succeeded in bringing together thousands of 
Turcoman tribesmen against the Ottoman authority.
269
 Their rebellion, under his 
leadership, broke out in central Anatolia in 1512, when civil war throughout the 
Ottoman Empire was at its peak. Taking advantage of the situation, Nur Ali’s 
planned to capture Amasya.
270
 On the way, he and his troops captured the city of 
Tokat and read a hutbe (Islamic sermon read in mosques) in the name of Shah 
Ismail.
271
 Hearing word of these developments, Ahmed sent his vizier and lala (the 
tutor of the prince), Yular Kısdı Sinan Paşa to suppress the revolt. Sinan Paşa was 
defeated and killed by Nur Ali Halife’s rebels in a battle in Sivas. Thus, Ahmed lost 
his most important supporter in his struggle for the Ottoman throne. Subsequent to 
this, a locally-based Mehmed and his troops followed and caught Nur Ali Halife’s 
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army in a bloody battle near Göksu.272 Nur Ali and many of his soldiers were killed; 
and the rest fled to Iran. 
     Ottoman historians’ depiction of the Nur Ali Halife rebellion is similar to that of 
the Şahkulu rebellion. The rebels represented an alarming threat for the state 
authority, but ultimately were humiliated and defeated. Many chroniclers, including 
Celalzâde, Lütfi Paşa, Edâ’i and Şükrî, almost completely ignore this rebellion. This 
silence may only be attributed to the relatively small scale of the rebellion. Among 
those who did record it, İdris-i Bitlîsî narrates the rebellion as an event that 
accelerated the succession of Selim:  
The Qizilbash community reached to Tokat, where it caused a great sedition. 
As the majority of population in that region was already unbelievers, who 
albeit seemed like Sufi mystics in appearance, they were accompanied by a 
large mass of people in that sedition. Eventually, some of the prominent 
Janissaries, Ottoman timar holders, and other wise men who were supporting 
Selim, joined to discuss the invitation of Selim to Istanbul to accede to the 
throne. Confirming the appropriateness of his sultanate, they made a great 
effort to secure it for him.
273
 
 
As this passage makes clear, Selim, who had fled to Kefe following the battle with 
his father, was invited to the Porte by the Janissary corps in Istanbul, who opposed 
against the sultanate of Ahmed and eliminated pro-Ahmed statesmen. This passage, 
with others mentioned above, confirms that Selim was aided in his pursuit of the 
throne by the Qizilbash issue. Part of this success was the quirk of fate, but it was 
also, in part a strategy managed by Selim and pro-Selim faction. In addition, there is 
a blur distinction in this passage that İdris makes make between the Sufis and the 
Qizilbash who participated in the Nur Ali Halife rebellion. This is extremely 
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important because İdris here tries to keep the Qizilbash distant from any religious 
activities. He invites his readers to beware against taking the Qizilbash as Muslims 
although they were dressed like mystics.  
Sâdeddin also mentions the Nur Ali Halife rebellion in his chronicles. In 
contrast to İdris, he places the events after the accession of Selim, suggesting that 
Nur Ali Halife took advantage of the political turmoil that stemmed from Ahmed’s 
acting like a sultan in Anatolia.  
That being the case, an aşağılık and deviant called Nur Ali Halife from the 
debouched Qizilbash, recruited many followers from the Turcomans living in 
the province of Rum. They rebelled together with his 20,000 hell-faced 
soldiers, abusing the conflict and schism in the country.
274
 
 
Apart from their abuse of the civil war, this passage also reminds us that not all 
Turcomans were Qizilbash.  
Indeed, after having denied the throne by the Janissaries, Ahmed crossed to 
Anatolia and, pretending to be a sultan, appointed statesmen to the provinces. As 
mentioned earlier, Ahmed’s strategy was to acquire the support of the Qizilbash by 
making his son, Murad, a Qizilbash. Rıza Yıldırım recently posited that it was a 
strategy of both Bayezid and Murad, based on the latter’s belief that Ismail’s support 
was necessary for a victory against Selim.
275
 In any case, it was not surprising that 
Ahmed tried to create a coalition to claim or reclaim the throne given to him by his 
                                                             
274
 Sâdeddin, p. 84.  
275
 Rıza Yıldırım, “An Ottoman Prince Wearing Qizilbash Taj: The Enigmatic Career of Sultan Murad 
and the Qizilbash Affairs in the Ottoman Domestic Politics, 1510–1513,” Turcica 43 (2011), p. 114. I 
am indebted to Rıza Yıldırım for sharing the unpublished version of this article.  
88 
 
father. Ahmed understood that the outcome this was a matter of life and death, and 
failure would—and did—mean death for him.276 
The pejorative narrations of the Şahkulu and Nur Ali Halife rebellions 
reflected a belief in the rightfulness of Selim’s anti-Qizilbash struggles held by the 
narrators. The Qizilbash threat was perceived as a serious one, particularly to the 
political authority of the Ottoman dynasty. The historians criticized the rebels for 
exploiting the dynastic struggle to achieve their political aspirations. 
 
3.4.   Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I argued how Ottoman historians justified Selim’s 
“illegitimate” acts as part of their role in the Süleyman’s project to restore his 
father’s image. One may argue that if it were propaganda, it should have had a large 
audience that was influenced by these opinions. For whom the propaganda was 
made? Indeed, it is not possible to say that a lot of people read these books 
considering the fact that the reading activity was mostly confined to a small group of 
elites in the Ottoman Empire, including the sultan, his entourage and advisers. But 
such an argument certainly misses the long run effects of discourse created in these 
sources. This discourse helped the creation of imperial ideology in the long run that 
can be followed through the imperial edicts. Therefore, while Selimist historians 
explained the rightfulness of Selim in his anti-Qizilbash acts, in the first instance 
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they tried to win the favor of the sultan, but as an obscure purpose they wanted their 
opinion to spread among the masses.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
THE SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS IMAGE OF THE 
QIZILBASH IN THE 16
TH
 CENTURY OTTOMAN 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I examine how Ottoman bureaucrat-historians described the 
Qizilbash community from social, cultural, as well as religious perspectives. How 
did they portray the Qizilbash and themselves? How did they perceive the self-hood 
with respect to the otherness of the Qizilbash? How did these new perceptions and 
positions influence the cultural and religious stance of the Ottomans at any time 
thereafter? In addition to the general image of the Qizilbash in Ottoman 
historiography, I also discuss the depictions of the two events most-often used by 
Ottoman historians to express differences between the Ottoman and Safavid regimes 
and polities. The first is the battle of Çaldıran, which, as narrated by Ottoman 
historians, was a war of the legitimate against the illegitimate, of the true religion 
against heresy, of justness against cruelty and of God-supported against God-cursed. 
The second is the occupation of Tabriz by Selim just after the battle of Çaldıran. 
Ottoman narratives of this incident reveal both the city under Ismail, and the changes 
that occurred during its brief occupation by Selim. 
91 
 
Both narratives depend on an alienation of the Qizilbash as the “other.” For 
Ottomans, the other was most often ehl-i küfr (people of infidelity) until the 16th 
century. The rise of the Safavids, as political actors in the Middle East, opened a new 
era in the holy mission of the Ottomans.
277
 The Qizilbash, whether the Safavids or 
the heterodox Turkish population of Anatolia, became the new “other.” This othering 
is easily observed in 16
th
 century Ottoman historical writing. An examination of 
these histories shows us three reasons why the Qizilbash were targeted as an internal 
religio-political threat. First, they had joined several revolts against the Ottoman rule, 
such as the rebellion of Şahkulu in 1511. Second, they had close connections with 
the Safavid Shah and joined forces with his army. The Qizilbash saw the Shah as 
Mahdi (the prophesied redeemer of Islam) and, at times, equal to God. Third, as the 
16
th
 century progressed, Ottoman and Turcoman elements gradually diverged from 
each other in terms of religious understanding. This issue might not have been a 
concern for the Ottoman state until the 16
th
 century because, as discussed earlier, 
Ottomans had been tolerant towards varying religious practices in earlier periods.
278
 
 
4.1.    Depictions of the Battle of Çaldıran 
 
The battle of Çaldıran is the best known event of Selim’s career. Therefore, 
this battle is the best-recorded incident in the historical sources I used. Examination 
of historians’ depiction of Çaldıran shows the battle as the war of good against evil. 
Incorporated into this is always a pejorative image of the Qizilbash. The significance 
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of such presentation is that, for the first time, the authors narrate an event from the 
first-hand, i.e. Haydar Çelebi and İdris-i Bitlîsî, or from what they heard from those 
who participated, rather than through rumors concerning the Qizilbash that circulated 
throughout the Ottoman realm. One goal of these histories was to bring a message to 
the readers that Selim was right in his anti-Qizilbash struggles.  
For the Ottomans, the significance of the battle of Çaldıran lies in its position 
at the peak not only of Selim’s career, but also of the Ottoman-Qizilbash conflict. 
Selim’s anti-Qizilbash policy had enabled his ascension to power in 1512. Selim’s 
first task as Sultan was to execute his rivals, including his brothers and their sons. He 
then turned his gaze towards the Safavids under Shah Ismail. The battle of Çaldıran 
removed, or significantly reduced the Safavid threat in 1514. In the aftermath of 
Çaldıran, and with tremendous efforts from İdris-i Bitlîsî, Ottoman authority in 
Eastern Anatolia was restored in three years; and the mountainous region from 
Erzurum to Diyarbakır subjugated.279 Following the victory in the battle of Çaldıran, 
Ottomans initiated a great deal of persecution of the Qizilbash, which led the 
Qizilbash to develop new tactics to avoid persecution. According to İdris-i Bitlîsî, 
more than 40,000 Qizilbash were massacred during this period.
280
 This number was 
never repeated by other sources, however. Until a new source is found, İdris’ 
statement may only show the exaggerated and propagandist nature of some of the 
narratives.  
The defeat in Çaldıran slowed Safavid propaganda in Anatolia, as it grew 
clear certain that their power would not expand into Anatolia. Perhaps more 
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important than the battle and the lands lost, Ismail never regained his old reputation 
and dynamism. Roemer explains the depth of damage done to Ismail’s reputation by 
the battle of Çaldıran: “In the eyes of his followers he had also lost the nimbus of 
invincibility, even if the defeat had done nothing to impair his reputation for 
sanctity.”281 In other words, his defeat in the battle crushed the once-fanatical 
devotion of his followers.
282
 The waning of Ismail’s unifying image caused a 
continuous civil war between the Qizilbash tribes in Safavid Iran, which lasted until 
Shah Abbas (r. 1587-1629) who eliminated the Qizilbash power significantly. As a 
result of the waning of Ismail’s invincibility, the Twelve Imam faith was promoted.  
We shall now investigate how the Ottoman historians imagined the Qizilbash 
by narrating the battle of Çaldıran. The ways that Ottoman historians justify the 
battle of Çaldıran, fought against a Muslim state rather than a more traditional Other, 
contains clues to Ottoman perceptions of the Qizilbash. A detailed examination of 
Ottoman histories reveals that there were three sources of justification for the 
conflict: their heresy, the fact of their having killed Sunnis and plundered their 
properties, and their lack of their legitimacy to rule. All three reasons are related to 
and complement each other. According to the account of Haydar Çelebi, who was 
commissioned to write a diary of the battle, Selim invited Ismail to become Muslim 
before the battle: “Without using my sword, I invite you to come to Islam.”283 Since 
it is an Islamic tradition to propose non-Muslims to accept Islam before fighting 
against them, we understand from Haydar Çelebi’s use of this quote that the 
Ottomans tended not to consider Safavids within the circle of Islamic religion. 
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Second, as Ottoman sultans considered themselves the protector of the Sunni people, 
and they could not have been indifferent to Sunni persecutions by Shah Ismail in 
Iran. Lütfi Paşa’s assesses this issue, noting that “It is difficult to tell how [Ismail] 
insulted the people of Sunnah. Wherever he found Sunnis, he killed them, receiving 
their properties.”284  
Furthermore, careful intertextual examination of the Ottoman narratives 
shows that the historians paid attention to the lack of legitimacy in the claims to rule 
made by Safavids. In the relevant passage of his Selimnâme, İdris-i Bitlîsî explicitly 
describes Selim’s motivation as “…the intention of removing the darkness of the 
cruelty and outrage of those, who usurped the throne of Cem (a mythical king of 
Iran) and rebelled against the most auspicious ummah.”285 Clearly, the usurpers of 
Iran were the Safavids, while the rebels against the Ottomans were Anatolian 
Turcomans. In another passage, İdris-i Bitlîsî claimed Selim said: “You have been 
purporting to be the conqueror of Iranian lands. What you did, however, was nothing 
more than capturing the unprotected lands by attacking the little children and 
insignificant remains of Iranians sultans (Akkoyunlus)…”286 Such accusations permit 
narrator to emphasize the illegitimacy of Safavid rule. İdris-i Bitlîsî adds that, in 
order to prove they were the legal heirs to the Iranian throne, the Safavids fabricated 
so-called seyyidlik (the state of being the descendant of the Prophet).
287
 In contrast, 
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Ottoman historians argue that Shah Ismail was only a sheikh, leading a religious 
order in his lodge; he had not real claim to the Sultanate.
288
  
This discussion of legitimacy of the Ottoman historians brings us to the 
debate among Islamic jurists whether a usurper’s rule could ever be legitimate.289 
Some “realism-based” jurists stated that the legitimacy of the usurper had to be 
recognized; other “law-based” jurists insisted on that fighting against the usurper was 
legal.
290
 It is easy to understand that Ottoman historians espoused the law-based 
trend. Their purpose was to make it religiously permissible to fight against the 
Safavids by emphasizing the illegitimacy of their rule in Iran. One may argue that if 
there was such a right of fighting against the Safavid rulers this could only belong to 
the residents of Iran who thought that Ismail was usurper, not to the Ottomans. 
However, the historians knew that Ismail had political aspirations also in eastern 
Anatolia having been ruled by the Akkoyunlus before. Thus, their discussion of 
legitimacy was mostly about eastern territories both states wanted to rule on.    
One signifier of Ottoman self-identity present in many of the sources I use is 
apparent in accounts of Selim’s east campaign. In these accounts, the historians 
create a contrast between the Ottoman self and the Qizilbash other through 
descriptions of Qizilbash respect for historically important religious figures. Before 
marching against the Safavids, the Ottoman army visited the tombs of certain 
religious figures. In addition to those of Bayezid II and Mehmed II, they also visited 
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the tombs of Ebû Eyyûb El-Ensâri and Seyyîd Battal Gâzi, near Eskişehir.291 The 
latter visit is interesting because Seyyîd Battal Gâzi was a heterodox religious figure 
important to the Qizilbash (as well as to today’s Alevi community.) The Ottoman 
army was on its way to fight a war against the Safavids accused of being unbelievers 
by the Ottomans. Moreover, the army visited the tombs of Sadreddin Konevî and 
Mevlana in Konya, both prominent mystical figures in pre-Ottoman Anatolia.
292
 This 
information becomes more meaningful considering that Safavids were imagined as 
having destroyed the tombs and killed respected scholars and Sufis.  
Such visits to the tombs should be considered part of Ottoman military 
tradition in order to ask for the help of God through the intercession of religious 
figures. Nevertheless, giving importance to this detail of the campaign deserves 
further thought, particularly considering that Konya was a detour from the route to 
eastern Anatolia, where the battle was fought. The historian’s accounts were 
sufficient to confirm to readers the respectfulness of Selim toward his own traditions. 
In addition, Kemalpaşazâde mentions that Selim fed the poor and the hungry in 
Konya before marching on the Safavids.
293
 The description of this act consolidated 
Selim’s image as a caring and compassionate sultan, whereas descriptions of his 
opponent, Ismail, indicated that people received nothing but cruelty.    
The depictions of Ismail as the leader of the Safavids hold an important place 
in Ottoman historiography. One image emphasizes his cowardice during the Ottoman 
eastern campaign. Modern historians describe the Çaldıran as a psychological war, in 
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which both Selim and Ismail were sending threatening and sarcastic letters to each 
other. By distributing copies of these letters, the historians humiliated Ismail as a 
cowardly man, not worthy of the sultanate, especially as he was initially reluctant to 
face Selim in the battlefield.
294
 According to Lütfi Paşa, riding horse and the girding 
of the sword were not proper activities for someone afraid of death.
295
 A ruler should 
have no fear. Similarly, Celalzâde says that the womanized breast cannot stand in 
front of the arrow and he continues with a metaphor of a lion and a fox to describe 
Selim and Ismail respectively.
296
 Moreover, Selim, in a letter to Ismail, attempts to 
humiliate him for his womanly fear of battlefield confrontation: Selim could not find 
the Ismail’s army for months.297 Celalzâde also reports on a letter in which Selim 
claimed that he had seen no sign of bravery and manhood in Ismail and advises him 
to give up his political aspirations by saying “You shall give up the claim of 
commandership by wearing headscarf instead of helmet, and chador instead of 
armor.”298  
Ismail is also depicted as licentious by Ottoman historians as he permitted the 
soldiers to bring their wives and children battlefield, which was considered against 
the battlefront ideal of chastity. According to Ottoman narratives, Ismail did this to 
prevent the desertions. As a result, Sâdeddin records, there were many fairy-faced 
women and girls in the Qizilbash army.
299
 At the end of the battle, Ismail’s wife, 
Taclu Hanum, was taken captive and forced to marry Tâcizâde Câfer Çelebi.300 
Selim’s justification for this act was that Ismail was a mürted (apostate), making 
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legally his family and all his properties halal. For that reason, he thought, there was 
no wrong in taking them.
301
 This justification, however, does not seem valid because 
in Islamic law, declaring someone apostate does not give the right to get his wife and 
property (Only if he enslaves him, he has the right to possess them.) 
A passage from Tevarih-i Al’i Osman of Lütfi Paşa shows the regretful image 
of Ismail while displaying the regularity and superiority of the Ottoman army over 
that of the Safavids. In his story, Lütfi Paşa uses an Anatolian named Rumî as he 
introduces the Ottoman army to Shah Ismail as a device to explain Ottoman 
superiority. Making use of quotes from Rumî , Lütfi Paşa implicitly compares the 
two armies: he describes all the troops in the Ottoman army, portraying the 
Janissaries as unbeatable, emphasizing their skill with firearms.
302
 As Roger Savory 
has stated, the efficient use of firearms played a significant role in the Ottoman 
triumph, particularly as Ismail considered them unmanly and cowardly.
303
 As Rumî 
continues to inform Ismail about the Ottoman army, he becomes more and more 
regretful of his attempt to fight against Selim. Lütfi Paşa’s description of the 
Ottoman troops portrays them as a systematic army, well equipped with firearms, 
while the Safavid army is merely a group of marauders.
304
 This contributes positively 
to the self-image created by Ottoman historians. The Safavid army, including 
irregular Qizilbash troops, is thus humiliated, while the superiority of the Ottoman 
army is emphasized.  
When narrating the Çaldıran, the Ottoman historians claimed that the lands 
ruled by the Safavids had seen no prosperity during the Safavid era. The Safavids 
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were plunderers, and the biggest enemy of development and prosperity. They support 
this view usually by the fact that during the search of Ismail, the Ottoman army went 
hungry because there was no food to requisition. Indeed, the Ottoman army did not 
find Safavids in the battlefield for months. The long campaign with no fighting made 
Ottoman soldiers tired. Suffering from the lack of food and water, Ottoman soldiers 
were demanding to return. Some historians attribute this to the devastation the 
Safavids caused in the lands they captured or passed through. Idris aptly describes 
the havoc caused by the Safavid occupation: 
Iranian lands were devastated by the mismanagement of the Qizilbash, and 
nobody has seen such prosperity as in the Anatolian borders and Armenia. No 
ears have heard the voice of drums, dogs or cocks. Obtaining drink and food 
for such a large army became a problem. There was nothing to eat in the 
month-long campaign save grass for the mounts.
305
 
 
According to Sâdeddin too, as the Qizilbash returned from Çaldıran, they looted all 
the places they passed over: “those blood-thirsty people, arrived in Tabriz, 
plundering everywhere on their way like pigs.”306  
On the Safavid side, however, this was probably a military delaying tactic of 
Ismail since his army was not prepared enough. We learn this from Busbecq, who 
also mentioned the plundering by the Qizilbash, but described it differently. 
According to him, laying waste and burning everything in their way, when their land 
was invaded, was a tradition means to push the enemies following them into 
hunger.
307
 Apart from the military side, the Turkish letters of Ogier Ghiselin de 
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Busbecq suggest another reason.
308
 He says that the territories controlled by the 
Qizilbash were much less fertile than the Ottoman territories 
Ottoman narratives emphasize the laxity of the Qizilbash in observing Islamic 
rules during the battle. For example, they record that the Safavids were drunk when 
the Ottoman vanguard troops, under the command of Şehsüvaroğlu Ali Bey, found 
them. They criticized the Qizilbash both for violation of Islamic rules, and their 
levity in the battlefield. Celalzâde reports: “It seems that the Shah was busy with 
wine and libation together with his subjects and commanders.” Recognizing an 
advantage, Ali Bey attacked the Safavids, beating them in this small-scale battle. 
Celalzâde continues his report, noting that the Qizilbash were not only drunk from 
the wine, but also from arrogance.
309
 In contrast, Lütfi Paşa attributes the Safavids’ 
drunkenness not to religious laxity but to “Dutch courage.” Ismail, surprised at the 
size and regularity of the Ottoman army, ordered his soldiers to drink wine so that 
the hard job of victory could be achieved: 
Did you see how Selim, the Sultan of the Rum, came and stand in front of us 
with his great army? It is difficult to achieve this job with a sober mind. 
Anyone, who loves me, and is loyal to me, shall drink wine so that we can 
achieve this job.” Suddenly, he produced some rose wine, pouring some for 
himself from the carafe, and afterwards for his other malignants.
310
 
 
According to Lütfi Paşa, the Safavid method of preparation for a war was one of the 
factors that paved the way for the Ottoman victory.
311
 When narrating this event, the 
Ottoman historians express the confidence that comes from soldiers’ direct 
observations. Accusing the Qizilbash of violating religious prohibitions, the 
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historians’ main purpose was to open the Qizilbash methods of religion and warfare 
to discussion.    
The narratives also depict the Çaldıran war through Ottoman Quranic verses. 
Surah al-Fil, which portrays the fate of those who aimed at Ka’bah is one often-
referenced verses.
312
 . The army of Ebrehe, who wanted to destroy the Ka’bah, was 
defeated by God through the small firestones, carried by flocks of a bird known as 
Ebabil (the Swift). İdris states that the Janissaries were like Ebabil, carrying bullets 
instead of stones.
313
 Emphasizing the military superiority of the Ottomans, Bitlîsî 
states that the Qizilbash was the army of Ebrehe. Sâdeddin gave a more explicit 
example of the relevance of the al-Fil surah: “They (the Janissaries) turned the 
deviant community into the small bites of food by attacking them like Ebabil.”314 
İdris employs another Quranic verse, in narrating the cry Ottoman soldiers “Truth 
has come, and falsehood has departed.” The verse continues: “Indeed, is falsehood 
(by nature), ever bound to depart.”315 Such uses of the Quran certainly increased the 
credibility of the narratives for the reader, as they equated the Qizilbash with the 
non-believers who lived in the time of the Prophet Muhammad.  
 According to 16
th
 century Ottoman historiography, the Ottoman army was 
blessed by God, and the Safavids were unbelievers cursed by God. Edâ’i claimed that 
the Ottomans received their well-being and peace from God, whereas the Qizilbash 
polished the armor of enmity and grudge.
316
 Sâdeddin represents Ottoman troops as 
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soldiers on the path of religion, while portraying the Qizilbash as a community of 
unbelievers.
317
 For Haydar Çelebi, Ottoman troops were Muslim gâzis supported by 
God, and the Qizilbash were godless people whose path was the wrong one. İdris 
supported this opinion, again, with a verse in the Quran: “and God supported him 
[Prophet Muhammad] with angels you did not see…”318 This verse also mentions 
that God helped Prophet Muhammad in his struggle against the polytheists of Mecca 
(Mekke Müşrikleri). Thus, Haydar Çelebi implied, God was with the Ottomans in 
their fight against the unbelievers. A similarly dichotomy is expressed in Lütfi’s 
depiction of Selim and Ismail: “One is the sea of cruelty; the other is faith. One is the 
soldier of evil; the other is the soldier of God. One has his black fate cover his 
sorrowed face. The flag of one is supported by God; that of the other is cursed by 
God.”319 So it is understood by the reader that the Qizilbash were not simple heretics 
but, according to the narrators, infidels. 
 The Çaldıran war, depicted as the war of good against evil, was a turning point 
in the history of the Ottoman dynasty. The way it is narrated by Ottoman historians 
teaches us a lot about the Ottoman perception of the Qizilbash. By using contrasts 
between various angles of the Ottoman-Qizilbash conflict, the historians provide 
legitimacy for Selim’s aggressive anti-Qizilbash policies.  
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4.2.    Turning Hell Into Paradise: Selim’s Occupation of Tabriz 
 
A description of the occupation of Tabriz by Selim is the best example of the 
contrasts, developed by Ottoman historians, between the Ottomans and the Qizilbash. 
Tabriz, the capital city of the Safavids, was located in northern Iran. Capturing the 
city was politically important for the Ottomans. Following the battle of Çaldıran, 
Selim occupied the Tabriz, staying eight days. He then departed for Amasya, where 
he wintered. The choice of Amasya was due to resistance of the Janissary corps tired 
of campaigning for months, and the fear of potential return of the Qizilbash to 
Tabriz.
320
 Tabriz was re-occupied by Ismail as soon as Selim departed. Despite the 
shortness of Selim’s stay in Tabriz, Ottoman historians depict him as having 
reinforced the Sunni faith there. In this section, I will examine this reinforcement as 
presented in the Ottoman historians’ narration of Selim’s occupation of Tabriz. It is 
not important here to assess whether the amendments of Selim mentioned by the 
historians actually happened. Rather, I will focus on how Ottoman historians 
depicted the city of Tabriz before Selim’s occupation and on his departure. This will 
improve understanding of the Ottoman historians’ perceptions of the self and other. 
The narrative of Selim’s occupation of Tabriz contrasts the Ottoman and 
Safavid rules. According to Ottoman historians Sunni beliefs, which had been 
damaged in the city by Ismail, were then renewed by Selim. Selim is shown in 
contrast to Ismail. When narrating the occupation, Lütfi Paşa and İdris-i Bitlîsî rely 
on a Prophetic tradition that in each century God would send a mujaddid (renewer of 
religion), who would explain matters of religion in order to rid it of bid’ah 
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(innovations).
321
 It is typical that no consensus on the identity of the renewer exists 
for a certain century. However, according to Lütfi Paşa and İdris-i Bitlîsî, the 
renewer of the 9
th
 century in the Islamic calendar was Selim, due to his decisive 
struggle against the Qizilbash.
322
 They thought that Selim deserved the title of 
mujaddid because he saved the people of Islam (like Sunnis in Tabriz) from the 
cruelty and heresy of the Qizilbash and reinforced the strength of Islamic rules in the 
world, especially in Iran and Central Asia.  
 
4.2.1.   Tabriz from Ismail’s Claim to Selim’s Occupation (1501-1514) 
 
Consolidating his power in Iran, Ismail established Safavid autonomy in 
Tabriz in 1501. The Tabriz and Iran of this time, was considered by Ottoman 
historians as having entered a dark age (cahiliyye), full of damages and insults to the 
core religion. The historians note that, while the city was a center of Sunni faith in 
past, it was now captured by a non-believer and resident Sunnis were forced to 
exchange their pure faith into heresy. Indeed, the majority of the Iranian population 
was Sunni before and after, Ismail, despite the substantial numbers of Shi’as in 
northern Iran and Horasan.
323
 It was not until the time of Shah Abbas (1587-1629) 
that the majority of the Iranian population converted to Shi’a Islam. At that time, 
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religious conversion succeeded because of the significant contribution of Shi’ite 
scholars imported from Jabal Amel in southern Lebanon.
324
 
 Among the Ottoman populations, the best known accusation regarding Ismail 
was his persecution of the Sunni dwellers of Tabriz. Kemalpaşazâde records that 
Ismail killed all of the Sunnis—adults and children—burnt them whether they were 
dead or alive, and scattered their ashes into the wind. He rid the city of Tabriz, once 
the center of Islam, of Sharia and filled it with cruelty of heresy and bid’ah.325 As I 
will discuss below, many Sunnis fled into Anatolia to escape the persecutions of 
Ismail. The migration of Nakshi and Halveti mystics to Anatolia, especially, 
consolidated the position of Sunni religious orders in the Ottoman lands.  
 According the narratives of Ottoman historians, Ismail’s tyranny was not 
limited to persecutions of Sunni people. They also portray him as disrespectful 
towards the mosques and traditions of Sunni Islam. For example, he converted the 
Uzun Hasan mosque in Tabriz into a military arsenal.
326
 The tradition of Friday 
prayer was almost abandoned under Ismail and when, it was occasionally performed, 
the hutbe was recited in the name of Ismail, instead of the names of hulefâ-i raşidîn 
(the initial four caliphs following the Prophet).
327
 The conclusion of the narrators was 
that Ismail was unworthy as he attacked the family of the Prophet and the obligatory 
and supererogatory rituals of the religion.  
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4.2.2.   Tabriz after Selim’s Occupation 
 
The historians who provided the Ottoman narratives mention that certain 
Sunni dwellers of Tabriz invited Selim to conquer the city and save them from 
Ismail’s heresy and cruelty. In their writings, they portray Selim as the sole protector 
of Sunni Islam. The Tabriz Sunnis were remnants of the Seljuks and Akkoyunlus, 
both deemed earlier protectors of true religion.
328
 Such a letter inviting Selim to 
rescue them is recounted by Lütfi Paşa. This is a letter from the ulemâ of 
Transoxania, in which Selim is described as the Mehdi-yi ahıri’z-zeman (the savior 
commissioned by God), and requested to help remove heresy.
329
 Anotherr letter 
comes from someone called İsfahanlı Molla Hoca, who states that he was a Sunni 
and a follower of the religious sciences. He invited Selim to conquer Iranian lands 
and rescue the sincere believers from the cruelty of the Qizilbash.
330
 In the same 
letter, Molla Hoca also indicated that he considered Selim as Zülkarneyn, who he 
believed would come from Anatolia to conquer Iran and rule there for two 
centuries.
331
 Celalzâde posits that Molla derived these clues about Zülkarneyn from 
the hadith collections, though he cites none. Zülkarneyn is mostly identified with the 
Alexander the Great of Macedonia (323 BC), who can be considered as the first 
Conqueror of the history.
332
 There has been a vast amount of eulogistic literature 
about him in Islamic realms too. Thus, the figure of Zülkarneyn was presented as a 
                                                             
328
 Celalzâde, pp. 263–264.  
329
 Lütfi Paşa, 149–153.  
330
 Celalzâde, p. 264–266.  
331
 Ibid, p. 266. Zülkarneyn is a Quranic figure, whose the prophethood is not certain. He built a wall 
or rampart of iron against Gog and Magog on request of the oppressed people. Al-Iskandar, EI2.  
332
 Feridun Emecen, Zamanın İskenderi, Şarkın Fatihi: Yavuz Sultan Selim, p. 13.  
107 
 
good example of a ruler like Selim, who claimed to be the Conqeuror of the 
World.
333
 
 With the support of these letters, which provide Selim with justification, the 
Ottoman army marched on Tabriz just after the Çaldıran war. Selim sent a vanguard 
of 400 Janissaries, led by İdris-i Bitlîsî, to prevent the plundering by the Qizilbash.334 
İdris-i Bitlîsî described his task as saving the city from the attacks of the devils, 
providing the Ottomans with moral support among the city dwellers, and dispelling 
fears and anxieties of the population about an Ottoman occupation.
335
 İdris-i Bitlîsî 
was a former Akkoyunlu officer and spoke Persian, so his selection was reasonable. 
Upon arrival in Tabriz, İdris arranged a meeting in which the notables and scholars 
participated and he read a message from Selim: 
I am honored to give the good news to the People of the Oneness (ehl-i tevhid) 
that I waged a holy war against the People of the Heresy (ehl-i ilhad). My 
intention in invading towards the East is to revive the signs of religion, and to 
replace the false religion, using my sword. It is my aim to revitalize the 
primary and secondary fundamentals of the religion.
336
 
 
İdris repeats his mention that Selim’s purpose: “…was solely to help the 
religion. He never intended to receive anyone’s property. He did not sit on the throne 
of the Shahs in Tabriz. He did not take their properties away.”337 İdris thus contrasts 
Selim and Ismail, who was responsible for cruelty before Selim’s occupation of the 
city of Tabriz. İdris argues that Selim’s intention was not to hold and manage 
anyone’s land, but only to serve as a renewer of the religion. While Selim’s initial 
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intention was to stay longer in Tabriz, he changed this decision. According to Edâ’i, 
Selim sat on the throne of Tabriz and coined money in his own name.
338
 Thus, Idris’ 
statement that Selim was not willing to conquer the city is not supported by other 
sources.  
 As far as Ottoman historians are concerned, Selim was welcomed into Tabriz 
with a spectacular ceremony.
339
 This implies that Tabriz’s people were fed up with 
Safavid pressure and cruelty. According to Kemalpaşazâde, the Sunni population of 
Tabriz was pleased with Selim’s arrival because they no longer had to conceal their 
identities, as during the Safavid rule. Despite the Safavid pressure, however, they 
still had managed to preserve their belief that is described by Sâdeddin as the 
religious sect of müçtehid imamlar (four major interpreter imams in Sunni Islam).340 
Sâdeddin describes the happiness of Sunnis in the city as follows: 
At that time, the Sunni population, most of whom were Iranians, avoided the 
Qizilbash behaviors that they had not witnessed among their ancestors. For this 
reason, they saw the coming of the true-faith Padişah (Selim), who defeated the 
heretics and helped his co-religionists, as the guarantor of their wellbeing. 
Considering this event as the rebirth of the Shari’a of the Prophet, they 
welcomed the arrival of the Sultan.
341
 
 
It is also interesting that the people of Tabriz asked Selim for mercy by saying that 
they were not the Qizilbash:  
You are like Sedd-i İskender (Alexander’s Gate for Gog and Magog), you are 
the founder of the hill of the people of religion… O saint, you shall know we 
are all Sunnis; this is the love of Ebubekir, Osman, Ömer and Ali. O Shah, 
mercy upon Tabriz, your state shall live eternally, the east is scared of your 
sword, the fire of rage shall not destroy Tabriz.
342
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Recounting of the names of four caliphs by the Tabrizi Sunnis is important because 
the Safavids were accused of disrespectfulness towards the first three caliphs before 
Ali.
343
 In contrast, by showing their respect to Ebubekir, Osman and Ali, the 
historians conclude that Tabriz welcomed Selim’s occupation. 
At the request of the people of Tabriz, Selim commanded his troops not to 
damage the city.
344
 This act parallel’s Mehmed II’s conquest of Istanbul, as Mehmed 
II had called for preservation of the city as it would be the abode of Islam. Although 
Selim did not pillage Tabriz, he permitted the killing of any Qizilbash caught by 
Ottoman soldiers. Kemalpaşazâde says that anyone suspected of being a Qizilbash 
was killed immediately.
345
 The persecution of Qizilbash was not limited to Tabriz, 
but also extended to Nahçivan, the next-nearest city to Tabriz.346 
 I argue that Selim’s occupation of Tabriz is depicted by the Ottoman historians 
in order to justify the future policies against the Qizilbash. In the Ottoman narratives, 
the purpose of the occupation of Tabriz was reconstruction of the Sunni faith in the 
city. According to the historians, Selim’s arrival was salvation to the Sunni dwellers 
of Tabriz. To this end, the mosque of Uzun Hasan was immediately prepared for 
Friday prayer. One week later, Friday prayer was performed there with many 
participants, welcomed enthusiastically by the residents of Tabriz, even those who 
were unfamiliar with the four caliphs.
347
 In the prayer, the names of Selim, the four 
caliphs, and the companions of the Prophet Muhammad were mentioned. İdris 
reports that, once devoid of these beauties, the residents of Tabriz were now peaceful 
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and secure that they could again pursue the beautiful traditions of Islam.
348
 
Kemalpaşazâde records the feelings of the people of Tabriz. “[T]hey were praying 
the fair shadow of the Sultan to cover all of the Iranian cities, and for his justice to 
remove the existence of those inauspicious peoples.”349 
 The Friday prayer in Tabriz was narrated differently by a Safavid chronicler. 
Hasan-ı Rumlu was the son of a Qizilbash chief in the service first of Ismail and then 
of Tahmasb.
350
 As he narrated events, when it came to the name of the Padişah while 
the hutbe was recited, the imam said “Sultan Abdülmuzaffer İsmail Bahadır Hân.” 
Rumlu adds that Ottoman soldiers wanted to kill the imam, but the Sultan Selim did 
not give them consent, on the grounds that it was a mistake made out of routine. 
Moreover, according to Rumlu, Selim said that it was a pity that three seyyids 
(descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) died in the battle of Çaldıran. Rumlu 
attributes Selim’s early departure to his fear of the potential return of Ismail to the 
city by using a verse from the Quran: “He cast terror into their hearts.”351 
 Rumlu’s narrative reminds us that the chroniclers one way or another will 
always reflect the official stance of their patrons. However, unlike the Ottoman 
historians, Rumlu used a neutral language when talking about the Ottomans or the 
sultan. He often calls Selim the Sultan of Rum. Thus, we can consider 
abovementioned relatively negative comments as exception to our generalization that 
Safavid chronicles used a neutral way of expression about the Ottomans. The same 
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assessment holds for the Lübbü’t Tevârih of the Safavid historian Abdullatif Kazvinî. 
He even seems to ignore the Ottoman part of early Safavid history.
352
 
 It is useful to understand more of the history of Tabriz to understand why 
Selim’s occupation of the city was narrated as it was by Ottoman historians. Tabriz 
was an important city of the Seljuks, of whom the Ottomans considered themselves 
legitimate heirs. Although the city would be ruled first by Karakoyunlu and then by 
Akkoyunlu polities, the majority of the population of Tabriz was still Sunni—or so 
the Ottoman historians insist. Sources written before 1517, when the Ottoman state 
captured the caliphate from the Mamluks, wrote their narrative differently. However, 
most of the sources I use here were written during the reign of Süleyman (1520-
1566). At that time, the Ottoman sultan, as the Caliph, was presented as the sole 
protector of people of Sunni Islam, regardless of where they lived. Therefore, it 
would not be an exaggeration to state that this narrative thread was a product of such 
a perception of the caliphate. This kind of narrative also gives the readers of Ottoman 
histories an understanding of Safavids’ lifestyles, religions and administrative 
mentalities.  
Moreover, I argue that this narrative was written to justify Ottoman 
occupation of the capital city of a neighboring Islamic state. It is well known that 
Tabriz was occupied many times by the Ottomans after this first occupation. Yet 
there was an Ottoman rule between 1585 and 1603.
353
 This information is also 
important to understanding the value of Tabriz as an eastern garrison for the 
Ottomans. In order to justify the occupation, Ottoman historians had to argue that the 
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city was filled with Ismail’s heresy and cruelty until the day Selim arrived there. 
Both the Ottoman defeat of the Safavids on the battlefield, and that the Safavid 
disrespect to the traditions of Islam legitimized the occupation of their lands. 
 
4.3.    Humiliating the “Other”, Glorifying the “Self” 
 
The emergence of the Qizilbash threat clearly drew the boundaries of Self and 
Other in the 16
th
 century Ottoman historical works. The authors of those works 
determined the Self as more urban, more educated, more just and finally more Sunni; 
the Qizilbash Other consisted of uneducated nomads who followed a heretical 
religion. Qizilbash were also condemned for rebelling against the central authority by 
allying with Shah Ismail.  
In this section, I will examine the social, cultural and religious aspects of the 
Ottoman perception of the Qizilbash. I argue that the extensive use of historiography 
as a vehicle for political and religious propaganda began in the 16
th
 century as a 
response to the Qizilbash threat. Although I will look to other sources, İdris-i Bitlîsî’s 
Selimshahnâme is the main source for this section, as it includes a considerable 
quantity of information about the social, cultural and religious aspects of Ottoman 
official discourse regarding the Qizilbash. While other Selimnâmes focus on the 
political events, and the legendary figure of Selim, Idris includes long depictions of 
the Qizilbash.
354
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4.3.1.    Nomadism: Ignorance and Poorness 
 
As described above, the Ottoman state was founded by Turcoman nomads at 
the turn of 14
th
 century.
355
 However, in the process of establishing an imperial order, 
the behavior of Ottomans towards the nomadic Turcomans altered significantly. 
Turcoman rebellions, and Turcoman allegiance to the Safavids, alienated them from 
the Ottoman regime. This alienation can be observed through an examination of 16
th
 
century Ottoman sources including mühimme registers, fatwas, anti-Qizilbash 
polemical literature and historical writing. Before analyzing the alienation as it is 
described in the historiography, it will be useful to examine further the image of 
Turcomans in pre-Selim chronicles to see differences. Although pejorative 
expressions regarding the nomadic Turcomans and heterodox religion can be traced 
in 15
th
 century chronicles, use of the word “Turk” in these instances was not 
necessarily pejorative. For example, Neşri (d. circa 1520) did not hesitate to use 
“Turk” as a synonym for Muslim or Ottoman.356 Two factors, the subjugation of 
Islamic holy lands, and the Qizilbash rebellions and coalition with the Safavids, 
meant that the Turkish character of the state was subsumed into the more powerful 
Sunni Islamic character in the 16
th
 century, and Ottoman lands entered a Arabo-
Persian cultural hegemony. This situation would last until the 20
th
 century, when 
Turkishness was revived as the pillar of identity.  
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 Yet in the 16
th
 century, Ottoman sources tend to use the word Turk 
pejoratively. This is ironic, as many of authors seemed proud of attributing the roots 
of the Ottoman dynasty to Oğuz Turks of Central Asia. It is equally ironic that these 
authors did not believe that the Muslim and pre-Islam Turkish identities contradicted 
each other.
357
 Still, not only the religion of the Qizilbash but also what we recognize 
as their ethnic identity came under rigid criticism by Ottoman historians. One 
explanation offered for this contradiction is that the humiliation efforts were not 
about ethnic identity, but about class stratification.
358
 Ottoman society was divided 
into two groups, reaya and askeri.
359
 Ottoman historians considered the askerî well-
educated, religious and just, honored with the service of the Ottoman dynasty. As 
Celalzâde describes the pre-Bayezid Ottoman statesmen, they: 
. . . consulted in state affairs, were the courageous, the virtuous and the mature 
of their time. They indeed had pure faith, and were just, merciful, sincere and 
religious. To this group, deviance from the truth and bribery were great crimes. 
Despite not being nobles, the ordinary people could also reach the post of the 
vizierate, provided that they received a good education.
360
 
 
Celalzâde states that a door was left open to members of the reaya, that is, a reaya 
could become join the ruling strata. However, we know that this was seldom 
possible, especially after the mid-14
th
 century. Nobility (i.e., an askeri ancestor) was 
generally required for one to reach the highest ranks of the imperial hierarchy. 
As far as Ottoman narratives are concerned, the reaya can be divided into two 
groups in terms of their obedience to the state. A careful examination of Ottoman 
histories reveals that there was always an ideal subject in the Ottoman Empire. The 
                                                             
357
 Lütfi Paşa, p. 154.  
358
 Aslı Ergül, “The Ottoman Identity,” p. 634.  
359
 Karen Barkey, Empires of Difference, p. 76.  
360
 Celalzâde, p. 278.  
115 
 
accepted, ideal, or conformist reaya is loyal to the Ottoman regime. The unaccepted 
or non-conformist reaya is not. Of course, accepted and unaccepted types changed 
according to the different conditions. Generally speaking, however, 16
th
 century 
developments determined the idealized model. This new type of ideal subject was the 
exact opposite of the Qizilbash: Obedient (not dealing with the political issues, which 
are not his or her business), tax-paying, and remaining within the boundaries of his 
or her status of reaya.  
Images of the Qizilbash in sixteenth-century Ottoman historical writing 
reflect these assumptions. In certain narratives, being Turcoman is equal to being 
poor and idle. In his writing about the Şahkulu rebellion, Sâdeddin refers to the 
social stratification of those involved noting “the jobless, the penniless people, who 
spent their lives on foot, possessed the brilliant horses, riding while yelling 
“Shah!”361 Similarly, İdris recounts that “it could be only a dream for a nomadic 
Turk to possess such a beautiful horse…”362 Emphasizing the poverty of the Turks, 
Kemalpaşazâde continues the same line of argument, describing “the dirty Turks, 
who had wooden feet and never mounted a horse.”363 Considering that these passages 
were derived from the portions regarding the Şahkulu rebellion, one may argue that 
the Ottoman historians were attempting to create a contrast between the Qizilbash 
soldiers and the better-equipped Ottoman soldiers. In other words, with an attempt at 
humiliation, they emphasized that normally it was nearly impossible for a nomadic 
Turcoman to be a part of the Ottoman cavaliers. 
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 The Ottoman historians also characterized the Qizilbash as ignorant and 
mentally deficient people. This image was the opposite of the Ottoman self-image, 
which emphasized education and urbanity. In fact, the central authority viewed not 
only the Turks but all of peasants and nomads in the same way. For example, Turks 
were etrak-ı bi idrak (Turks with low capacity of understanding), and Kurds, a 
mountainous people, were nothing more than ekrad-ı bi idrak (Kurds with low 
capacity of understanding). They were expected to remain within their social position 
without becoming involved in political affairs. Addressing the problem between the 
Ottomans and the Dulkadir leader Alaüddevle, a man of Turcoman origin, İdris calls 
him “a foolish, woolly-minded Turk who dares to show me the way with blood-
shedding! Oh how uncultivated!”364 Sâdeddin, recounts comments of those who 
believed that Ahmed was not worthy of the throne. In these quotes, the Qizilbash are 
defined as “some çarıklıs (those wearing simple shoes made of rawhide) among the 
Anatolian Turks” and “some bald and barefooted” people.365 Sâdeddin describes the 
Turks of Antalya in passing as those who understand nothing, like animals.
366
 The 
overall impression is that Turks were widely regarded as ignorant people without any 
sense of understanding.
367
  
Using such imagery of the Qizilbash, Ottoman historians drew a boundary 
between the educated askerî class and uneducated or ignorant masses—the Self and 
the Other. This was in part a result of the rise of Ottoman urban culture—high 
culture—under the influence of Arab and Persian traditions in the 16th century. High 
culture representatives included scholars, educated statesmen, professional 
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bureaucrats and merchants. The description of the Qizilbash as poor nomads was a 
product of the growing gap between the urban culture of the Ottoman elites and the 
low culture of the nomads such as the Qizilbash, unsophisticated people living in 
rural areas. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the authors regarded being nomad, and, 
by extension being a Turk, as a sign of ignorance and saw nomadic existence as the 
main cause of the Qizilbash rebellions. According to the Ottoman historians, these 
poor nomads should have been loyal to the sultan, of whom they always needed 
protection. 
 
4.3.2.   Uncultivated Men: Atrocity and Mercilessness 
 
The Qizilbash were not only condemned for their nomadism, they were also 
portrayed as wild and merciless. Qizilbashi would kill anyone regardless, man, 
woman or child, young or old. Their main target, according to the Ottoman history 
chroniclers, was religious men and women, especially Sunni sheikhs. According to 
Şükrî, Shah Ismail legalized the merciless persecution of the pious.368 Sâdeddin cites 
an occurrence when the Şahkulu rebels were fleeing to Iran: 
On their way back, they encountered a caravan. Killing the caravan owner, 
they stole all of their properties. Sheikh İbrahim-i Şebüsteri, the author of 
Enbiyanâme, and his son were also in the caravan. He took such a risk with the 
intention of making a pilgrimage. The caravan plunderers martyred him as 
well. Yet they say that when the sheikh saw that those blood drinkers are 
attempting to kill his son, he begged them to kill himself first. Ignoring his 
pleas, those killers first killed the sheikh’s son only for oppression and torment. 
                                                             
368
 Şükrî, p. 137.  
118 
 
Seeing this, the sheikh fell down, screaming “Allah”. They immediately 
martyred him in that position.
369
 
 
This passage includes several important points about the Other. They stole from 
innocent and pious people. This was “unlawful warfare” (hirabah). It was well-
known to Sâdeddin’s audience that Islam permits Muslim holy warriors to take the 
property of the enemy following a victory. There was no religious or legal base to 
robbing the innocent, however. Second, the Others did not hesitate to kill a religious 
scholar. Sâdeddin records later that İbrahim-i Şebüsteri was highly versed in the 
sciences of tafsir (the Quranic exegesis) and hadith (the prophetic tradition). He was 
a mystic adhering to Nakşibendi Sufi sect, which suffered from Ismail’s Sunni 
persecutions in Iran.
370
 Sâdeddin implies that ruthless persecution of such a scholar 
shows that the Qizilbash had no respect for scholarship or for Islamic sciences. Such 
persecutions were even a religious duty for the Qizilbash, according to İdris.371 Third 
and most important, despite the fact that Şebüsteri begged them not to show him the 
murder of his son, they did so deliberately. That is, they had no sense of mercy. They 
killed him too while he was facedown and defenseless.  
Kemalpaşazâde recounts a similar story regarding the atrocities of Ismail. 
According to his chronicle, Ismail persecuted the Şeyhülislam of Herat, a descendant 
of Sâdeddin Taftazâni, together with his 60 students because they did not pay 
homage to him.
372
 
                                                             
369
 Sâdeddin, p. 65.  
370
 Hamid Algar, “Naqshibandîs and Safavids: A Contribution to the Religious History of Iran and her 
Neighbors,” Safavid Iran and her Neighbors, ed. Michel Mazzoui (Salt Lake City: The University of 
Utah Press, 2003), p. 31.  
371
 İdris, p. 132.  
372
 Kemalpaşazâde, p. 85.  
119 
 
 In another passage, Sâdeddin attempts to show the ruthlessness of Shah Ismail: 
“This deviant ugly-face Shah killed his birth mother, who was the daughter of Hasan 
Han, because she attempted to divert him return from the path of heresy and 
cruelty.”373 Further accusations of cruelty can be found in Sâdeddin’s accounts. He 
accuses Ismail and his soldiers of cannibalism: He states that Ismail ordered his 
soldiers to eat the bodies of Alaüddevle’s two grandsons who had been captured and 
killed during the campaign against the Dulkadirs.
374
 The practice of cannibalism is 
also mentioned by Safavid sources, but as a sign of loyalty and piety.
375
  
In the hands of the Ottoman historians, images of the Qizilbash as savages 
capable of the most extreme acts of barbarity carried obvious implications. By 
condemning the Qizilbash as barbarians, Ottoman historians presented the Self as 
civilized. Accordingly, those suffering from the cruel acts of Ismail in Iran asked for 
mercy from the Ottoman sultan. İdris, for example, indicates that “Most of the 
innocent in danger were asking for the mercy of this dynasty that grants the plenty of 
livelihoods. They were appealing for the help of this dergah with the intention of 
taking shelter in the shadow of compassion.”376 Similarly, and in contrast to the cruel 
image of Ismail in the Ottoman narratives, Selim is portrayed as a merciful sultan 
against the suffering of people. İdris reports that Sultan Selim ordered his troops to 
act mercifully against the bystanders during the campaign. No victim of Ismail 
should be harmed, Selim told his men.
377
 Sâdeddin presents Selim as punishing 
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toward the cruel, and mild against the victim.
378
 Using a similar language, Celalzâde 
says that he returned goodness with goodness, and malignancy with harsh 
malignancy.
379
 In sum, Ottoman lands were presented as peaceful place under the 
protection of the sultan, whereas Safavid lands were not safe because of the tyranny 
of Shah himself. This merciful portrait of Selim, who pursued a harsh policy against 
the Qizilbash, in the Ottoman historiography probably aimed to present him as a man 
who differentiates the good and the evil, and thus to better justify his acts.    
The merciless image of the Qizilbash also justified the act of war against the 
Qizilbash. It was the sultan’s duty to protect not only his own subjects and Sunnis of 
Iran who were suffering from the cruelty of the Qizilbash. Thus, the political 
confrontation between the Qizilbash and the Ottomans consolidated the religious 
position of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
4.3.3.   Disobedience and Waywardness 
 
An ideal reaya should be obedient to the state and the sultan, and should act 
in accordance with his or her social status. In Islamic terminology, the legitimacy of 
the command for obedience to the sultan was derived from the verse of Nisa in the 
Quran: “O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in 
authority among you.”380 Providing that the authority did not command his subjects 
to disobey God’s commands, obeying him was equal to obeying Allah and the 
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Prophet.
381
 Although during the initial two centuries of Islam there was a place for 
rightful political activism (kıyam) when faced with an unjust ruler, later Islamic 
jurisprudence advocated for a surrender and absolute obedience to authority, 
rejecting the right of rebellion.
382
 It became a duty to obey the ruler, whether he was 
good or bad, or even if he were a tyrant. Tyranny was better than anarchy.
383
 
Another legal issue important to discussions of Self and Other in the 16
th
 
century Ottoman world is the concept of territorialism, as expressed in the Hanafi 
School of law, the official sect of the Ottoman Empire. According to this doctrine, 
the territories ruled by Muslims are called dâr’ü-l Islam (the abode of Islam), while 
those ruled by non-Muslims are called dâr’ü-l harb (the abode of war or non-
Muslims).
384
 There was an implicit contract between the state and the dwellers of the 
abode of Islam, whether Muslim or not. Adherents to Hanafi territorialism believed 
that every individual living in dâr’ü-l Islam had accepted this contract innately. 
Those who broke this contract by rebelling against the ruler would make their 
persecution legal.
385
  
This information makes clear why Ottoman historians condemned the 
Qizilbash rebellions for their disobedience as fitne (civil strife) instead of kıyam (the 
legal right of rebelling against an unjust ruler). Civil strife would plunge a country 
into anarchy. According to Ottoman historians, anarchy was the purpose of the 
Qizilbash, who were wicked by nature and incapable of obeying the state and the 
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sultan. Within the context of Şahkulu rebellion, the historians used similar phrases to 
describe the Qizilbash character. Sâdeddin stated that the Turks of Antalya were 
unruly and stubborn by nature. Ill-temperedness was another feature of their inferior 
natures.
386
 One of the frequently used terms to describe the Qizilbash is dike burun, 
which means a stubborn person who does not obey.
387
  
As for the Ottoman historians, the rebellious Turcomans took advantage of 
the chaotic environment in the Ottoman Empire that stemmed from the dynastic 
struggle between Bayezid’s sons. Celalzâde records:  
Seeing the movements and insurgences of the princes, Şahkulu came to realize 
that the country was empty and there was no one protecting it. Also, there was 
nobody in the sultanate. Without any delay, he gathered the mischief-makers 
around him and rebelled.
388
 
 
It is also possible to show the important of obedience to the Ottoman state by 
comparing the historians’ depictions of the Qizilbash with their depictions of the 
Kurds of eastern Anatolia. The Ottomans were supported by Kurds in their struggle 
against the Qizilbash. Şükrî reports that the Kurds showed their obedience by kissing 
the hands of the sultan during the campaign of Tabriz.
389
 This obedience was a result 
of the promise of the Sultan to honor the Kurds, and to shower them with gifts if they 
showed their loyalty to the sultan by fighting against the Qizilbash.
390
 The chronicler 
İdris-i Bitlîsî was of Kurdish origin, and his narrative reveals very well how the 
Kurds allied themselves with the Ottomans. He met with prominent Kurdish leaders, 
to invite the pure-faith Muslim community to be subject to and in compliance with 
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the sultan in the duty of fighting against the Qizilbash. After accepting this invitation, 
İdris states, the Kurds kicked the Qizilbash out of their region and plundered their 
properties.
391
 İdris continues, remarking that “With the benefit of alliance with the 
sultan of holy warriors, they managed to take back the hereditary lands that were 
usurped by the Qizilbash through oppression and violence.”392 İdris also mentions 
that Kurdish leaders asked him if the Ottoman administration would appoint a 
commander who could enable the Kurdish troops to act in unity. Since they were 
mountainous people, İdris adds, they were not able to act together and opposing 
against their peers was their temper.
393
 The Ottoman elites preferred Kurdish nomads 
and peasants to their Turkish counterparts. İdris repeatedly alleges that this 
preference was owing to the fact that Kurds were Sunni religious people. However, 
there were also practical reasons: use of their military ability against the Qizilbash, 
and receiving the properties of the Qizilbash. In essence, using the example of 
mountainous Kurdish tribes, İdris attempts to explain how a low status subject should 
behave.  
 Another sign of the ideal of obedience expected by the Ottoman administration 
is elaborated by Edâ’i. Following the Çaldıran battle, the Ottoman troops marched on 
Alaüddevle, the ruler of the Dulkadir and of Turcoman origin. He was explicit in his 
denial of Ottoman authority. An interesting note is that Alaüddevle was the 
grandfather of Selim and father in law of Bayezid. Selim was angry of Alaüddevle’s 
preventing the convoy of food going to the Ottoman army waiting for the war against 
the Safavids.
394
 As Edâ’i reports:  
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[Alaüddevle] possessed many properties and much wealth; but he got all this 
wealth thanks to the state of the sultan of Rum. There was an agreement 
between him and the sultan that the sultan would not covet his crown and 
throne, and in exchange Alaüddevle will not leave the path of obedience and 
never ride a high horse with arrogance.
395
 
 
Edâ’i then mentions the suggestions of a member of Alaüddevle’s entourage. These 
suggestions perfectly reveal the strength of the Ottomans, and the potential result of 
rebelling against them. In order to show this strength, Edâ’i goes on saying that 
nobody could defeat the sultan in the battlefield; nonetheless, if he [Alaüddevle] 
apologizes, the sultan of the world, with his great forgiveness, would have forgiven 
him.
396
 
 This disobedient character of the Qizilbash—as defined by the Ottomans or the 
Ottoman historians—was one factor that justified the Ottoman war against them. 
Disobedience against the ruler was in itself enough to justify the war. Ebussuud, the 
Şeyhülislam of Süleyman I, he replied to a question asking about the legality of 
Qizilbash persecution by stating that “Their persecution is legal for two reasons, one 
being their having brought swords against the soldiers of Islam (bagî) and the other 
being they are infidels in many respect.
397
 One problem, however, in the fatwa of 
Ebussuud is that a bagî is theoretically a Muslim rebel against legitimate ruler and 
cannot be infidel. A modern scholar suggests that an explanation to this contradiction 
may be that Ebussuud implied that the Ottoman sultan was just ruler and must 
therefore be obeyed.
398
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4.3.4.   Betrayal: Alliance with the Safavids (Qizilbash?) 
 
Prior to examining the Ottoman accusations of betrayal by the Qizilbash, it is 
important to restate that the Ottoman historians generally make no distinction 
between the Anatolian Turkish people, called “Qizilbash”, and the Safavids of Iran. 
It is more important to remember that the Qizilbash were Anatolian nomadic-tribal 
Turks who had founded the Safavid state. In a strict sense, then, it may not be correct 
to argue that the Qizilbash allied with the Safavids but rather, recognize it as a way 
for both to avoid succumbing to the Ottoman autonomy. Nonetheless, we can assume 
that there was an alliance between the Qizilbash and the governing strata of the 
Safavid state, and that this alliance had a religious impact on the Qizilbash.  
 By the tenth century, and especially under the sheikdom of Cüneyd, the sheikhs 
of the Safaviyye order became spiritually important for Anatolian Turcomans. This 
continuing relationship intensified when the Safavids became both political and 
militant, culminating under Ismail in 1501. Ismail conducted intense religious and 
political propaganda campaigns in Anatolia; the Ottomans considered these activities 
a great challenge for the existence of state and religion. However, it was not until the 
reign of Selim that the Ottomans employed harsh policies against the Safavids and 
their Anatolian collaborators. Furthermore, these policies were supported by literary 
works. Without any doubt, this collaboration was the most significant factor for the 
harsh reaction of the Ottomans to the Qizilbash. 
 It should be emphasized that in addition to discontent created by the Ottoman 
imperial regime, and the religious links between the Safavid sheikhs and Anatolian 
Turcomans, an economic factor also motivated these masses to rally around the 
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Safavid flag. In the 16
th
 century, the Ottoman sultan still considered himself as 
supreme gazî.399 However, one result of increasing military institutionalization and 
developing international relations was that the Ottoman state ceased to be an ideal 
place for gazâ, military raids into the enemy lands. Nomadic-tribal Turcomans living 
in the frontiers were replaced by Kapıkulu troops and earthbound provincial soldiers, 
i.e. tımarlı sipahis. With the rise of the Safavids, Anatolian Turks found new 
opportunities for gazâ, in which they gained plunder in return.  
 Ottoman historians portrayed the insurgent Qizilbash as betrayers, the agents 
and provocateurs of the Safavids in Anatolia. Sâdeddin explains the relationship 
between Turks of Anatolia and the Safavids as one in which  
Turks, devoid of any understanding, got into contact with and adopted the 
deviance of the grubby ones, without knowing their true face. They sacrificed 
their children and properties to the Shah. Those who are able to visit him with 
oblations and gifts. Sending countless offerings through their shamelessly 
deviant caliphs, they see the door of the Shah, who is proud of his sins, as 
hacet kapısı (a gate of giving for the needy), even the Ka’ba of desires. They 
present their grown up daughters or sisters as gifts to the Shah’s men, who 
should be defeated. When they hear of the name of the Shah, they immediately 
fall prostrate.
400
 
 
This passage includes many clues to the close relationship between the Qizilbash and 
the Safavids. We understand that the relationship was facilitated by Ismail’s caliphs, 
or agents in Anatolia. Second, Sâdeddin states that the Anatolian Turks were seduced 
by Ismail. In fact, a relationship had been established by the mid-15
th
 century. Also, 
regardless of their contact with the Safavids, the Qizilbash were not Sunnis and they 
were gradually alienated from the Ottoman imperial regime in social and economic 
terms. Furthermore, this passage also suggests that the Qizilbash saw Ismail as God, 
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his post as Ka’bah, and any visits paid to him as pilgrimage (haj). Finally, they are 
represented as a people with no concept of chastity. Their obedience to the Shah 
reached to such an extent that they were presenting their women to the service of the 
Shah and his men.  
 Many other statements in the Ottoman histories imply that the Anatolian Turks 
betrayed the Ottomans by allying with the Safavids against the Ottoman political 
authority. Ismail’s first meeting with the Qizilbash in Erzincan is commented-upon 
by Kemalpaşazâde as: “Wherever there are dissolute people, seditious and 
unbelieving, proud of their faith, they became subject to the malignant Shah, coming 
together in Erzincan.”401 Accordingly, Şükrî depicts the Qizilbash-Safavid 
cooperation one of deceit and coercion: “He initiated the fight, saying I am Mahdi, 
made Turks worship himself. He became Murshid and made people prostrate 
himself..." Şükrî also records that Ismail tempted the people toward mischief.402 
 
4.3.5.   Ottoman Piety versus Qizilbash Heresy and Deviance 
 
Religious imagery regarding the Qizilbash is especially important, as the 
historians made extensive use of religious rhetoric in describing them. According to 
the narratives, the Qizilbash religion was nothing but heresy, deviating from the true 
path of Islam to which Ottomans adhered—Sunnism. But the roots of the conflict 
between the Qizilbash and the Ottoman central authority were not only religious; 
they were also political, social and economic. Condemning their beliefs was the most 
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effective means to justify Selim’s anti-Qizilbash acts using such narrative portrayals. 
Furthermore, according to the Islamic law, the only way to justify war against 
Muslim rivals would be to accuse them of heresy and deviation from the core 
Islam.
403
 
 To understand how Ottoman historians explained the Qizilbash religion, I will 
first probe how they positioned the Self, i.e., being Ottoman, within the Islamic 
world. As I have stated, the Sunni identity of the Ottoman Empire intensified in the 
16
th
 century, a result of the conquest of Islamic holy lands and the emergence of the 
Qizilbash threat. The Ottoman sultan was now not only a gazî, fighting against the 
infidelity and heresy in the Islamic frontiers but also a caliph, the successor to the 
Prophet.
404
 Another important factor in consolidating the Sunni identity relates to the 
establishment of Safavid state. For the authors of the Ottoman chronicles, many of 
Sunni scholars, mystics, artists and merchants took refuge in Ottoman lands. Upon 
Selim’s orders thousands were brought from Tabriz.405 In the following decades, they 
contributed in significant ways to the consolidation of Sunni culture in the Ottoman 
Empire.    
 The Islamic character of the state became increasingly apparent by the early 
16
th
 century. Thus, claims of legitimacy were now not enough to describe the self. In 
his legitimizing efforts, Lütfi Paşa succinctly explains how the Ottomans legitimized 
their rule through Islamic terminology. According to Lütfi Paşa, some Sunni 
Muslims, worthy of the throne owing to their pure and uncontaminated religion, had 
                                                             
403
 Caroline Finkel, Rüyadan İmparatorluğa Osmanlı, tr. Zülal Kılıç (İstanbul: Timaş Basım, 2007), p. 
94.  
404
 Colin Imber, “Ottoman Dynastic Myth,” p. 11. 
405
 Celalzâde, p. 383, Kemalpaşazâde, p. 122, Edâ’i, p. 96. In the Selimnâme of Edâ’i, Selim’s order is 
given: “God, with his all generosity, granted me the throne of Anatolian and Iranian lands. The whole 
country is ours. But they are the dwellers. Let them live in rightness and contentment.”405  
129 
 
risen since the Prophet and the four Orthodox caliphs. Among these pure Muslims, 
were the Seljuks, who paved the way to the Ottomans. Lütfi Paşa saw other states 
straying from the righteous path as küfran-ı nime (ungrateful), as they showed 
ingratitude to the religion sent by God.
406
 Lütfi Paşa adds that it was known that 
some early Muslim rulers, including some of Abbasid, Buyids and Fatımid rulers, 
were actually rafızi (heretic). In some states, such as Gaznavids and Kharezmis, the 
subjects were the ungrateful, rebelling against their rulers. However, following the 
same path as the Seljuks, the Ottomans refrained from being ungrateful to Islam. In a 
manner similar to that of 15
th
 century chroniclers such as Neşri, Lütfi Paşa also 
claimed that the Ottomans were the rightful heirs of the Seljuks as the Seljuk ruler, 
Alaaddin, granted Ertuğrul the lands where the Ottoman principality was founded.407 
According to his narrative, God gave abundance to the Ottomans’ lives and 
properties because of their preference for true Islam as their religion. Even when the 
Ottomans fought with few men, they became victorious with the help of God. 
Moreover, Lütfi Paşa drew attention to the fact that, especially in the early Ottoman 
period, the sultans were pious people who abstained from drinking alcohol and all 
state-related decisions were made in accordance with the Islamic law in line with 
ulemâ’s recommendations.408  
 Within the books I used for this study, Ottoman sultans were routinely 
portrayed as the representative, or shadow, of God on earth, as well as the protector 
of orthodox Islam against the infidels and heretics. For instance, İdris-i Bitlîsî states 
that the Ottoman state can be differentiated from the other Islamic states through its 
intense struggle with heresy. İdris claims that, after the period of four caliphs, no 
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sultan had fought against the infidels as much as the Ottomans did.
409
 To him, Selim 
was the sultan who limited the lifetime of the Qizilbash or infidels, and protected the 
world with his alertness.
410
 He was also the servant of harameyn (Mecca and 
Medina), removing the heresy and impiety of the people of obstinacy with his 
mace.
411
 
 I shall now examine the Ottoman perception of the Qizilbash religion. Above 
all, it is good to know that Ottoman historians deliberately do not use pejorative 
expressions when they mention the Safaviyye Sufi order. They praise the early period 
of the order since thought that it was a Sunni order, while stating that it was Cüneyd, 
the grandfather of Ismail, who twisted the order into a “heretic” one. As I stated 
above, contemporary scholars do not agree about the religious nature of the early 
Safaviyye order, and its Shi’ite versus Sunni basis. However, there is no doubt that 
16
th
 century Ottoman historians tend to accept the order as inherently Sunni. 
Celalzâde describes Şeyh Safiyeddin, the founder of the Safavid order, as “…an 
eminent person at the rank of sainthood from the Ardabil dynasty, who possessed the 
knowledge of religious sciences.”412 İdris also employs positive rhetoric when 
writing about the early times of the order. He remarks that the sheikhs of Ardabil 
were on the pure path of the Sharia, and that many of naïve Anatolian people were 
their adherents.
413
 Later in his Selimshahnâme, İdris writes that the Safavid order had 
turned to the path of “heresy” three generations before the time of Ismail. That is, 
according to İdris, the order was Sunni prior to the sheikhdom of Cüneyd.414 
Accordingly, when Selim arrived in Tabriz, he ordered the persecution of those who 
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have been adherent to Ismail, his father and grandfather.
415
 According to İdris, 
Ismail’s ancestors (before Cüneyd) were pious men who never delayed their prayers, 
and their piety enabled Ismail to gather so many supporters in Anatolia who later 
granted him the sultanate.
416
 Celalzâde attributes Ismail’s deviation from the 
Prophetic path of his ancestors to his becoming friends with the Turks of Anatolia, 
without any sense of perception.
417
 In sum, the Ottoman historians prefer to make a 
distinction between Safavids before and after Cüneyd. Using such distinction they 
show that Ismail, his father and grandfather, betrayed the religion of their ancestors, 
and so cut their links to a 200-year history. That history was one of the claims of 
legitimacy of their rule.   
 According to the Ottoman historians, the Qizilbash, who deviated from the 
pure path of earlier Safavid sheikhs, did not refrain from violating even the 
fundamental rules of the orthodox Islam. Our sources state that anything forbidden 
by Islam was allowed and legitimate in the religion of the Qizilbash. Furthermore, 
these religiously illicit acts were the most important parts of their religion. In other 
words, the Qizilbash fabricated a new religion by denying the illicitness of their 
behavior. Şükrî reflected this view by stating “They call him Shah Ismail. He has 
grudge against the religion of Islam. Instead, he formulated an invalid wrong 
religion.”418 Among the acts forbidden by religion were disparaging mystics, the 
Prophet’s companions, the four initial caliphs, and even the Prophet himself, 
destroying the mosques, attacking and firing on the graves of important Sunni 
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religious figures, killing Sunnis, drinking alcohol, fornicating and homosexuality. In 
one of his fatwas, Kemalpaşazâde summarized the illegitimate acts as such: 
The unbelievers occupied territories belonging to Sunnis, and they spread their 
invalid religious sect. They damned the three initial caliphs, denying their 
caliphate. They reviled the people of the sciences and the great interpreters of 
Islamic law. They supposed the Shi’ite path of their leader, Ismail, was the 
easiest and most correct path to follow. Shah was the limitless authority in 
religion. According to them, whatever Shah permits is permissible; whatever 
he forbids is forbidden. For example, Shah made it permissible to drink 
alcohol; then they regarded it as permissible. Consequently, there is countless 
number of evil and heretic acts by them.
419
    
 
Emphasizing Safavid deviance Safavids from the religion of their ancestors, İdris 
remarked that the remains of the adherents of the order fell into heresy, pursuing the 
way of the ignorant. He used a verse from the Quran to explain their deviance: “But 
there came after them successors who neglected prayer and pursued desires; so they 
are going to meet evil.”420 They were violators of the religious duties in Islam. In 
another passage, İdris points out that in the religion of Ismail zina (fornication) and 
homosexuality were unhampered; they were even forcing good people to 
homosexuality.
421
  
 Moreover, according to İdris, Ismail considered himself as a descendant of the 
Prophet. Indeed, the Safavid house claimed to trace itself to Ali, and thus to the 
Prophet. Despite this claim, İdris continues, Ismail never hesitates to insult the 
Prophet and his family. İdris explains this contradiction in this way: 
He attributes himself to Fatıma (daughter of the Prophet and the wife of Ali), 
but never feels ashamed from the soul of the Prophet. Prophet would not give 
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consent to this saying of him in the Day of Judgment. He overtly claims of 
imamate. But he does not have the religion neither of Muhammad nor Christ.
422
 
  
Another characteristic of the Qizilbash religious imagery in 16
th
 century 
Ottoman historiography is worship of Ismail as a quasi-divine figure. His adherents 
called him by a number of titles that were actually used by other states as well. For 
example, the Ottoman authors also described the Ottoman sultans with such titles as 
Mehdi-yi sahib-i zaman (Lord of the Age),
423
 zillullah (the shadow of God upon 
Earth),
424
 and el müeyyed min indillah (God-supported). The divine-right of the ruler, 
i.e., the concept that the state had been divinely sanctioned for the order of the 
universe, was not exclusive to the Safavids or Ottomans.
425
 Spiritual authority was a 
Western medieval phenomenon that helped polities to legitimize their rule especially 
in the absence of genealogical legitimacy.
426
 Although Ottoman historians implied 
that what the Sultan says is the manifestation of God himself, Ottoman Sultans were 
never referred explicitly as God.
427
 Ismail presented a different case, however. He 
was not only accepted as reincarnation of Ali but also God’s manifestation in human 
form (tecellî).428 The Ottoman scholars criticize Ismail’s being a God-like stance as a 
sign of heresy. In their critique, they refer with sarcasm to the battle of Çaldıran 
which Ismail lost against Selim. How could a demi-God lose a battle against a 
mortal?
429
 The importance attached by the Qizilbash to their Shah is presented by 
Kemalpaşazâde in the way that Ottoman soldiers were cheering the name of God, the 
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Qizilbash were yelling “Shah.” The implication of this statement is that the Shah’s 
name was more important than the name of God.
430
 Moreover, as far as Lütfi was 
concerned, because he foresaw that he would lose the battle of Çaldıran, Ismail told 
his soldiers that the Twelve Imams (rather than God) would come and save them.
431
  
Religion in Safavid Iran was closely associated with the religious figure of 
the Shah: He was Godhead heir to the crown. An Italian merchant, who visited 
Safavid Iran, explained the religious atmosphere in Persia as one in which: 
The name of God is forgotten. . . and only that of Ismail remembered; if 
someone falls when riding or is dismounted, he appeals to no other God but 
Shiac, using the name in two ways, first as God Shiac, secondly as prophet; 
while the Mussulmans say “laylla, laylla Mahamet resurala,” the Persians say 
“Laylla ylla Ismael veliala”; besides this everyone, and particularly his 
soldiers, consider him immortal, but I have heard that Ismael was not pleased 
with being called either a God nor a Prophet.
432
 
 
Although the Italian merchant says that Ismail was not happy to be considered equal 
or identical to God, a careful examination of his poetry he wrote under the pen name 
Hatayi or “sinner” displays the opposite view. Ismail’s poetry shows that he regarded 
himself as the avatar of God.
433
 In one poem, Ismail wrote of himself: “I am very 
God, very God, very God! Come now, O blind man who has lost the path, behold the 
Truth. I am that Agens Absolutus of whom they speak."
434
 Acceptance of this quasi-
divine character of the Shah Ismail made his religious propaganda widely circulated 
in Anatolia because of the fact that heterodox Turcoman faith possessed beliefs such 
as tenâsüh (reincarnation) and hülul (incarnation). Presenting Shah Ismail in such 
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ways was thus important as Anatolian vernacular Islam attached more importance to 
divine figures than earthly figures such as Bey or Sultan.
435
 
 Interestingly, Ottoman historians mostly refrained from using the word “Shi’a” 
for the religion of the Qizilbash in spite of the fact that Shah Ismail announced 
Twelver Shi’a as the state religion. Some scholars such as Ebussuud even attempt at 
differentiating the Qizilbash religion and Shi’a. He posited that the Safavids were not 
adherents of Shi’a, but received a bit from every heresy.  
 Ottoman histories also mention exaggerated claims concerning the religion of 
the Qizilbash. İdris says that they were Zoroastrians: 
Worshipping the fire that they learnt from the Mugs (The title of the leaders of 
Zoroastrians), the red crown of the Qizilbash appeared like a fire. They wore 
this crown according to the religion of Zoroastrianism. Just like they throw 
Abraham into the fire, Shah Ismail scattered the fire over the world. As he 
deserved to be thrown into the fire, the sultan of religion punished him.
436
  
 
In this passage, İdris implies that the red headdress worn by the Qizilbash 
represented their Zoroastrian beliefs, as red is the color of fire. This accusation of 
İdris, however, was probably a metaphor as there is no other sign of such an 
accusation in other sources. 
 The religious imagery of the Qizilbash in the Ottoman histories is the same as 
in the fatwa collections and anti-Qizilbash polemical literature. Yet Ottoman 
historians directly copy the fatwas of the grand muftis. Even when they do not, they 
still share the argument that Qizilbash religion had strayed from the pure path of 
Islam, which meant they cannot be counted Muslim. Both in fatwas and Ottoman 
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histories, Qizilbash religion is presented as the antithesis of Sunni Islam, in terms of 
religious practices. As is can be seen from abovementioned religious imagery, 
however, the historiographical propaganda barely considered the Qizilbash as 
Shi’ites. As Colin Imber rightly noted, this would discriminate against those who 
never involved in the anti-Ottoman activities and were not adherents of Ismail.
437
 
Instead, the Ottoman chroniclers preferred terms meaning heretics and infidels.   
 
4.3.6    Adjudication: Ratifying the Persecution 
 
Some passages in Ottoman narratives devoted to the endorsement of the 
Qizilbash persecution combine all the imagery mentioned. Employing religious 
discourses, the historians occasionally give their own solutions, while at other times 
they recount the fatwas of muftis. The claims of justification of the war against the 
Qizilbash are mostly derived from religion despite the fact that there were also 
political and economic aspects of the Ottoman-Qizilbash conflict.  
Ottoman historians deemed the Qizilbash religion more dangerous than the 
religions of non-Muslims. The Qizilbash religion was something that might affect the 
masses, and so was considered a threat that could damage the core of Islam. The 
“infidelity” of non-Muslims had nothing to do with Islam. Fighting infidels was a 
common religious duty for a Muslim. Islamic law permits three types of war: 
fighting apostates (mürted), fighting brigands (eşkıyâ or haydût) and fighting rebels 
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(bâgî).438 It seems that, in the eyes of Ottoman historians, all of these causes were 
valid for the Qizilbash case. Accordingly, Ottoman chroniclers interpreted 
elimination of the spreading effect of the Qizilbash “heresy” as a top priority. 
Related discourse also provided justification for fighting against the heretics at all 
costs, as they were thought to embody the three legal reasons for warfare.  
In the Ottoman Empire, only certain muftis were entitled to issue a fatwa on 
specific issues of Islamic law. Thus, when the historians mentioned religious 
adjudication concerning the Qizilbash, they mostly applied these fatwas. For 
example, Celalzâde used the fatwas of muftis to justify war against the Qizilbash as 
follows:  
They pursue a worse and more heretical path than the infidels. The infidel’s sin 
is only the acts of attributing partners to God (şirk), and dirtying the clean 
water of religion. They oppose against the Quran and the Prophet. They want 
to spread the teachings of Bible. They damage and despise the religion of the 
Prophet. Inasmuch as that community (the Qizilbash) is not likely to give up 
the way of heresy, vowing not to do it again, then they are worse and more 
deviant at all points than the sinful infidels, who will go to hell.
439
 
 
Kemalpaşazâde uses similar arguments to declare that that killing heretics in their 
tracks was more valuable than killing the true infidels.
440
 Kemalpaşazâde had himself 
served as Şeyhülislam for eight years (1526-1534) and his fatwas, together with 
those of Hamza and Ebussuud (d. 1574) became references the Ottoman sultans in 
their acts against the Qizilbash. For example, Ebussuud answered the question, “Are 
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those killed by the Qizilbash martyrs?” by saying “Yes, what a great gazâ and what a 
great martyrdom!”441 
İdris first lists possible threats and damage to the Ottoman Empire, and 
concludes that the Qizilbash threat was the most urgent one. Recounting the same 
fatwas of the abovementioned muftis, İdris explains the reasons for their persecution 
as a way to protect “the property and people, and saving the people in Islamic lands 
from their cruelty, and the certainty of their political and religious enmity towards 
the dynasty standing in the post of Islamic caliphate.”442 I should remind that what 
İdris means to say here is exactly the issue of territorialism in Hanafi School of law. 
He accuses the Qizilbash of breaking the tacit contract between the state and the 
subjects. Thus, by referring to this contract, unlike the other historians, İdris offers 
non-religious factors to justify the war and persecution. He continues, noting that all 
the scholars and muftis agree that it was vacib (necessary) to kill the Qizilbash.
443
 
Yet there was no agreement in the 16
th
 century historiography concerning the type of 
such religious duty, namely whether it is vacib or farz (obligatory). For example, 
Kemalpaşazâde says that it is farzı’l-‘ayn, an individual religious obligation, to be 
performed by every Muslim.
444
 In the earliest attempt to define Qizilbash heresy in 
1514, Hamza declared that it was incumbent vacib.
445
  
 İdris explains why this is so using a metaphoric way of expression, attempting 
to justify such acts because a similar decision had been made following Prophet’s 
death. İdris examines both scriptural and factual proofs respectively: 
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Getting rid of this cruel and sinful community is more important than fighting 
with the infidels, the French and the Tatars. This is because in the law of pious 
sultans and in the tradition of şeriat şiarlı sultan (the sultan acting according to 
Islamic law), following the morals and manners of the four initial caliphs and 
pursuing the styles of the pathfinder imams is the rightest ways to follow. All 
of the four caliphs report that after the passing away of the Prophet, they found 
it truer and more appropriate to attack first Müseyleme-i Kezzab, the fake 
Prophet, and his troops by asking for advice from Ebubekir, Ömer, Osman and 
Ali. Actually, upon the death of the Prophet, it has been decided to capture 
Damascus and to fight with the real infidels and the Kaisers of Rum. But they 
now backdated the fight with those who claim to be the new Prophet.
446
 
 
Then he explains the factual proof as follows:  
With the agreement of the muftis, it is more important to get rid of the civil and 
religious enemy, than to get rid of the foreign enemy. For informed members 
of the army, to get rid of the opponents is the one of two seeds. That is because 
healing one single disease from the body of earthman is easier than healing a 
more complicated disease going around people.
447
 
 
As can be seen from the second passage, according to Idris, killing Qizilbash was 
militarily reasonable and necessary. If it were not considered urgent, their heresy 
might have spread over the huge masses of Anatolia. Now, both the muftis and the 
commanders were in an agreement about the urgent elimination of the Qizilbash. 
According to İdris, religious sedition could be eliminated with the proofs of 
the Quran. Civil sedition could be removed by the sword of heroism. It was the 
agreement of religious scholars that when these two seditions came together, as in 
the case of the Qizilbash, it would be of top priority to fight against them.
448
 İdris 
says that their biggest sin was to insistently deny Islam. The scriptural proof was a 
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verse from the Quran: “And whoever exchanges faith for disbelief has certainly 
strayed from the soundness of the way.”449 
İdris-i Bitlîsî also explained the necessity of fighting the Qizilbash. As is 
known, he played a prominent role in delivering Kurdish support to the Ottoman 
struggle against the Qizilbash. Following the battle of Çaldıran, the Ottoman army 
and Kurds fought together to take back the eastern provinces. However, as they 
waited in the castle of Diyarbekir, a disagreement between the Kurdish lords and the 
Ottoman beys emerged. The Ottoman beys preferred to stay in the castle and the 
Kurdish beys insisted on continuing the war. At this point in his narrative, İdris lists 
six drawbacks to delaying the battle as demanded by the Ottoman beys. First, it was 
an opposition to the divine order as it appeared in the verse: “Strive in the cause of 
God.”450 Second, it was in conflict with the command of the Sultan, and thus to the 
order of God in the Quran: “Obey those in authority among you.”451 Third, avoidance 
of fighting while soldiers were waiting may be perceived as negligent and timid. 
Fourth, the Ottoman sultans could not have fallen behind their ancestors’ braveness 
in warfare. Fifth, the Sultan seemed primed for the duty of removing the Qizilbash. 
Finally, waiting there with nothing would increase prices and then lead to scarcity.  
As discussed above, many Ottoman scholar-historians agreed on the 
persecution of the Qizilbash was religiously permissible. Ebussuud’s fatwa, however, 
reminds us that there were some concerns about Shah Ismail’s claim to be a 
descendant of the Prophet that is there could be some hesitation in killing them. In 
his answer to a question whether it would still be legal to kill them if he was the 
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descendant of the Prophet, Ebussuud attempts to prove that Ismail was not a 
descendant of the Prophet. 
 This perception of the Qizilbash issue is also depicted in the letters of Ogier 
Ghiselin de Busbecq. Busbecq wonders in his correspondence with Rüstem Paşa (d. 
1561), the Grand Vizier of Süleyman I, “What right have they (Ottomans and 
Safavids) to wage war against one another, when they are bound by religious ties?” 
In his reply, Rüstem Paşa says “I assure you that we abhor the Persians and regard 
them as more unholy than we regard you Christians.”452  
In the adjudication about the Qizilbash, there were some mübah (permissible) 
things as well. For example, Sâdeddin states that plundering their slaves and 
odalisques was permissible.
453
 According to the fatwa of Kemalpaşazâde, it was not 
licit to marry their men or women. Their country was darü’l-harb (the abode of war 
or non-Muslims). All of their children were bastards. Whatever animals they 
slaughtered were not halal and couldn’t be eaten. If someone wore the börk (the red 
headdress) special to his or her iman (faith) was doubted: It was clearly a sign of 
heresy and denial.
454
 Plundering their properties, women and children were halal. If a 
man gave up this deviant way and became Muslim, he becomes free. If he did not, 
what he deserved was the sword.
455
  
As suggested by Sâdeddin’s account, the legality of Selim’s marrying 
Ismail’s wife to Tacizâde Cafer Çelebi was still an issue in the later 16th century 
when Sâdeddin wrote his work. Sâdeddin explores the question in this way:  
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He made this decision by conferring with the scholars. Why not? Also, they 
have no religious marriage contract. Their marriage is mut’ah marriage 
[temporary or short term]. They often live together without a marriage contract. 
It is a widespread rumor that especially the impertinent Shah Ismail was getting 
everyone’s home and harassing their privates disgustingly. Yet Ismail liked and 
married that woman (Ismail’s wife) when she was the wife of one of his 
commanders.
456
 
 
 
Sâdeddin attempted to justify an act of Selim by emphasizing that the Qizilbash 
marriage contract was not legal in religious law. So, their wives could be married to 
anyone.  
 
The result of these adjudications was the immediate persecution of the 
Qizilbash. The edicts, ordering this persecution wherever the Qizilbash were found, 
were sent to the provinces.
457İdris states that the number of the persecuted exceeded 
40,000 and adds that whoever deviated on his or her path from God would be killed 
by the sword of God.
 458
 
 
4.4.   Conclusion 
 
 By focusing on the Ottoman social, cultural and religious perceptions of the 
Qizilbash in the 16
th
 century Ottoman historiography, I have shown that those 
perceptions, as a product of Ottoman early modern literary culture, had a political 
purpose. They legitimized acts of the past, established the position of the Qizilbash 
within the Empire, and justified its foreign policy towards Iran in later relations. In 
doing so, the lifestyles, cultures and religions came under harshest criticism of the 
Ottoman historians, rather than the political threat they posed. This allowed the 
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scholars to define their own identity by defining the Qizilbash identity. In addition to 
describing detailed passages concerning facets of the Qizilbash imagery, I have also 
discussed ways the historians narrated the battle of Çaldıran by drawing comparisons 
between two armies, and how they perceived Selim’s occupation of Tabriz, which 
lasted only eight days, as transition from hell into paradise glorified by the coming of 
the Ottoman sultan. By investigating these two events, I have argued that 16
th
 
century Ottoman historians did not only narrate the recent past, but also justified the 
act of war against the Qizilbash, which was still a possibility and, sometimes, an 
actual threat for the Ottoman dynasty during the 16
th
 century as they wrote their 
works.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
144 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 Starting with the mid-15th century, the Ottoman began to evolve from a tribal 
organization into a bureaucratic state. Centralization consolidated the power of 
central authority. With the growing needs of a geographically large and socially 
diverse state, it was no longer only a regional power, but an empire with new 
identities, such as the successor of the Byzantine Empire and the center of the 
Islamic caliphate.  
The developments, however, were implemented at the expense of the 
Turcoman nomadic tribes, known as the Qizilbash since the end of the 15
th
 century. 
Those heterodox Turcomans had played a fundamental role in the initial period of the 
Empire. Owing to their nomadic lifestyle, their position became degraded socially 
and economically. Furthermore, in the early 16
th
 century serious natural disasters 
also contributed to a deteriorating level of subsistence for the Qizilbash. With the late 
15
th
 century rise of the Safavid house in Iran, the presence of the Qizilbash began to 
challenge the Ottoman political authority through their religious and political links to 
those Safavid leaders. Upon their migrations to Iran, they became the main human 
source of the Safavid army, as well as the state.  
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I argue that the Qizilbash threat that challenged the Ottoman political 
authority in the early 16
th
 century became central to the Ottoman historical writing as 
early as circa 1514, when Selim pursued anti-Qizilbash policies. My thesis 
considered the pejorative views of the Qizilbash Ottoman historical narratives 
created as a response to this threat. Hence, my main argument is that, by casting the 
Qizilbash as the Other, and with the circulation and revision to the sources 
throughout Ottoman history, the boundaries of Ottoman self-identity became shaped 
as well. Relying on these well-shaped identities, and bolstered by the conquest of the 
Holy lands in Arabia, the Ottomans assumed the duty of representatives and 
protectors of Sunni orthodox Islam; the Qizilbash was presented as “heretics” cursed 
by God and deviants from the true faith. I have also argued that this anti-Qizilbash 
discourse justified acts of war, as it incorporated many reasons why Selim should 
waged a war against them. This justification became a core and basis in Ottoman 
relations with the Qizilbash in later periods.  
In this study, I have used a sampling of chronicles and war diaries written in 
the 16
th
 century, as well as another special genre: corpus of Selimnâme literature. 
This literature first emerged in the final years of Selim’s reign but most of the works 
were written during the reign of Süleyman (1520–1566). In a sense, this increasingly 
historiographical activity aimed to shape and edit the near past and also to project the 
future despite the limitedness of its audience. Its appearance was a phenomenon of 
the age of Süleyman, who wanted to clear his father’s name, an age when the 
imperial image of the Ottoman Empire was consolidated to a significant extent. 
Süleyman’s reign was marked by the projection of the self-identity. Editing the 
recent past, which was incorporated with his father’s hostility toward the Qizilbash, 
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not only produced an official history of the reign of Selim, but also legitimized 
Süleyman’s own rule as his lineage could be cleared from any illegitimate acts.  
In the third chapter, I examined the civil war between Bayezid and his sons 
through the eyes of Ottoman historians, with a special emphasis on the role of the 
Qizilbash problem in the struggle for the throne and also the image of the Qizilbash 
rebels who exploited the dynastic conflict in the empire. The period of civil war 
(1509–1513), was the best-documented era for the sources of my study. Therefore, I 
chose to analyze the Ottoman perception of the Qizilbash through a close analysis of 
this period. I described the Qizilbash threat as the most important determinant in the 
struggle to achieve the throne, and one that helped Selim to do so. In addition, the 
historians’ narration of the civil war is a good example of the historiographical 
attempt at legitimization. Within the context of the Qizilbash issue, the Ottoman 
historians attempted to explain why Selim was the righteous candidate for the throne. 
He possessed the great skills of a sultan, and nobody could change the destiny of 
God.  
As I have discussed in the third chapter, Selim’s deposition of his father was a 
matter of rumor during and after the reign of Selim. Bayezid was the legitimate 
Sultan and the Sultans were to rule until their death in the Ottoman Empire. To 
abdicate a sultan was a dangerous step no one dared to take until Selim. Selim forced 
his father to abdicate the throne using the urgency of the Qizilbash threat. This was 
the only example of a sultan’s enthronement by deposing his father throughout the 
whole Ottoman history. Selimnâmes even written during the reign of Selim explicitly 
acknowledge that Selim’s action was considered unacceptable even during the reign 
of Selim. One of the main motivations of the Selimnâme authors was to reshape the 
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past with an attempt at justifying Selim’s dangerous act, which was considered by 
some more against his father, a ruling sultan. 
As seen, these works possessed a propagandist nature and a political purpose. 
As I argued in the introduction chapter of this study, they were politically motivated 
accounts whose authenticity should be questioned. Therefore, they should not be 
taken as a real record of events as they were not necessarily telling the truth because 
of their propagandist nature. This is why the purpose of this study was not to discuss 
how true the accounts of Ottoman historians when they narrated events. As I stated 
earlier, the political history of Selim’s reign has been studied by modern historians to 
a certain extent. However, nobody was interested in the Qizilbash image in the 
Selimnâme literature. For this reason, I attempted to show the propagandist nature of 
the Selimnâmes and some other supporting sources, which reported about the 
Qizilbash events by defining the Qizilbash as an opposite image to the Ottoman self-
identification.  
With this aim, in the fourth chapter, I analyzed the social, cultural and 
religious aspects of the perception of the Qizilbash in 16
th
 century Ottoman 
historiography. This was a pejorative image that helped shape Ottoman identity. 
Without doubt, being Ottoman was equal to being Muslim, at least against the 
external non-Muslim enemies. Before the 16
th
 century, Ottoman sultans were largely 
holy warriors who fought infidels for the religion of Islam. Indeed, in the early 
period of Ottoman statehood, there was no need for any definition of the other except 
as the outside enemy. However, as a response to the increasing Qizilbash threat in 
the 16
th
 century, a more Sunni-minded religious discourse developed. The political 
need to portray the Other (i.e., the Qizilbash) as infidels required a portrayal of the 
self as pious Sunni Muslim. As I have shown, the incorporation of the Islamic holy 
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lands (Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem) was also effective in the consolidation of 
orthodoxy in the Ottoman Empire.    
In this study, I also demonstrated that the Ottoman historians presented the 
Qizilbash threat as more serious than any other political or religious threat. 
Politically, it had the potential to spread throughout the empire, through hidden anti-
Ottoman propaganda. Religiously, in contrast to non-Muslims the Qizilbash regarded 
themselves as part of Islam and thus could damage the core of “True Islam.” As Aslı 
Ergül has stated, non-Muslims could be accepted as minorities living under the 
umbrella of Islam with a zımmi status, and they would not be disturbed as long as 
they met the fiscal and social expectations of the state. But the official stance against 
the Qizilbash, who were considered as an internal threat to the safety and security of 
the state, solidified through the anti-Qizilbash discourse, which constitutes the bulk 
of this study.
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Furthermore, I suggested that the Ottoman historians made a great effort to 
direct their hostility towards the Safavids, or the Qizilbash, by excluding the region 
of Iran from their criticism. In fact, the 16
th
 century observed an increase in the 
intellectual and cultural exchange between Iranian and Ottoman lands, especially a 
result of the exile of Sunni scholars fleeing Safavid Iran. Persian influence on the 
Ottoman literature and historiography thus greatly increased as well. All of the 
historians refer to pre-Islamic Iranian mythical kings in their eulogy of the Ottoman 
sultans, as part of a literary tradition of their time. The Sufi culture, the early period 
of the Safeviyye included, was praised by Ottoman historians as well. But, according 
to them, the Safavid, or Qizilbash, rule in Iran ruined all of the beauties of this 
country.  
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The results of this identity discourse should be examined in terms of the 
position of Anatolian Turcomans and the Ottoman-Safavid relations in later 
centuries. With this well-defined anti-Qizilbash discourse, the persecution of 
Anatolian Turcomans continued throughout the 16
th
 century. They were under 
pressure of the central authority. These persecutions can be observed from mühimme 
registers, published by historians such as Ahmed Refik, Colin Imber and Saim Savaş. 
As a result, those who were not persecuted developed strategies—including 
migration to Iran and conformation with the Bektashi, an urban religious order 
accepted by the Ottoman central authority. Also, abandoning the strict attitude of his 
father, Süleyman pursued a more balanced policy towards Iran. But the Ottoman 
perception of the Safavids has always remained as the hostile one generated in the 
16
th
 century.  
Anti-Qizilbash polemical discourse caused another phenomenon that the 
position of Sunni religious orders such as the Halvetî and Nakshibendî consolidated. 
Prominent leaders of those orders fled from their former heartlands in Iran. Their 
migration to the Ottoman territories occurred because Safavid rulers were 
orchestrating anti-Sunni persecutions in their territories.
460
 Thus, the influence of 
Sunni orders spread over Anatolia. Along with Bektashi sect, which possessed a 
heterodox character, they were supported by the state through waqf lands. After 
Mehmed II’s confiscation of the waqf lands belonging mostly to heterodox tekkes 
(dervish lodge), these regions were returned to the orthodoxy. However, it is certain 
that the quantities of land granted to Sunni orthodox tekkes increased during the 
consolidation of Sunni orthopraxy in the Ottoman Empire. The Bektashi order may 
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be considered as the most obvious exception to this. The intimate relationship 
between the state and the Bektashis can be traced to the Ottoman desire to isolate the 
Qizilbash as a rural, heterodox folk cult, while Bektashis were incorporated into the 
system as a canonical urban variety of heterodox Islam that conformed to the state. 
Another factor easing the institutionalization of the Bektashi sect is that it was 
embraced by the Janissary corps as their official order.
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A final point concerns my analysis of the Ottoman discourse on the Qizilbash 
using the ways this discourse was reflected in the works of certain Ottoman 
historians. There is no doubt that such an approach neglects other parts of the story, 
for example the Qizilbash perception of the Ottoman administration and the sultan. 
Although we have more limited sources to answer this question, it is possible to 
develop an approximate answer. A quatrain reflecting this perception and the 
psychology of the Qizilbash was written by the Qizilbash poet Pir Ali:  
Osmanlı yanına kalır mı sandın 
Nice intikamlar alınsa gerek  
Mehdi çıkar ise nic’olur halin 
Heybetli küsleri çalınsa gerek.462 
 
O Ottoman! Did you think that you would get away with what you did 
Many revenges should be taken 
What if Mahdi comes 
Kettledrums should be played. 
  
This and many other poems written by sympathizers of Qizilbash or Shah Ismail, like 
Pir Sultan Abdal, a 16
th
 century poet who lived in Sivas, invite further research about 
the perception of Qizilbash towards the Ottomans.  
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